CROZER QUARTERLY

Volume XXV OCTOBER, 1948 Number 4

OUR HERITAGE AND OUR FUTURE

KENNARD NOTTINGHAM WARE

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

WE ARE LIVING in an era of acute crises. The twentieth century was hailed as a harbinger of peace and plenty. It has not yet reached the mid-century mark and our civilization has sustained two catastrophes—each surpassing in bloody fury anything theretofore recorded in the history of man. Signs multiply that the third and climactic disaster is rapidly developing—a third world war in which our very survival is at stake.

These imperious challenges to man and his ways require a basic reappraisal of our faith—an interrogation of our souls.

The great distinction between man and the rest of the animate world is that he alone can imaginatively transcend the life processes in which he is involved and see their direction and trend. With the insight thus gained, he may creatively interpose his will to emphasize, curb, or modify the forces which are shaping his destiny. To be profitably exercised the transcendent mind must intelligently appraise the forces which it would shape.

Let us attempt such an appraisal.

In our cultural heritage there are two major elements which form the very warp and woof of the social, intellectual, and religious fabric of our lives—the Hebraic and the Hellenic. Plato tells us that the state is the individual writ large and thus gives a double significance to the vast canvas of the *Republic*. If we may borrow the Master's figure, we may say that the great body of literature which constitutes the Old Testament and the equally great body of Hellenic literature, represent on enormous canvases a depiction of two great forces which struggle in the hearts and minds of every thinking man today. These two cultures are great protagonists whose orchestration has constituted the music and also the discord of Western history. They have warred, fused, and dissolved; but they each represent an essential factor in our minds and souls, both on the larger canvas of the state and on the smaller but more numerous canvases of individual souls. Need we give examples? Let one of each suffice. St. Francis of Assisi may serve an an exemplar of one

and Aristotle of the other. The whole roll call of the immortals could be summoned on one side or the other; or let us fuse them in St. Augustine or St. Thomas Aquinas, the one a Christian Platonist and the other a Christian Aristotelian with Platonic overtones. On the larger canvas let us cite the failure of each force when not balanced by the other by referring to the sophistic sterility so painfully manifest in the post-Augustan phases of Roman culture and the equally sterile but blood-drenched orgies of religious zealotry which have erupted with volcanic fury intermittently from Constantine to the Thirty Years War.

We have spoken in generalities about two great forces which war in our very souls and which are manifest on the larger canvas of history. Let us follow Plato, even though it be a long way off, and choose the larger canvas, for it is far easier than to attempt to probe the human soul with our clumsy forceps.

When the prophet Zechariah cried out, "Thy sons, O Zion, against thy sons, O Greece," it was a battle cry, a call to arms and to the bloody arbitrament of a social and cultural war between Hellenic culture and Hebraic religion. Each represented the end product of a long evolution resulting from primitive antecedents which were, perhaps, not essentially different. At some distant bifurcation of the road which leads from primitive savagery to a mature culture, the ancestors of the Greeks began to emphasize one of two basic attitudes and the Hebrews another. The Greeks took the humanistic road and the Hebrews the theistic. There was, of course, no such clear-cut choice. All primitive people are surrounded by forces with which they must make terms or die; some of these forces are uniform and recurrent, and man has but to adjust himself to them as best he may. They present no problem but adjustment to the inevitable. If you throw a spear, it hits the mark at which it is accurately aimed. If you drop a stone, it falls. There is no mystery and no problem. You are merely dealing with certainties. The known is, however, a narrow patch of light by a camp fire in the night, and the surrounding darkness is everywhere beyond the fringe of radiance. The food supply is capricious; fire, flood, famine, and disease threaten extinction. There is a constant struggle to control the environment, to make peace with hostile forces by magic and by propitation. An animistic stage is eventually reached in which it is assumed that everything is guided and controlled by more or less anthropomorphic deities—they are originally manifold and mostly malevolent. *Pari passu* with the development of society the nature of the supernatural exfoliates according to a general pattern but with marked variations. As tribes and societies became more clearly articulated, precisely defined and integrated, they acquire tutelary gods with whom the tribe maintains a well-defined

reciprocal relationship. In return for sacrifice, praise, and prayer the gods protect the tribe. Thus rites of propitiation mixed with rites of sympathetic magic develop gradually into a ritual which in time becomes stereotyped if the people is successful and prosperous. Meantime the circle of light which represents the known and controllable widens empirically from observation and common sense. There was, perhaps, a big catch of fish which could not be immediately consumed. The rotting fish caused a lush growth of corn—and fertilizer was discovered. There was a gradual discovery of recurrence in astronomical phenomena. Thus there was a steady enlarging of the light circle of the known as against the unknown and a gradual increase in human ability to meet unknown contingencies—a rough medicine developed, more weatherproof dwellings, better means of defense and offense, an increasing superiority to beasts of prey, and a larger domestication and use of animals for food, clothing, and services.

The course of development in the Hebrew line of descent was dominantly religious in character while that of the Greek became increasingly rationalistic. Both Hebrew and Greek at all stages of development were religious and rationalistic, but whether from natural endowment or from environmental pressure or both, the Hebrew became progressively more absorbed in religion, while the Greek was devoting his powers more and more to enlarging his understanding and control of nature and of the forces by which he was surrounded.

Let us take first the Hebrew fork of the road.

The record of the spiritual pilgrimage of Israel is found in that great body of literature known as the Bible—that fabulous book which has sometimes thrown a healing light and at others a baleful glare over Western culture for nearly two thousand years and itself is the product of a thousand years of development and agony. The Bible! Until recent years it was the most read and the least understood collection of books the world has ever known. Now it is much less read and much better understood. To a mind unblinded by traditions and enlightened by the cumulative scholarship of the past hundred and fifty years it is the most fascinating book in the world. It is a book of horrors and of healing. It is the autobiography of a tortured people—a people whose soul was seared and tempered in the crucible of history; a small people surrounded by great empires which were as an upper and a nether millstone that ground the wheat of Israel into white bread. But many of the loaves were burned and the flavor thereof was exceeding bitter.

There never was a literature so in need of critical exegesis. One who picks up the Old Testament and plunges unaided into its fantastic and turbid depths will find a great deal to shock and horrify a sensitive

soul, but will, as he proceeds, arrive unexpectedly upon beautiful and moving stories, very poignant poetry, the majesty and beauty of holiness and the whole gamut of human emotions from the tender story of Ruth to the horrible cruelties of a tyrannous, vindictive, and childish God, but a God who is growing with the spiritual growth of his people, for he is the soul of Israel writ large.

Out of the agonies of this strange people Israel have come forth great wisdom and deep understanding. The story rightly understood is the most moving in the world's experience. Enormous heat and pressure is required to transform carbon into diamonds. So wisdom and understanding, it seems, can come only from human suffering and sorrow which so chasten the spirit that it becomes in a sense divine. At least it attains an inwardness of feeling, a perception and understanding that breaks down the barriers of subjectivity and individualism. The sufferings, the spiritual and physical crucifixion of this ancient people, gave rise to the concept of the suffering servant of God and ultimately to the vision on Calvary—a human-divine encounter which represents the climax of human experience and will forever enrich the spirit.

The Hebrews, subjected as they were to repeated and overwhelming catastrophes, evolved their ethics, morality, and religious views in the course of a desperate attempt to understand and comply with the demands of a capricious God, himself a reflex of their fluctuating fortunes. Yahweh had chastened them with fire, the sword, drought, and plague—obviously they had displeased him and he must be appeased. In desperation they searched their minds and hearts to determine the nature of the offenses for which they were scourged and the proper means for atonement. Various theories were developed. Yahweh had made a covenant or series of covenants whereby in return for his protection his people would worship him alone and seek to do his will. This covenant had been breached by the worship of the agricultural fertility gods, and Yahweh, a jealous god, was afflicting them for their apostasy. The Deuteronomist movement developed a whole literature in support of this theory in which they largely rewrote the political and religious history of the people to prove the thesis that apostasy was the cause of Yahweh's consuming anger. In 621 B.C. some of these writings, ostensibly dating from the time of Moses, were providentially "found" and were accepted and promulgated by the ardent young King Josiah. There ensued a drastic religious revolution in which the false gods and their prophets were "purged" and the worship of Yahweh centralized in Jerusalem. Despite the thoroughgoing nature of this atonement and the complete dedication of the young king to the cause of Yahweh, the expected change did not eventuate. The power of Yahweh did not pro-

tect his neophyte from the spears of the Egyptians, and the tide of battle swept over the young king's bloody corpse.

In desperation the Hebrew devised the most elaborate and punctilious ritual of sacrifice, praise, and prayer. One cannot read the extant records without amazement.

Most important of all the answers which arose from the anguished souls of Yahweh's people was that provided by the great prophetic movement. So powerful, so great, so profound was this movement and so immeasurably important the enrichment of the spirit that flowed and still flows from it, that it seems almost sacrilegious to dismiss it in a few paragraphs.

The major prophets (Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah) were men of great emotional intensity, and out of the crucible of their anguished souls poured forth the pure gold of spiritual insight which can apparently be fashioned in no other way. These prophets denounce the ritualistic niceties and the blood-splattered sacrificial altars with which the priestly hierarchy sought to appease an offended God. They rebuked the prevalent lust, greed, and corruption, proclaiming that only a pure heart and a contrite spirit abounding in justice and kindness to even the lowliest would avail. Through these teachings Yahweh reached the full stature to which he was evolving through the centuries. The still small voice at last was heard—more profound and moving than all the cursings, plagues and scourings, the thunderbolts, the earthquakes and the mighty ragings.

We are all familiar with the great and revolutionary utterances of the prophets. We also know that the prophetic visions were not fulfilled —that power politics, greed and corruption were not materially lessened. But the answer was nevertheless of the greatest significance. The still small voice was never completely drowned by the clash and tumult of the stormy world in which it was born or by the subsequent catastrophies which overwhelmed Israel. Also the bloody sacrifices, the curses, and the ritualism continued to flourish. But the prophetic insight continued to nourish choice spirits and was, perhaps, the most important element in the soil out of which Jesus of Nazareth grew.

Let us now attempt a bird's eye view of the terrain traversed by the Hellenic fork of the cultural road and note its typical flora and fauna.

One thing we immediately note—the atmosphere is clearer. There is no vested priesthood and no major theological teaching which must be established and defended at all cost—and no jealous god continuously posing riddles which must be correctly answered at the hazard of existence itself. Greece was geographically exceedingly defensible and was only once in the period of its *floruit* seriously threatened by a great power.

That threat was triumphantly overcome in a striking demonstration of their intrinsic superiority to the surrounding world, the "barbaroi." This triumph did much to build up their confidence in their power to shape and control destiny, and it ushered in a period of triumphant humanism. The light around the campfire, as they flung on fresh fagots, seemed to flood the world. It is in this radiance that we still live, although we are increasingly aware of its limitations.

The Greek genius was not for religion—they were not God-intoxicated like the Hebrews. But they were not devoid of religion. Religion is too important in the culture of any people to be by-passed. We must, therefore, pause briefly to characterize it and taste its flavor.

The religion of the Greek expressed his sense of being at home in the world. The gods were bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh—they were neither transcendent nor all-powerful. They were, as time went on, increasingly content to mind their own affairs and let the Greeks mind theirs. "So it was," we are told, "that the Greeks prayed, neither prostrate in the dust like the Oriental, nor kneeling with bowed head like the Christians, but with uplifted face and outstretched hands. In the divine presence they behaved as Kipling tells us the souls of the heroes behave:

'And they rise to their feet as He passes by, gentlemen unafraid.'"[1]

The Hebrew idea of the awful, blinding majesty of the God of Sinai would have appeared barbarous and offensive to the Greek. His gods, like their worshipers, were convivial and friendly, and their festivals the occasion for happy feasting. Their cult was humanistic and warm. But Greek religion did not grow with the growth of the people. A people never completely outgrows religion, even if the religion is not a worthy one. But as the Greeks grew more sure of themselves, they relied more and more upon their own powers and less and less upon a reciprocal relationship with the divine.

In a sense it may be said that the Greek discovered the human mind. Certainly he discovered it as an instrument of precision. He was the first rationalist. The body of knowledge accumulated by the oriental peoples, whose entry upon the stage of history preceded that of the Greek by so many centuries, was empirical. They had skills, crafts, and technical aptitudes. They had knowledge of many facts but did not have a higly developed, self-critical, organic body of knowledge. That which most sharply distinguishes the Greek from the barbarian is his ability to perceive clearly, to analyze, to draw comparisons, to reach conclusions, and to organize and develop these conclusions into coherent self-consistent patterns. He discovered the joy of pure thought quite apart

[1] B. A. G. Fuller, *History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. I, pp. 31 f.

from the possibility of a later application to the so-called useful arts. It is characteristic that the Greek should take Egyptian forms of measurement and create the abstract, highly analytical science of plane and solid geometry. Most characteristic of all is the development of logic which is a technique for accurate, analytical thinking.

The Greek discovered or even created a world of order where he found chaos. There gradually dawned on him as a goal for achievement the impressment of form upon a chaotic world of recalcitrant matter. Chaos and infinity were horrible concepts whose only virtue was their inherent possibility of growing by human or divine ministration into gracious and revealing "Forms," and their great genius was devoted to the realization of the possibilities of shaping the gross material of experience into forms manifesting increasing insight and beauty. Virtue *(aretē)* was the realization of the utmost possibility inherent in any given subject matter, human or material, when acted upon by the most refined skill of the particular craft involved. "Goodness," perfection indeed, was more technical than moral. Balance, moderation, proportion, harmony, grace, the mean, *i.e.*, neither too much nor too little—these were the goals of their thought and their technique, and how amazingly they succeeded in the achievable goals which they set themselves. Mathematics, music, architecture, scuplture, drama, poetry, philosophy—everything the Greek touched was endowed with harmony, grace, and proportion. Their idealized portrait statues are calm, serene, and balanced. Their sculptured Cromwells have no warts. Their athletes, even when throwing a discus or launching a javelin, have no bulging muscles nor distorted faces. Their temples glitter in the clear, bright sunlight of Hellas in serene and balanced perfection. They have no soaring spires or minarets symbolizing an uneasy and unappeasable aspiration after things formless and unattainable. Yes, perfection is the Greek virtue and the Greek limitation.

All Greek works are works of art which are perfect and flawless. They challenge the spirit to no new heights. They represent a stasis and demand of us nothing but eternal contemplation. They do not tease the spirit with that which just eludes the grasp and thus beckon the spirit onward.

If we turn to theology and philosophy, we find that they, too, are works of Greek art whose ultimate embodiment is perfection, eternal contemplation, and a divine stasis. Plato's ascending spirals of thought ultimately reach the supreme form from which emanate the lessers forms—each a divine and perfect pattern of which all earthly forms are faint adumbrations which strive vainly, because of the recalcitrance of matter, to approach the heavenly pattern. The ultimate, the heavenly pattern can only be eternally contemplated as the flawless work of art.

Associated with this conception of the perfect heavenly forms or patterns which are imperfectly reproduced in earthly forms, are two other fruitful ideas. One is that the forms are associated in a hierarchy of values, each of which may transcend itself and rise into the next higher order of value or degenerate into a lower form of lesser value. The other idea is the ancient and widespread one of emanation. It seemed clear to ancient thinkers that man was an amazing hybrid sharing the nature of animal life generally, but also having godlike attributes. This was an outgrowth of the primitive conception of a soul which was an impalpable and wraithlike counterpart of the body which might and did leave the body and function independently in dreams and at death continued an independent life for an indefinite term. This relatively immaterial essence was later conceived to be a spark of the divine which had somehow been banished and entombed in the flesh. All the inquietude, unrest, and aspirations of man were in fact the longing of the exiled soul to be reunited to the divine.

The human idea of God evolves like all other human ideas despite the attempts of theologians to freeze it. (Thank God human thought cannot be permanently curbed despite the threat of excommunication, hell fire, the stake, and the gibbet!) So in the course of time the tribal god becomes the god of the universe—a completely transcendent being divested of all anthropomorphic taint, and stripped of any attribute which might warm or strengthen the human soul lost in the immensity of space or in the emptiness of its own humanity. But this God, so perfect and so poor, strangely enough has real power: he has haunted Christian theology and still haunts it.

Let us pause to consider this philosophically postulated Supreme Being a little further.

God is the highest and purest form of mind. He is perfect. Since perfection lacks nothing, it would be a contradiction in terms for God to desire or will. It is thus unthinkable that he should directly act upon matter. What, then, is the connection between God and the world? The answer is typically Hellenic. His effect upon the world results from the yearning contemplation of the divine by all lower forms. This causes the motion of the heavenly bodies and all sublunar motion. Again we have the contemplation of perfection, *i.e.,* of the perfect work of art. One thinks in this context of St. John's "Ecce Homo": Behold and contemplate the Divine Man *(theios anthrōpos)* and be moved by his perfection; and also one thinks of the haunting words of Saint Augustine: "Inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te," again a call to the contemplation of divine perfection.

But there was also the Logos doctrine. The Logos is divine

thought implemented by will and with the power to affect matter. The Logos is an emanation from God. Just how an emanation can have qualities, characteristics, and capacities not found in that from which it emanates is not clear; nor was it any clearer to the Greeks than to us how mind or thought can act on matter. However, the Greek conception of mind and matter, of soul and body, tended to blur the frontier which divides them. All matter is formed of atoms. There are various forms of atoms. The mind and soul are matter but are composed of very fine atoms having great mobility. The soul, due to the very fine, smooth atoms of which it is composed, can filter into and out of the too, too solid flesh or other forms of matter. Thus beings made of atoms of this type may enter into and affect matter, organic or inorganic, by a kind of spiritual-physical osmosis.

Thus Greek thought conceived of a bridge between divine perfection and the world in which mankind struggles and aspires, the human soul itself being a spark of the divine temporarily entombed in the flesh from which it would eventually return to its heavenly home.

When Greek philosophy and Hebrew thought were blended, the Logos was vested with a personality. It was referred to as the first-begotten Son of the Father and as the creator of the world, not *ex nihilo* but after the Greek manner by the imposition of form. By the alchemy of Greek philosophy acting upon Hebrew tradition the peasant preacher of Galilee was metamorphosed into the creator of the world and a member of a metaphysical trinity which had existed from all eternity. Thus the Hellenic antecedents of the Prologue to the Gospel of John are obvious; nor is the prologue irrelevant to the rest of that beautiful and moving spiritual poem.

The blending of Hebrew religion and Greek thought which begins with Hellenistic Judaism perhaps a hundred or more years before the Christian era went on apace in the great formative period beginning with the earliest Christian writings and extending through the Augustinian formulation and indeed to the present time. Greek thought is found throughout the New Testament writings. It is most obvious in the Fourth Gospel and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, but it is present to a greater or less degree throughout.

This great fusion of Christian teaching and Greek philosophy—this journey from the Sermon on the Mount to the Nicene Creed; this transition from the world of the Syrian peasant to that of Greek philosophers—was a necessary step to the conquest of the Græco-Roman world by the new religion. Nascent Christianity required an intellectual formulation, a mature theology, which Greek philosophy could alone supply; but when one reads the simple moving record of the

Palestinian prophet, with all its spiritual insight, amazing simplicity and clarity, its rich dynamics of love, human and divine, and then studies the subtleties of the Nicene creed, the cost seems too great.

In order to focus the cultural contrasts which we have been discussing, let us confront the sons of Zion with the sons of Greece and ascertain their respective views on some fundamental issues: the nature of God, of sin, and of immortality.

Yahweh, the God of Zion, is, and always was, a growing, dynamic god who was alternately a flaming beacon and a consuming sword, a god as intimately associated with and as vital to his people's existence as the blood in their veins. His growth was a reflection of the growth of his people. And what a growth he had! From the irrational demon who attacked Moses with intent to kill and was appeased by a bloody foreskin (Exod. 4:24-26) to the transcendent yet immanent Father—God of the universe who looked with loving kindness on all his children, whether Jew or gentile, whether bond or free—is a long spiritual journey. Philosophically this rugged individualist leaves much to be desired, but for a broad religious appeal the concrete must always be more effective than a mere negative abstraction which has been stripped item by item off humanity. The living and loving Father of all mankind, responsive to the needs and prayers of his children, has a religious appeal which is totally lacking in the Greek bloodless abstraction which can feel no emotional glow and whose cold perfection can neither will nor desire nor hate nor love, for these attributes imply perfection which is *ex hypothesi* impossible.

Herein lies the basic difference between Greek and Hebrew, between philosophy and religion. The God of one is the embodiment of the intellect and of the artist's love of perfection, the other of intuition and emotion—the one of contemplation, the other of yearning. The one is essentially aristocratic; the other is common to all humanity. The problem of the individual and of culture is somehow to preserve and enlarge an ever-deepening emotional insight and couple it with a fearless intellectual drive.

Equally revealing are the Greek and Hebrew attitudes toward sin.

With the Greek, sin is a shortcoming, a deficiency, a lack of perfection. The conduct of life is a *technē*, an art, a skill calling for a high degree of intelligence. Sin is stupidity, a mere boorishness, a failure to perceive and understand real values, or a lack of technical skill in achieving them. Socrates elaborated this doctrine, but it is implicit in the entire Greek achievement.

With the Hebrew, and with the Puritan, his spiritual descendent, sin is a defiance of the one true eternal God. It is a cancer of the

soul. It blights and destroys. It is beyond human reparation; repentance and reformation are not alone efficacious. God, by an act of grace, can alone heal and make whole, but man cannot of himself merit this grace. A sinful soul is cut off from the company of the elect. It is a matter for sackcloth and ashes and exceeding great sorrow. It burns like fire in the very marrow of the bones. Sin-sick souls of the tragic Hebrew cast, whether ancient or modern, descend into the depths of hell in their spiritual anguish. They are poles apart from the serene Greek who knows not the anguish of hell nor the raptures of heaven but pursues a sunlit *via media*, and to whom anguish and rapture alike would appear raw, crude, and barbaric.

There is also a polarity in the Greek and Hebrew conceptions of immortality. The rationalist Greek is a universalist and a perfectionist, the empirical Hebrew a particularist. Empiricism and particularism result from the intuitive approach. Individualism and personality are blurred by the categories of genus and species. Rationalism develops breadth of concept; intuition, depths of understanding and feeling. The idiosyncracies of personality defy classification and are thus repugnant to the rationalist. This is reflected in the Greek and Hebrew concepts of immortality.

The soul to the Greek, at least of the Platonic school, is a spark of the absolute, an exile entombed in flesh with gleams and flashes reminiscent of its heavenly home to which it is struggling through a series of incarnations to return. Its goal is reabsorption in the godhead. This is a complete negation of personality. No human being or any reasonable facsimile thereof will receive the stamp of eternity. The human individual has no part of eternity; only the spark within, which has sequentially occupied several human habitations, will survive, and that only as a drop in the ocean of the absolute.

With the Hebrew it was far otherwise. In the Yahwist writings the concept of a blessed immortality was late in arriving. Yahweh had no dominion over the dead. In the Old Testament there are only two or three dubious expressions of such a belief. In the late literature the idea of resurrection arose and gained ground. In the time of Jesus the doctrine was officially accepted by the sect of the Pharisees. Resurrection is not a doctrine of the immortality of the soul but of the immortality of the individual, with all personal idiosyncracies included.

There can be no question that these two approaches to reality have each a firm basis in our very souls else they would not have such unquenchable vitality, and it is equally clear that we cannot yield full allegiance to both. Yet we cannot relinquish either without surrendering something of fundamental importance. Thus the sons of Zion and

the sons of Greece war in our hearts and lay waste our souls. We search for some divine synthesis, some sacrament which will truly mediate and fuse the *eros* of the intellect with the *agapē* of the Christian heart.

Let us speak further of this tension in our souls. We have placed *vis-à-vis* two great cultural traditions and noted their challenge and response, their temporary repulsions and unstable fusions. We have seen the one flower into an ordered world of intellectual vision and its creation of a cosmos out of formlessness and chaos, and have seen it reach a senescence of spiritual sterility in the dying empire of the Cæsars. We have traced in rough outline the other great cultural approach to reality—its great visions, its essential and intimate relationship to transcendent yet immanent supernatural power, and its failures to carry out its program of regeneration in its ever-recurrent efforts to capture and to dominate society and the individual soul.

After a fashion and in varying degrees we accept the major premises of Aristotle and Christ. We attempt to build up in a logical manner from axioms and premises a coherent intellectual structure, scientifically and philosophically sound. We reduce our necessary assumptions to an ultimate minimum. We rigorously refuse to make any assumption which is not logically necessary for the conclusion at which we arrive; yet at the same time our minds and hearts are full of rich overtones of religion and poetry, of values and forces which rebel against intellectual regimentation, which burgeon and flower in the heart and, laughing at logic, soar over the *flammantia mœnia mundi* which pedestrian science attempts in vain to storm. The sudden poetic intuition flashes in our hearts with such overwhelming certitude that it seems a god-given inspiration whose validity it were blasphemy to challenge.

There is then that tension or "schism in the soul" between an urge to find the true place of man in the scheme of things by a scrupulously honest intellectual effort which refuses to make gratuitous assumptions and a genuinely felt belief that true wisdom and insight is derived transcendentally, a view with which Paul so clearly confronted the Greeks of his day. The one is a thoroughgoing humanism; the other in its purity is a faith that we are eternal beings to whom a right relationship to God is of overwhelming importance and may be obtained only by surrender of the will and full and unconditional acceptance of divinely appointed means of grace. Rare indeed is the charioteer who can successfully drive this team of fiery steeds who fight to follow diverging roads.

"Nature and reason" is opposed by a divine revelation. When this latter, a mysterious sacrament which may in itself give life eternal, is

opposed to an ordered life of balanced human values lived as a studied art, a *technē*, suddenly the whole solid facade so painfully built by the human intellect through centuries of effort and insight begins to crumble under the battering rams of unprovable assumptions manned by the barbaric forces of irrationalism—or so it seems to the defenders of the classical fortress.

Once the fortress falls, new values become dominant and eventually establish a new tyranny, against which in course of time there is another renaissance and reformation. Thus the cycles follow each other, but with the disruption of each pattern there is a temporary fusion of the basic antinomies in a pattern which embodies the deeper insights of both.

Where are we now in that cyclic process? The current logico-rational phase was ushered in by Descartes, the protagonist and one of the inaugurators of modern philosophy. Cartesian philosophy to the present time has maintained an uneasy alliance with the scientists and that rapidly growing son of the latter, applied science who first showered us with gifts and now threatens us with extinction. There are signs that the reign of Descartes is nearing its end. There is a mounting conviction that we have sold our souls to the devil—and the mess of materialistic pottage we received has a distinct odor of brimstone. The devil seems about to claim our Faustian souls.

There are everywhere signs of revolt against the materialistic philosophy which has so long been in the saddle. Philosophy itself has long been restive. The atmosphere of a closed deterministic system is again becoming exhausted and foul. Fundamental, ever-recurring questions which even though they be insoluble, are posed by a Sphynx which threatens to destroy us unless we return a plausible answer—and science and scientific philosophy offer no aid. Religion, purged and chastened by the scientific purgatives of higher criticism and rigorous analytics, is beginning to rebel against the eunuch rôle it plays in modern society. It begins to realize that it has betrayed its sacred heritage, its most profound and moving insights by listening to the scientific pipings to which the rest of the world was dancing. All of us, whether scientists, philosophers, theologians, classicists, or plain ordinary citizens are feeling with increasing intensity the total inadequacy of our spiritual resources to meet the tragic collapse of our civilization and the threat of imminent cultural bankruptcy. We have grown so thinly rationalistic that we lack the ability to respond to the challenge of tragedy with any depth of feeling at all. We are simply dumb. But there is a profound soul searching going on at certain levels. The appalling tragedy of our collapsing culture has underlined and brought to view our spiritual bankruptcy. Thinkers are

searching for answers which will give us a new sense of values worthy of our sacrifice and service, by which we may live if we can or die if we must. Religion of a profoundly spiritual character alone can offer values which transcend physical destruction. But religion of that character is the child of tragedy greatly conceived and born of the severest pangs. Isaiah and Jeremiah were prophets so conceived and so born, but we cannot take ready-made answers. Is there a new religion or a religion reformulated of old elements but endowed with an organic life of its own in the making? Or, are we too anemic and tepid to reinterpret our classical and religious cultures into a new and dynamic culture having range and depth enough for long-time growth and eventual maturity?

This challenge cannot be met as some would meet it by choosing one set of values and discarding the other. As we have seen from our too sketchy review of our dual culture, either unbalanced by the other produces distortion and we descend into the abyss of fanaticism or fall into sterile desiccation. As immiscible as intuition and logic may seem, we cannot be complete men or women unless we cultivate both. It is true that they cause a tension in our souls, but that may be the secret of growth. They each challenge and supplement the other —they are the male and female principles whence come rich progeny. Let us courageously refuse the peace of death which would ensue if we adopt the oft-advocated policy of either/or.

We desperately need a reawakening and a rededication to deeper values than are offered by a culture dedicated to a frenzied production and frenzied consumption of "things."

Will not some prophet, with the heart and soul of Jesus Christ and the mind and pen of Æschylus, some modern prophet with words of fire and yet full of compassionate understanding, melt and mold our stupid bovine minds? But no, we can produce only sly foxes that deal in grain futures, a race of men who can worship with true devotion no God but Mammon. Yet there are actually a great number, a large majority, perhaps, of people of good will and intelligence who are capable of being moved to high levels of understanding and achievement. But how? Out of our anguish a new spiritual integration should arise, a new gospel with philosophic depth and religious warmth. Will it?

Our culture is in death throes and in birth pangs. An old phase is ending and a new one beginning. We are justified in wondering, like Franklin, whether the ruddy sun we see is rising or setting. It is, perhaps, too early to say; but if it be setting, let us at least have the empirico-rational conviction that there will be a tomorrow's sun which will usher in a new day of intellectual clarity and spiritual fulfillment.

I AM A MINISTER

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON
Crozer Theological Seminary

THERE RECENTLY came to my attention an illustration in an old book. The book was *Margarita Philosophica*, written by Gregorious Reisch and published in 1503. The illustration was titled "The Tower of Learning." It presented the general scheme of education from the old Roman days down to the time of Shakespeare, and even beyond. The tower stands in the right foreground, and just to the left is a young boy about to enter it. Admitting him to the tower is a young woman opening the door with the key of grammar, while she extends to him a hornbook from which he is to learn his letters.

On the first two floors of the tower the child is taught Latin; the third floor is for arithmetic, rhetoric, and logic; he learns astronomy, geometry, and music on the fourth floor; the fifth floor introduces him to moral philosophy and natural philosophy. The tower is capped by the queen of the sciences, theology. His respective teachers are Donatus, Priscian, Boethius, Cicero, Aristotle, Ptolemy, Euclid, Pythagoras, Seneca, Pliny, and Peter Lombard. What an array of subjects and what an academy of teachers! And theology has the highest place!

How far we have come since that sixteenth century to a day when our order is more like the facetiously ascribed arrangement of sons in the British family: the eldest son goes into the government; the next son into the law; the third son into business; and the youngest son, poor fellow, enters the church. Perhaps the Reverend G. W. Streatfield in *Between the Acts* by Virginia Woolf is what many or most folks have in mind when they think of the minister. Miss Woolf characterizes him as ". . . a piece of traditional church-furniture; a corner cupboard, or the top beam of a gate, fashioned by generations of village carpenters after some lost-in-the-mists-of-antiquity model." Certainly we ministers have lost much of the sincere and genuine approval given to our position by those of other days and other times. Here and there we are met with a straightforward acceptance and are cheered by the simplicity of those who regard us with an acceptable reverence that sees not ourselves, but our associations. There is a subtle confirmation of the general change in attitude toward us in the intuitive way we come to recognize at once the unctuous use of "Reverend" or the irresponsible bestowing of "Doctor" upon us by those who have neither discernment nor power.

The external causes of this depreciation of religion and its consequent loss of prestige are not difficult to discover. It would seem

unnecessary to do more than merely point out the rapid growth of the secular world, the area of human life that is apparently outside the interests of, and unrelated to, the world of religion. If religion has retreated within itself, that is all the more reason for an accentuated difference. Most people will consider it merely an axiom that religion and the church have utterly failed to make commensurate progress within their own fields. So to do has only aggravated the injury to the cause of religion. Thoreau gave epigrammatic utterance to the difficulty when he said, of our inventions, "They are but improved means to unimproved ends."

Moreover, education in the interest of religion has been lamentably behind secular education. The latter has increased in power and in scope, while the former has not as yet even established itself beyond the limits laid out for it by a comparatively few far-seeing and hopeful adventurers. We require elementary education in the schools and we are rapidly subsidizing education in the colleges and universities; we are still arguing even the character of education in the churches. If we of the church could be a little more objective about the situation, we should see more clearly what is involved.

All this would be little more than trying to set fire to an already burned-over field if it were not for its relation to another and far more serious defection. It is bad enough that the condition exists, but it is worse that the minister has accepted it meekly and has allowed it to influence and color his attitude toward himself and his ministry. The uncomfortable fact is that the ministry has lost its sense of dignity. The minister has acquiesced in the general conspiracy to rob him of his authority. Worst of all, the determinating and absolutely requisite sense of mission has deteriorated into a humiliating experience of being little more than a modern Ruth "amid the alien corn."

As if this were not bad enough, we go on to greater devastations of mood and spirit. We are enervated by our concern for the growing weakness of the institution we serve—the church. It seems of little worth to be throwing away our lives in the interests of a social organization that is moribund. Gradually we begin to doubt even the cause that has hitherto loomed before us like some chalice of ancient knighthood. But the end, in every sense of the word, comes when we lose sight of the very object of our service—God. This is the final degradation of the ministry.

But if the stream of influence goes in this one direction, it goes in the opposite direction as well. The church, the cause, and God are accepted by the world at the valuation we place upon them. By placing a low estimate upon them, by doubting their efficiency—or even their reality—we need not be surprised when the world outside ourselves places a

similarly dubious interpretation upon them. Let a businessman mark down the price of an article he has for sale, and many will believe that he is trying to sell a damaged article. Many others will question whether the re-marked article is the same as that originally offered for a higher price.

Our recourse seems often to be found in an attempt to substitute for our former high sense of value the new criteria of the world. So we talk about the size of the church we serve, the number of additions we have made to its membership in the course of a year. We boast of our standing in the community and the number of addresses we have been called upon to deliver, the number of invocations we have offered, in the pursuance of our extracurricular activities. We judge our fellow ministers by their salaries in the same way that we feel we have made progress when our own salary is raised or when we move to a "bigger" church, where the word always means more members and more salary. The church budget is not to be slighted or allowed to go unrecognized and unappreciated; it goes down in the cold print of the association and convention reports and so uncontestably states our position and importance. I have known some ministers who were more concerned to have us know that they had a secretary than that they had a gospel.

It is time we put a stop to all this. It is high time we took a decided stand against this wave of depreciation. Listen to Paul as he tells his readers in Rome that he has a serious work to do. Listen to him especially as he says, "I magnify mine office." Some of our modern translators have given to this declaration a power that should bring us up with a start of guilt. "I make the most of my ministry" (Goodspeed); "I lay great stress on my office" (Moffatt); "I take pride in my ministry" (Weymouth); "I magnify my ministry" (Revised Standard Version). That is the way a minister should talk. That is the fearless and confident assertion he should make about the work he earlier chose as the most tremendous challenge he knew. Here is no vestige of capitulation to a current mood of despair or imputation of inferiority. Here is the ringing challenge he flings back, not because he is ignorant of the inadequacies within himself or the difficulties of his undertaking, but because he accepts them as imperious demands that he put the burden of responsibility squarely where it belongs.

Both the church and the world are in desperate need of ministers of religion who have great confidence in themselves, in the church and in their God, men in whom the light of faith burns steadily and clearly. Such ministers will serve not only the church but other ministers as well. Enthusiasm and faith are just as contagious and just as empowering as despair and doubt. We have a duty to ourselves, to our church, to our cause, to our God, and to our fellow ministers.

This deep and earnest longing for a restoration of a proud and confident ministry is well expressed by a "Returned Chaplain" who wrote "Why I Gave Up My Congregation" in the March, 1948, number of *Commentary,* a publication of the American Jewish Committee.

> They [the rabbis] are adept in political and literary discussion and engage in such discussion very freely. I have heard God justified by social theories, the Bible praised on literary merit, Jewish traditions historicized. But I have rarely encountered a simple and complete acceptance of Jewishness that needs no rationalizing. I have found almost no sign of that prophetic zeal which such acceptance—and only such acceptance—can call forth.
>
> In brief, I have found talented rabbis, but not rabbinic rabbis. The rabbis, while they may be a powerful influence in the life of the community, have no acceptance in the community as rabbis. They carry weight in all fields where, whatever their rights as men, they have no claim from the standpoint of their life's vocation.
>
> . . . I hear the same talk that I heard before I left. Talk about "enjoyable" services, "satisfying" sermons, "inspiring" synagogues. I hear discussions about the choice of English reading, the separation or non-separation of pews. I see a determined effort to make the synagogue "attractive," as if through some aesthetic magic we could somehow draw in the spiritually inert without having to disturb their inertia. The road must be made easier; the rabbi must draw the indifferent into the synagogue, even if, in the process, the synagogue must be emptied of its meaning and the rabbi voided of his rabbinate.[1]

In the true community the author envisonages, the rabbi "would find himself at last able to speak in his own idiom, as a complete and self-respecting personality rooted in a deep and old history, and he would no longer have to compete with the theater in pageantry, with the latest best-seller in literary modishness, with the nearest church in ritual appeal. He would serve a community that truly needed a rabbi."

Allow for the obvious titular changes, and you will not need to make one word different to express the equally fervent prayer of every Christian minister who lays great stress on his office, who takes pride in his ministry. I think of my father's mild, yet most effective, rebuke to me when I told him I had answered my school teacher's query about his occupation by saying, "He is a publisher." "I am not a publisher," corrected my father with a humility that bespoke a genuine pride, "I am a printer." Then he added significantly, "Benjamin Franklin was a printer, too."

I am a minister.
I believe in the ministry.
When the time came to choose what I should do with my life,
    where I should serve mankind,
I chose the church.

[1] Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 235 f. The quotation in the following paragraph is from the same essay, p. 237. These quotations are made by permission of the publisher.

When all the ways of being a useful man lay open before me,
When the world offered many roads I might travel,
I chose the path of Christian service.
It was not the only way; I chose it out of countless others.
It was my answer to a question that was asked by something deep within me.
And there was another Questioner, from somewhere outside myself, and high above me.
That other Questioner I believed was God.
I still believe it.
And so I chose the ministry.
I am a minister.
I believe in the ministry.

The years have past, few or many,
According as I think of whether they belonged to me
Or to that other Questioner.
A countless host of other folk afforded me a fellowship that I could see and happily enjoy.
But there was, too, another fellowship I only felt and knew, and counted on.
The road I walked was thronged with many—pilgrims like myself.
Some walked with sturdy step that challenged me to be at least as sure as they.
Some, lamed at birth or later by some accident,
Slowed my step and loosed my tongue.
There were many quite heedless of my presence along the very road they walked themselves;
But there were also those who looked at me—
Shyly, hopefully, challengingly.
If ever I spoke a helpful word, I spoke it,
Humbly and prayerfully, to these.
Often I doubted, often I was anxious,
Often I knew the aching bitterness of real defeat.
But often I was lifted up beyond myself and all my cares,
By some soft murmured word or soul-relieving sigh, scarcely heard.
I was a minister.

I am a minister.
I magnify my ministry.
I lay great stress upon my office.
I take pride in my ministry.

A. A. BOWMAN ON THE VALIDITY OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

JOHN K. McCREARY
Bates College

THE UNTIMELY death of the late Professor A. A. Bowman, of Princeton and Glasgow Universities, brought to a close one of the most promising investigations into the nature of religious experience that has been undertaken in this century.[1] Bowman's quest for an adequate defining concept of religion had as its goal the appraisal of religious knowledge. The possible validity of such knowledge led him through perhaps the most comprehensive examination of world religions attempted in the last two decades. His tentative conclusions (they evidently were not intended as final) are most illuminating.

Some Tentative Conclusions

In both Hebrew and Greek thought Bowman finds strong elements of an impersonal point of view, in contrast to the view which (as in the case of animism) thinks of nature as personal or as being in some sense the abode of a god or gods, or in contrast to the view which (as in the case of mysticism) thinks of all nature, including man, as negation, which is overcome in the affirmation of a universal Self.[2] This discovery of the impersonal, or secular, in nature, might appear to spell the doom of religion, its own self-destruction, for religion acknowledges, according to Bowman, the place of the secular in nature. However, man's deepening sense of what life means or may mean, leads to a deepening sense of his finitude, and thereby to a more adequate apprehension of the infinite and unconditioned in the religious sense. Bowman finds that the kinds of unconditionedness are formal and ontological: those typified by space and time and the relations of space and time which are assumed in indicating the position of an object; and those typified in a self as subject to conditions which are not external (a self by definition cannot be considered, in Bowman's view, from the standpoint of the spatio-temporal system merely) but which imply the thought of a guaranteed universal order. When man seeks, as he has done and still does, in religion, to address himself to a divine being, he is "interpreting the object of his thought ontologically . . . assigning existence to the infinite that he *thinks*." [3]

[1] See the Memorial Introduction by Norman Kemp Smith to A. A. Bowman's *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion* (2 volumes), first published in 1938 (London, Macmillan).
[2] A. A. Bowman, *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 10, 22.
[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 65-69.

Keeping this question of the unconditioned in mind, the tentative conclusions reached in the concept of religion may be stated. We may offer a summary of Bowman's findings, which are based on logical analysis and historical research.[4] First, religion "begins and ends in the preoccupation with existence," determining the "forms which our concern for existence shall assume" as man's experience develops into a growing insight. Second, religion's "most significant feature" is found in its "progressive idealization of life." Here there is awareness, however vague at first, that existence "is valuable only in virtue of the factors which render it personal." Therefore, if one were to exist in any sense "which falls short of what it means to be a person" (say, in the sense of mere spatio-temporal existence), that would be "not to exist at all in the sense of religion." Third, since religion is determined to realize existence in ideal form "by the possibilities inherent in personality," it finds these culminating in the idea of communion "between the finite individual and a divine person." Yet, relations with a material world and with other finite subjects require the including of morality in the concept, perhaps along with ordinances and rituals for more "direct forms of communion with the divine" and for the stabilization of religious life and "habituation to a devotional attitude." Fourth, religion "implies . . . the reality of the finite world . . . to which man's attitude must be specifically secular," for, hard as this saying may seem, its truth must, according to Bowman, be included in the concept of religion. (Bowman's view would be questioned by the late Archbishop Temple, in whose *Nature, Man, and God,* a "sacramental" view of all existence is presented.) Fifth, religion requires the postulate—which finds chief support in Christianity—of the existence of a being to which the finite subject can relate his personality as whole. Whether the mandate is legitimate or otherwise, "Believe in God," in the sense here indicated, would be the initial mandate of religion. In this tentative statement of the concept of religion, then, we find ourselves led to the problem of the validity of the kind of knowledge here presupposed.

For, according to Bowman, if a secular or impersonal view of nature is implied in the demand of religion for a "spiritual" view of that which religion calls the divine, the relation between "God" and "nature" must be such that to think of nature is not (necessarily) to think of God, whereas to think of God is to think of nature as somehow related to him. Thus, the thought of God would include the thought of nature in a way in which the thought of nature would not include the thought of God. This requires us, in Bowman's opinion, to take an "introverted" view of nature. Indeed, religion implies this. For, when we reflect upon the physical universe, this means to interpret according to natural knowledge, *i.e.,* to see the

[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 125-127, 152.

physical world in the light of relations which are defined according to space and time. But when we think of "God," this is not to think of "a being that stands in external relations with other beings, as the units of physical reality do in a spatio-temporal system." Bowman believes that "the relationship which God bears to the things of the world" is something more—the "inner nature" of things.[5] Whether things have an "inner nature" is a question which Bowman does not, at this point, consider on its own merits; as we shall see, he seeks to show that the "reality of selfhood is a necessary presupposition of religion," and that according to the definition of a self, it cannot be understood in a merely spatio-temporal way.[6] Therefore, according to Bowman, the "relationships which serve to define the nature of religion are . . . relationships which involve the inner nature of everything that in any way enters into a religious context" —this context being determined by requirements of the tentative conclusions above stated. Religion, then, implies "an introverted view of nature," and this requires a consideration of the problem from a standpoint involving not merely the concept of religion but the validity of that concept. The question, then, is fairly before us: How does Bowman seek to prove the validity of the concept of religion at which he has arrived? As he deals with this question, Bowman encounters the "new naturalism" presented in the religious philosophies of Alexander and Whitehead.[7] From his treatment of this view we shall select for consideration the discussion of selfhood; as noted above, he considers the fact of selfhood essential to religious experience.

Religion and the New Naturalism

Bowman has to regard with some care the new physical view of nature and its relation to religion, as presented by Alexander (in his *Space, Time, and Deity*) and Whitehead (in his *Process and Reality*, and other works). He points out that there are certain features which characterize it. First, it appears to rest upon the "exclusion of the conscious subject from the realm of physical existence."[8] Second, the physically existent "must be defined as anything which occurs, or occupies a place in space-time, with whatever this implies as to the necessity of motion, or generally speaking, of change." Third, "all such entities exist in perpetually changing and indefinitely varied systems of relations."[9] Now this "physical realism" which is taught by the new naturalism, asserts that these entities are the terms of relations, and that the relations

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 168.
[6] As, for example, in the philosophy of Samuel Alexander.
[7] *Op. cit.*, pp. 201 f.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 203. Bowman quotes from A. N. Whitehead: ". . . Nature can be thought of as a closed system whose mutual relations do not require the expression of the fact that they are thought about"—*The Concept of Nature*, p. 3.
[9] *Op. cit.*

exist along with them but do not enter into their existence as components. This means that from the standpoint of physical science the terms are independent of relations in which they are found; and from the standpoint of knowledge (epistemology) relations have a nature which may be considered independently of the terms between which they hold. Now Bowman is profoundly interested in the implications and consequences of this view of nature. It is characteristic of his position generally that he should find it necessary to look at the question from the standpoint of the epistemological assumptions underlying the theory of nature which has been presented. Alexander and (perhaps) Whitehead do not consider it essential that epistemology should be given primary consideration. For them, the question of theory of knowledge is one among many other questions. Bowman finds it necessary, therefore, to scrutinize the nature of experience. He seeks to make a beginning of proof as to the validity of his concept of religion by reference to *meaning* in the world of nature—meaning which indicates relations, though relations, too, may indicate meaning. And, such relations would be "beyond" the relations of mere coexistence and sequence, such as those found in the new view of the natural world, as presented by Alexander and Whitehead. Not finding the view as presented congenial to his own, Bowman seeks to refute the new view, so presented, and in defense of his own position, to undermine the former and secure the latter by what he considers a correct analysis of experience.

A brief statement of Bowman's critique of experience takes account of certain points. First, the "plain man" does not conceive his *self* as nothing but the series of his mental states; he ascribes to that self a kind of independent nature and invariability, which, in another sense, he might ascribe to an independently real and durable object. This phrase, "in another sense," is to be noted, because, in the view of the ordinary man (and certainly in the view of the psychologist and philosopher), the invariable identity of the self, maintained through successive changes, is not the relatively simple thing that the object is. But the question how we apparently insist on thinking of ourselves as one and identical (a leading characteristic of the experience of selfhood), carries us far beyond the analysis of our plain and ordinary man. But if the naturalistic doctrine of Alexander and Whitehead (sometimes called phenomenalism) will not do, and if the "common sense" view of the "man on the street" is inadequate, what is the fuller truth? From the point of view of the *self*, Bowman undertakes to answer. The second point, then, would be that there has been a strong tendency in modern thought to limit experience to the consciousness of an object on the part of a subject. This, according to Bowman, is a partial and one-sided view.

Experience cannot be identified exclusively with that aspect or type of experience which consists in the presentation of an object to a conscious subject. The conative and emotional elements must be given with the cognitive in that unity of experience which combines all three. This unity of experience is not determined by the isolated flashes of apprehension which occur in conscious life but is a complex thing more nearly expressible in terms of a universal "instinctual process" of which cognition is but one aspect. Experience finds place in itself for the subconscious and unconscious as well as the conscious; Bowman even queries whether the lowliest forms of existence—perchance inanimate things—could not be considered in some sense selves, *i.e.,* they may have an "unconscious experience" of their own. He asks whether this is not at least thinkable.[10] But, as to the main point, consciousness is to be defined in terms of experience, not experience in terms of consciousness. This seems to be an audacious assertion, Bowman admits. But he holds to it, as against phenomenalist doctrine which denies consciousness or an alternative view which treats it like any datum of experience rather than as implying the existence of a personal self.[11] Third, the problem of conscious selfhood is clarified when, in dealing with the related subjects of experience, consciousness, and activity, Bowman finds that even when consciousness of effort is present it does not define activity; it rather *implies* it. *Activity,* then, is a primitive type of experience even as the universal "instinctual process" is, to which it is akin. But activity may not be assumed to be simple. It involves such complexity as is seen when it manifests itself in selfhood. Here Bowman makes a distinction of crucial importance. Having recognized a universal process which is active, he sees it possible to view human beings either as facts or as modes of such experience. It is a *fact* that we exist, but this is not an object of experience, *i.e.,* we do not experience our existence in the first instance as a fact, the "content of a noun clause of which we are the subject."[12] Our existence may be understood rather as experience itself yielding up what it means to be a subject or self, and in this sense our existence is a *mode* of experience. Since experience, moreover, is capable of various meanings in its modes, it yields up what it means to be an agent. This brings the problem of religion, in its distinction

[10] *Op. cit.,* p. 240.

[11] *Op. cit.,* vol. I, p. 410; in connection with his discussion of mysticism Bowman is prepared to regard a self as what the subject (considered as a subject-self in process of observing) is even "when every vestige of an object has disappeared from consciousness." He sees no reason why a self need be defined by reference to an object. On a basis of strict empiricism it is not likely that Bowman would defend this view; however, he does not find the differing views held by James (one experience knowing another) and Bertrand Russell (data being criticized by data) to be adequate. *Cf.* James, *The Meaning of Truth,* p. 106; Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World,* p. 67. This problem is clarified by our further discussion.

[12] *Op. cit.,* vol. II, p. 267.

from "natural"[13] knowledge, before us very clearly. The critique of experience Bowman has given, in seeking to refute the "new naturalism," has developed from the need for an "introverted" view of nature;[14] the analysis of experience has shown us, says Bowman, that an introverted view of life is philosophically necessary.

Experience and Selfhood

In making a distinction between the relation of a self, or conscious subject, to objects, and its relation to other subjects, Bowman asserts that confounding the two relations is the basis of all error in religious thinking and religious life. While he has been willing to consider inanimate nature as a system of selves, he cannot regard it as a world of experience-bearing selves. At best it must be treated as an object or system of objects and not as a community of subjects. This justifies, he believes, his view that man's attitude towards nature must be specifically secular, whereas this is not so in the case of man's attitude towards his fellows. (Thus we find the distinction to be one between object-selves and subject-selves.)

This clarifies the difference in approach to reality which is found in natural knowledge and religious knowledge. As to the delimited problem of natural knowledge, the question is: What can we know as to the nature of that which exists, by a study of its appearances? The question posed by religion is: What can we know of the meaning of existence from a standpoint at which it reveals itself as an *experience,* and not merely as an observable fact? This introversion, indicated in the question for religion, is found, in Bowman's view, in the development of religion from animism on through to theism.[15] As we reach the more complex levels of religious development, as (say) in Christianity, life becomes viewed in the comprehensive sense of *the experience of what experience means.* This is not equivalent to what is called self-consciousness. To be sure, the latter is included in it. There appear to be two distinguishable, though not separable, orders of experience, the first comprising the total content of the second and including it as a special content of its own. The experience of life which is here in mind is not something abstracted or extracted from life. It is the experience of being alive. And the ontological basis for it is the universal nature of that active process whereby objects of experience "find their way successively into our consciousness."[16]

Now, what religion offers is meanings which become, perhaps by means of the "offices" of religion, the meanings of actual experience.

[13] The word is used to indicate a difference of approach.

[14] See pp. 309 f., above.

[15] *Op. cit.,* p. 331.

[16] *Op. cit.,* pp. 227-228.

The function of religion is to turn our experience of life into an experience of "the life eternal"—*i.e.*, into an experience of the whole.[17] At this point Bowman distinguishes life in three ways: life as *bios*, life as *zoē*, and life as *hē aionios zoē; i.e.*, life of the body in the biological sense, life of the mind in the "experience-of-living" sense—implying the introverted view of life (though it does not require that the experience be specifically religious), and life of the "spirit" in the religious sense which seeks to take account of "the life eternal" or experience "as a whole." Now, the life of the individual includes his past and future as a *mode* of experience; the "specious present" is episodic in contrast to the comprehensive view of life as a whole. Can there be such a view as the latter? If the conditions of life are all external, there probably cannot be. Our problem becomes, then, one concerning what religion calls "the personality of God," *i.e.*, an *internal* experience of life which would mean the same thing as a *completely comprehensive experience*. For Bowman, the revelation of God lies in the experience of being persons. Two attitudes which are fundamentally opposed, as seen from this viewpoint, to religion (and morality), are those which treat subjects as objects or objects as subjects. Religion demands the treating of objects as objects and subjects as subjects. In its progressive unfolding religion most strongly implies the attitude signified here.

The Problem of "God"

Now, have we the right to believe in a God as Subject and as Person and as experienced by us? We have seen in the analysis of experience that conscious data (an object or objects) are not really "given," except in a very limited sense; *i.e.*, granted an already existent universal, active, experience—of which man is part—it is possible to analyse them out of it. Thus, "data" are the product of experience in a far more fundamental sense than any in which experience could be asserted to be a product of the data (or "sensa") it contains. Data do not embody what is most primitive in experience. Bowman most strongly contends that there is *something* that cannot be discerned simply as its successive phases—the sequence of its own objective contents—but which is prior to them. This is made clearer in the light of the fact that our experience is conditioned by the plurality and sociality of experiencing or experience-bearing selves. The world as a whole, then, could not be what it is were experience not present in it. What difference does it make to the world that it not only exists but that, to some degree at least, it is experienced? Bowman asserts that the fact that the world not only exists but is in some degree at least experienced makes appear-

[17] The doctrine of the "whole" will be considered more fully shortly.

ances possible. Appearances are appearances *of* the independently Real and are *functions* of the latter; this may be said with confidence, and to it may be added the assertion that nothing in the realm of nature would be *what* it is unless, under the conditions in question, it *appeared* as it does. In *fine,* reality is to be thought in terms of the *ideally* complete system of all its functional appearances; its existence is experience revealing one of its meanings. And, human experience defines itself within the framework of an ideally universal experience, *i.e.,* human experience is an experience of the whole.[18] In Bowman's view, every experience we have is an experience of all there is, which means that though it is not the whole of experience, *it is an experience of the whole.*

But the logic of the whole position, *i.e.,* of the ideal to which experience has tended, particularly religious experience,[19] points not only to a universal experience but to a universal *Subject* creative of its experience. Bowman emphasizes the point that experience without a subject is nothing at all; thus, he feels, the logic of the situation points irresistibly not only to experience but to the Subject of it, and this in the universal sense. The argument which follows from this is stated thus: "It is from an analysis of experience, therefore, undertaken in the light of the fact that all human experience is the experience of subject-selves, that I hope to show our *right to believe* in God's personal existence. *The argument* is not a logical deduction from given premises, but *an attempt to extort from the actualities of human experience*—the experience of what it is to be a person—*the logic which such experience implies.*"[20] It is in this connection that Bowman centres his discussion on two lines of thought, "each terminating in the conclusion that unless we are prepared to believe in a personal God, we have no right to believe in the existence of any person whatever, and have consequently no right to believe that we ourselves are persons."[21] First, he argues "from the relation of subjects to objects." Persons, he contends, are not merely subjects aware of objects but subjects to whom objects of which they are aware have some significance, or relational meaning, to convey. This indicates that personality is the counterpart, in the conscious world, of "order" in the objective world; man appears to be fitted to experience individually and with his fellows as "the guarantors of meaning" an order or system beyond himself. Bowman views this as indicating that "man's practical belief in his personality and his right to organize his life upon a personal basis implies, whether he knows it or not, the existence of a personal God.[22] Second, Bowman argues "from the relation of subjects to subjects." Personality depends upon sociality. "Persons could not be what they are apart from the existence of others," and hence "a solitary personality is a psycho-physical impossibility."[23] Now

[18] *Op. cit.,* pp. 348, 361.
[19] P. 309, above.
[20] Op. cit., p. 394 (italics Bowman's).
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Op. cit.,* p. 399.
[23] *Ibid.*

just as Bowman was led to the conviction of the existence of a conscious being "commensurate with the system of nature," in his consideration of the relation of subjects to objects, he is led to the same conviction when he reflects on man's personality as relating him as a subject to other such individuals as subjects. In the second case, the conscious being would be a person "capable of sustaining for us vicariously the burden of those personal relations which we are able only in a very halting and inadequate way to sustain for ourselves."[24] He concludes that we have "no right to believe that we are persons unless we are prepared to admit, as the ground of our right, the existence of a personal God."[25]

We must give Bowman credit for recognizing that to some "the method of proof (if it can be so called)[26] will appear a highly illusive and perhaps sophisticated piece of reasoning."[27] He says that in any reasoned statement, however, of "the veritable process whereby *experience itself* reveals its supreme meanings," we may expect a certain necessary artificiality.[28] Thus, in the end, he requires actual experience to sustain the argument for the existence of a personal God. The presence of personal experience in the universe has as its "necessary implicate" a Subject and Person of whom such experience is a revelation.

Summary and Evaluation

The conclusions which Bowman reached, in the examination of religious experience, lay special emphasis on two concepts: personal selfhood and the idea of a universal experience which may be viewed as a creative Subject and a personal God. Considered in the light of our knowledge of nature, these concepts require an "introverted" view of life. (Bowman is not, of course, using the term "introverted" in the same sense as the psychologist, C. G. Jung, uses it.)[29] This implies that the conception of God includes the conception of nature, so that in this sense "creation" is a category of self-experience or the experience of what religion calls the "divine Self."[30] The world as "divine creation" is viewed by Bowman as a possibility which is more than abstract; it would appear to be an actuality of God's experience. For God, it is an actual experience, analogous to the artist's, of the possibilities of creation, and is distinct from the experience which it calls into being. Moreover, beyond the "creation" of the physical world lies the creation of subject-selves as the supreme possibility of divine experience. This implies, in an implicative way, God's need of man, with all that this signifies as to the possibilities of experience for man himself. The two concepts mentioned, therefore, are bound together in the view that the supreme possibility of human experience is that it can be viewed from the stand-

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 400.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 401.
[26] Bracketed material is Bowman's.
[27] *Op. cit.*, pp. 394-395.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 395.
[29] As Bowman himself observes; see *op. cit.*, p. 334 n.
[30] *Cf.* the doctrine of the Self in Hinduism; note H. Zimmer's work, *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization*, ed. by Joseph Campbell, New York, Pantheon Books, 1946.

point of the "divine experience" itself.[31] Bowman asserts, then, that the "new naturalism" (say, of Alexander and Whitehead) does not present an adequate view of experience; for, life as seen from the religious point of view implies not merely a sequence of events in the world of *factual* phenomena but existence as one with the *experience* of it. Here the *mode* of experience reveals man as subject and person and as "the content and product of God's creative energy."

The present writer believes that Bowman has placed his finger on a point that has not received adequate attention at the hands of contemporary thinkers (such as the "naturalists" above mentioned), namely, the status of the self. In the cosmic scheme presented by Alexander, the self is simply a neutral "point-instant" caught in the ceaseless redistribution of point-instants which make up the universe; the values and thought and strivings of men are, so it seems, mere incidents in the cosmic drift of things. Whitehead, it is true, has given a clearer picture of the status of selfhood in his concepts of what an "actual entity" (such as a man) having "unity" and "subjective aim" really is. Yet, as a former student and an able exponent of Whitehead has expressed it,[32]

> an examination of human experience seems to indicate that there is more involved than Whitehead reports. It is true that a subject is built up by its feelings; but there seems to be something which possesses the feelings, something more than the sum of the feelings. There is a "center" which, in reacting to other centers *has* feelings (to use Whitehead's term). The fact that these feelings are characterized by subjective form and are guided by subjective aim is due to *the nature of the subject*. While its feelings modify the nature of the subject, they cannot occur unless it is present to *possess* them. To repeat: the human subject seems to be more than the sum of integrated feelings.

This quotation asserts precisely the position taken by Bowman who had studied carefully and objectively what Alexander and Whitehead had to say. On the concept of selfhood, then, we find that the criteria which Bowman provides for it and for its values are most adequately treated.

The transition from the analysis of human experience to the concept of God is unusually well achieved. Bowman's skillful treatment of the problem would, in the present writer's view, be more readily grasped by the religious philosophers of India, than by many American thinkers who have been conditioned to strictly "humanistic" categories or frames of reference.[33] However, for them,[34] the supreme Self *(Atman)* is, in the end, equated with the "void," and the world of nature—including man—is illusory. For Bowman, God and the world are real. And so far as we can see at present, there should be no objection to regarding "God" as the correlate of a completed personality in man. It is clear that when we

[31] We note again how this point is reached in the religious development of man (p. 309, above) and how *from* this point man considers his experience.

[32] A. H. Johnson, *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (October, 1945)—italics ours.

[33] *Cf.* Swami Akhilananda, *Hindu Psychology: Its Meaning for the West*, New York, Harper, 1945.

[34] *I.e.*, the Oriental religionists.

try to define God we do so in the same terms as those in which we define personality in general. And, while there is ever the danger of indulging in our own projections (or what Freud called more severely "our narcissistic pride"[35]), it is true that, as Bowman has taught, it is possible for man to place his personality in the relation of subject to subject, so that God, if he exists at all, must be conceived as a person. It is only when man generalizes from his personality as to the particulars of that which is transfinite that he is in danger of "religious paranoia." Bowman does not need to look far for support of his view of God. For example, even in an American philosopher[36] who contributed heavily to the philosophy of pragmatism—a doctrine which would hardly share Bowman's views—we find the assertion that at bottom man has an "instinctive belief" in God, who is the *Ens necessarium*, the originator of all things and the creative power at work in the world. And, whatever inadequacies exist in Whitehead's statement of the nature of selfhood, his language on the concept of God effectively expresses Bowman's view: "God's role is not the combat of productive force with productive force, of destructive force with destructive force; it lies in the patient operation of the overwhelming rationality of his conceptual harmonization . . . he is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness." [37] Actually, "as a further proof of the existence of God and justification for his use of the term God, Whitehead claims to have a direct prehension of this timeless source of all order." [38] This concurs with Bowman's argument for the existence of God from the experience of "order" in the objective world.[39] Whitehead adds that this feeling "acquires that 'subjective form' of refreshment and companionship at which religions aim." [40]

The writer's opinion is that while we still do not know the historical relation of man to the physical universe, from which contemporary science and philosophy assume he emerged, it is certain that at man's present stage of development the physical universe fails to be coextensive with our experience of reality. Whatever the final truth about us may be, we are "the something to which truth matters." And while modern psychology would not be inclined to recognize a simple entity, or even unity, of selfhood, still, we have stirrings of consciousness, which, whether we portray them as originating beyond or within ourselves, are just as real as other conscious experiences. They claim recognition as experiences of beauty, of morality, and of that "spiritual" experience which Bowman has set forth as being in some sense "the presence of God."

[35] S. Freud, *The Problem of Lay-Analyses*, New York, Brentano, 1927.
[36] C. S. Pierce; see T. A. Goudge, "The Conflict of Naturalism and Transcendentalism in Pierce," in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLIV, No. 14 (July 3, 1947).
[37] A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, New York, Macmillan, 1929, pp. 525-526; quoted by A. H. Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 270.
[38] A. H. Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 274.
[39] P. 315, above.
[40] A. N. Whitehead, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

GOD IN THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS

L. O. BRISTOL
McMaster University

THE RELIGION of the Epistle to the Hebrews is stern and vigorous, challenging Christians to a complete dedication of themselves to the Christian faith, and demanding that they continue in that faith, going forward in spite of discouragement and opposition. The stern note of warning to those who lapse into indifference appears time and again. In a generation such as the present one, when men are weary of and wearied by the problems which seem to challenge the strongest faith, the Epistle to the Hebrews needs to be read often. It is an invigorating sermon to those who are questioning the value of the Christian gospel.

The challenge of the book rests upon its conception of God. This conception is threefold, and is worked out by means of argument followed by exhortation.

1. *The Sovereignty of God.* Underlying the whole of the sermon (for the work is actually a sermon rather than a letter) is the thought of a twofold world order—that which we know by sense perception being inferior and a copy or shadow of that which we know only by faith but which, in the final analysis, is the true world. Between the two worlds is a gulf dividing God, whose abode is in the true world, from man, whose abode is in the inferior world. This makes God unapproachable by man in his own strength. God is the King, the majestic Being enthroned on high.[1] It was not an easy thing for the ordinary person to come into the presence of royalty. Certain safeguards from the sovereign's point of view were necessary. While God needs no safeguard from man, yet the idea of God as transcendent Sovereign underlies a great deal of the thinking of the writer of Hebrews.

Since man is not able to bear the sight of God as he is, God has revealed himself in partial ways to the fathers.[2] Even when the full revelation is made in Jesus Christ, it is described as the brightness of God, with the underlying thought that the brightness is tempered to man's capacity. Likewise, as Christ is the exact representation of God's nature, yet he is seen by man as the stamp of God put upon the universe to reveal God. In other words, God in his sovereignty cannot be completely revealed to man, but in Christ has come the best revelation that man can bear.

Moreover, we are told in the sermon that men do not take it upon

[1] Hebr. 1:3; 8:1; 10:12; 12:2.
[2] Hebr. 1:1.

themselves in their own right to come into the presence of God. The approach is made through Christ.[3] In fact, this is the purpose of Christ's work. There was no question in the writer's mind about Christ's qualifications from the divine side, but the obedience learned through the experience of suffering and death made him able to help those who go through similar trials.[4]

The separation of God from man finds its best expression for the writer in the tabernacle in the days of Moses, when the people of Israel were in the wilderness between their slavery in Egypt and their entrance into the Promised Land of Canaan.[5] When the tabernacle was constructed, it had two sections. The outer section was used for frequent worship. Into the inner section, however, which was the abode of God in a special way, only the high priest could enter, and that but once a year and with elaborate ritual.[6] Here indeed was the emphasis on the sovereignty of God. He was not to be considered on any low plane, easily accessible to men and able to be cajoled or coerced to do whatever men wished at any particular time.

The majesty of God is worked out further in the reference to the awesome account of God at the time of the giving of the law in Moses' day.[7] Fire, darkness, smoke, and thunder characterized that scene. No one, not even a beast, could touch the mountain where God was, without incurring death.

If this picture of God in his majesty and transcendence were the only picture, the readers would despair of any knowledge of God. But this is not the only picture. It does serve to remind us, however, that the God of the Christian faith is not some inferior deity, whom we can force with our prayers or sacrifices into doing exactly as we wish in spite of what the results would be for our fellow men. We dare never lose the emphasis on the greatness of our God, for he is "God the Father almighty, Maker of heaven and earth."

2. *The Self-revelation of God.* But the transcendence of God can never be the whole consideration for a Christian—and the writers of Hebrews was a Christian. Moreover, his scriptures were the books of the Old Testament, and in those books God had come to men in various ways. It may be true for the writer that man in himself cannot come boldly into God's presence, but it is also true that God has come to man. This is the central affirmation of the sermon.

There had been partial revelations in days past, but they had been

[3] Hebr. 4:15 f.; 7:25; *et passim.*
[4] Hebr. 2:18.
[5] Exod. 25; Hebr. 9:1 ff.
[6] See Lev. 16.
[7] Exod. 19:12 ff.; Hebr. 12:18 ff.

partial and now were recognized as such. Abraham, Moses, Samuel, David, and the prophets had known something of God's revelation, but only through Jesus Christ came the perfect revelation.[8] The Son, superior to the angels and all other means of divine revelation, was the actual brightness of God's glory and the visible representation of his nature.[9] God had put his approval on the faith and witness of those who believed in Christ.[10] It was granted that the people of Israel had not entered into God's rest because of their lack of faith; but it was also to be emphasized that here was a new opportunity for men to enter into the perfect rest through Christ.[11] The priests of the Levitical rule had proved unsatisfactory, but God had called the true priest, even Jesus, to bring men to himself. Not through the Levitical descent but through the power of an endless life did Jesus exercise his priesthood.[12] The old covenant had not been kept by the people, but in Jesus came the ratification of the new covenant[13] as promised in Jeremiah. The heroes of faith had died without the fulfillment of the promises made to them, but God had brought fulfillment through Christ.[14] By faith in Christ Christians would come to the true mount of God, even into the presence of God himself.[15]

In all this we see the self-revelation of God. Not now in partial ways but in fullness; not through a host of intermediary beings (such as Stoic *logoi* or Jewish angels); not through the *logos* of Philo's speculation (which was at best an impersonal projection of the deity); but through Jesus Christ, the Son, the High Priest, the Mediator of the better covenant, did God reveal himself. This is the main assertion of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

Much of the terminology of this sermon may seem far removed from today. A great deal of the argument may fail to strike any responsive note in our minds. But the central theme cannot be ignored in any age. The transcendent, majestic God has seen fit to reveal himself to men in his Son. The wonder of this should never fade from our souls. It is the very core of the Christian gospel.

3. *The Judgment of God.* Growing out of the sovereignty of God and his self-revelation there is a third emphasis in the Epistle to the Hebrews. He has revealed himself, but not all have accepted the revelation. What is God's answer to such an attitude?

In Old Testament times when the revelation was only partial, there had come judgment upon those who refused to accept even that partial

[8] Hebr. 1:1-4.
[9] Hebr. 1:2-3.
[10] Hebr. 2:4.
[11] Hebr. 4:1 ff.
[12] Hebr. 7:16.
[13] Hebr. 10:1 ff.
[14] Hebr. 11:1 ff.
[15] Hebr. 12:18 ff.

revelation. The people of Israel were led out of slavery and recognized God's leading. But when they lacked the faith to take possession of the Promised Land, God did not allow them to enter into it.[16] This was his judgment upon them. In like manner the author asserts that the judgment of God will come upon those who refuse God's revelation in the Christian era. The readers are warned that they will not escape God's condemnation if they reject the gospel, spoken by Christ, affirmed by his hearers, and attested to by signs and wonders and gifts of the Holy Spirit.[17] The leadership of God is still available in Christ to lead men into rest, but lack of faith will bring forth the same judgment meted out to those who rejected God's leading in ancient days.[18]

The perception of God goes deeper than the outward appearance, for he can discern the inmost thoughts and purposes of life.[19] For those who fall away into indifference after having entered into the blessings of faith in Christ there is no second repentance.[20] Although this harsh statement has been explained in many ways, the fact remains that for the author of Hebrews second repentance was impossible if the sin was committed willfully and knowingly.[21] Vengeance belongs to God, and "it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God."[22]

The judgment of God, however, is not altogether negative. It means that by this very judgment the righteous will be vindicated.[23] The author considers the final judgment to be a certainty, and God is the Judge of all.[24] At the final judgment the earth will be shaken and only the eternal things will remain. The Christians together with the Old Testament faithful will then be vindicated.[25] The immoral, even among the Christian group, are to remember that God has the final word.[26]

This conception of the judgment of God came out of the author's knowledge of Jewish thought with its emphasis on God's final vindication of his people. Oppressed by conquerors, and with no opportunity of becoming a self-determining political unit, the Jews might well have compromised to the point of extinction. In so doing they might have been able to claim that there was no use is attempting to do anything else. Instead of this, however, they trusted that God would lead them to ultimate victory. Likewise, when the Christians met opposition and suffered persecution, they knew that God would not forsake them. But

[16] Hebr. 3:19.
[17] Hebr. 2:1 ff.
[18] Hebr. 3:7 ff.
[19] Hebr. 4:12 f.
[20] Hebr. 6:4 ff.
[21] See Esau's fate in Hebr. 12:16.
[22] Hebr. 10:26.
[23] Hebr. 10:36 ff.
[24] Hebr. 12:23.
[25] Hebr. 12:25 ff.
[26] Hebr. 13:4.

whereas for Judaism the hope of vindication was party nationalistic, for the Christians the vindication was on a moral basis. All would be judged by God; the wicked would be condemned; the righteous would be acquitted.

In a day when evil seems to be growing more and more evident, and when men seem indifferent to the results of sinful actions, it must be the task of Christian people to point out the disastrous consequences of evil. This must be done not in a spirit of hypercritical superiority, but with the same loving exhortation as that used by the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

These, then, are some of the conceptions of God in this sermon, and they underlie the forms in which they are expressed, and which in part have become meaningless to us. God is Sovereign, but he has revealed himself in Jesus Christ. Blessed are those who accept the revelation and enter into the perfect rest of the Christian faith. Upon indifference and sin comes the judgment of the righteous God.

WHAT IS OUR CHRISTIAN HERITAGE?

WILLIAM AUGUSTUS BANNER
Howard University

IN THE YEAR A.D. 384 the Roman prefect Quintus Aurelius Symmachus wrote a report, on the occasion of the restoration of the altar of victory, to the Emperors Valentinian II, Theodosius, and the latter's son, Arcadius. In this report Symmachus stated the case for the old religion of the Eternal City in this way:

> This was the cult that drove Hannibal from the walls of Rome and the Gauls from the Capitolium. . . . I do but ask peace for the gods of our fathers, the native gods of Rome. It is right that what all adore should be deemed one. We all look up at the same stars. We have a common sky. A common firmament encompasses us. What matters it by what kind of learned theory each man looketh for the truth? There is no one way that will take us to so mighty a secret. . . . We offer your majesty not a debate but a plea.[1]

This earnest plea for an old and familiar way of life provoked before long a reply on the part of Ambrosius, a Roman who had become the bishop of Milan. Ambrose answered Symmachus in this way:

> Why cite to me the examples of the ancients? *It is no disgrace to pass on to better things.* Take the ancient days of Chaos, when elements were flying about in an unorganized mass. Think how the turmoil settled into the new order of the world and how the world has developed since then, with the gradual invention of the arts and the advances of human history. I suppose that back in the good old times of Chaos, the conservative particles objected to the advent of the novel and vulgar sunlight which accompanied the introduction of order. But for all that, the world moved. And we Christians too have grown. Through wrongs, through poverty, through persecution, we have grown . . . .[2]

There is hardly to be found in the literature of the West a more forthright statement of the spirit of progress than this simple rebuttal of Symmachus by Ambrose of Milan. And it is of real significance that the author of this reply should have been a pastor of a Christian parish and a spokesman for the Christian attitude with respect to the preservation of the existing order of things. The essence of this attitude is found in these significant words: It is no disgrace to pass on to better things *(nullus pudor est ad meliora transire).*

In a sense this statement expresses the genius of Christianity in the aspects in which the basic Christian affirmations concerning the source and destiny of human life transcend time-honored systems of thought and modes of living, however dear these may be to the hearts of men. To hold on to such systems and institutions, in the face of the

[1] Seeck, *Works of Symmachus, Monumenta Germaniæ Historica, Auctores Antiquissimi,* VI, 1 (1883), p. 280.
[2] Ambrose, *Epist.* XVII *and* XVIII (Migne, *Patrologia Latina,* XVI, pp. 961-962).

purifying insights of the new religion, was for Ambrose to become reactionary and ultimately to fall into superstitution and cultural decay. Ambrose asserted simply that no bit of Roman culture, however familiar and attractive, was to be preferred to the new modes of life opened up to the individual through his acquaintance with the new Christian gospel.

But if Ambrose's attitude is correct with respect to the life and thought of the culture out of which the Christian movement emerged, it would be true also with respect to the culture which in time emerged with the growth of the Christian movement itself. The almost naked Christian affirmations concerning God, man, and the world have been clothed by Christians in many garments of culture from the earliest time to the present. As earthly rational social beings, Christians have been compelled to express in thought and in institution the meanings and implications of the bare outlines of their faith. To do this has challenged the best in human conception and the highest in intellectual and moral honesty and courage. This has been a difficult task, often attended by very disappointing and distressing consequences. In carrying ahead their tremendous task, Christians have consciously and unconsciously drawn heavily upon the world of their acquaintance, however formless and void this world in certain aspects, however representative its culture of a limited intellectual and moral perspective.

In the sustained effort to view their far horizons through often very dirty windowpanes, they have come in time to mistake the strange shapes upon the glass for the true landscape itself. In this confusion the creative exploratory insight so important to Ambrose has been refracted and Christians have fallen into superstition, obscurantism, bigotry, reaction, and moral turpitude. These are defects which arise from the failure, willing or unwilling, to distinguish clearly between that which is essential and that which is merely accidental; between the universal and the provincial; between what is fundamental in Christian culture and what is the expression merely of the limitations of time and place; between that which pertains to the freedom of the human spirit and that which pertains to its bondage.

It is a very sad thing that in times past and in times present Christians have identified themselves and have become identified with so much that is backward, stubborn, prudish, and reactionary in the human spirit. And this is sad because Christianity, so aptly interpreted by Ambrose, is in its essence progressive rather than backward; amenable rather than stubborn; spontaneous and mature in morals rather than legalistic and prudish; revolutionary in social theory and practice rather than reactionary. It is important, therefore, that we remind ourselves, from time to time, of the genuine character of

the tradition in which we come in order that we may give genuine thanks and escape the contempt of sincere earnest men who are unwilling to be fooled or misled in the pursuit of their highest human aspirations. This tradition is one which embraces really and truly in words taken from Carlyle's *Life of Schiller*:

> . . . Kingdoms conquered from the barren realms of Darkness, to increase the happiness and dignity, and power of all men; new forms of faith, new maxims of wisdom—new images of beauty "won from the void and formless Infinite": a "possession forever" to all the generations of the earth.

In certain very important areas of human experience the loss of the inspiring leadership of Christians, in modern and in recent times, has been distressingly apparent. This loss has involved in most instances the sacrifice of refreshing insights into the meaning of Christian truth for the sake of retaining cultural fetishes, provincial and contingent, if not downright unchristian in their character. Let us look first upon the realms of theology.

Since the beginnings of modern times Christians have been hampered by the retention of theological notions either outmoded by developments and refinements in philosophical and historical studies or undermined by significant achievements in the descriptive sciences. Much of mediæval theology embraced affirmations about the nature of the world and man which were entertained in the absence of adequate experimental science and historical criticism and which could hardly be expected to stand unquestioned when such science and such criticism appeared with the rise of modern times. Serious attempts were made to protect these old systems through ecclesiastical pronouncements and reaffirmations. But ecclesiastical pronouncements and reaffirmations cannot halt or reverse the thrust of human inquiry. On November 30, in 1825, Sir Humphry Davy, the English chemist, set down these words:

> . . . science, like the nature to which it belongs, is neither limited by time nor by space. It belongs to the world, and is of no country and of no age. The more we know, the more we feel our ignorance; the more we feel how much remains unknown. . . . There are always new worlds to conquer.

What is most unfortunate about this is that many old theological notions have been retained and defended by churchmen in such a way as to imply that their rejection involves the denial of basic Christian faith and aspiration. Creeds, which in many instances have no direct foundation in primitive Christian teachings, have been handed down as infallible statements of Christian truth and as the necessary condition for membership in the Christian fellowship. And these creeds, cold and dry-boned, have from time to time been rephrased and revamped by churchmen while the rich stream of new insights flowed by either unnoticed or unappreciated. Through this intellectual indifference church-

men and those Christians who have followed upon them have lost touch with the critical spirit of man and have become insignificant in the fellowship of honest inquiry.

Another area of experience where the failure to distinguish between the universal and the provincial has weakened the prestige of Christian leadership is that of personal morality. Unfortunately interpretations of the spirit and content of Christian ethics with respect to the individual often have taken the form of legalistic prescriptions more compatible with a frightened moralistic attitude toward life than with the broad ethical orientation of the teachings of Jesus. In the life of the individual, Christian ethics calls for a purity of motive which carries the individual beyond the corrupting indulgences of love of self, of pleasure, and of personal gain. In this emphasis a man is corrupted first by his intentions and only secondarily by his actions. Accordingly, where men are corrupt in their intentions, the quality of their actions is ethically insignificant, however much such actions may conform to what is regarded conventionally as Christian conduct.

It has been the most difficult thing in the history of the Christian movement in the West to save Christian morality from the moralism and legalism which perennially have gathered upon it and slowed it down, as barnacles slow down the ships upon which they encrust. But this is not all. In many historic instances, this conservative ethical legalism has embraced prescriptions and preachments which have for the most part been the expression of quite morbid individuals prepossessed with their own moral weaknesses, weaknesses which have led them to look cynically for the worst in human nature. Through this morbidity and cynicism, such individuals have come to look upon even the purest and most wholesome of human enjoyments as harmful snares. They have construed the ideal Christian life as a sombre existence characterized by precise moral conformity and reticence rather than by moral enthusiasm and courage.

A very short while ago a large religious body received headline publicity for its pronouncements against drinking and smoking. And while there is a very great deal to be said against both drinking and smoking, it is regrettable that Christian leaders, in a world sick for the want of fundamental human decency, should have interpreted decency in such narrow, priggish terms. It is one of the amazing feats of the human spirit that secondary contingent matters can be taken so seriously while the primary and fundamental are unrecognized and ignored. It is from such arid, provincial moral prudery that the Christian must move on to better things without fear of disgrace. Christian integrity must be interpreted perennially in terms of the quality of life which emerges with the most serious devotion to the highest and best

in human existence. It is such integrity which cannot be adequately reduced to a particular code and cannot be measured by mere external conformity to a particular and often quite provincial pattern of righteousness.

In no area of human experience, however, has the conservatism and reaction of Christians been more unfortunate than in their attitude toward the social traditions and institutions which have come to exist along with the church in a given society. A very significant part of Christian ethical teachings is the ideal of the Christian community as the fellowship of believers bound together by mutual concern for human well-being. Certainly for the very early Christians there was a rather clear awareness of the high level of mutual social responsibility that was to be maintained among the members of the Christian social group. And this awareness came in time to involve for Christians the condemnation of those social practices and lines of social cleavage which precluded the widest and deepest fellowship. Witnessing to this are the fundamental attitudes assumed, in time, toward slavery, toward inequality in possessions, and toward buying and selling for excessive profit.

Social conservatism, encouraged by the natural love of comfort, is, however, the constant threat lurking in the shadows of great socially revolutionary structures. And in time many Christians were to be found, even in the early church, who were for the most part unable to conceive of even a bare Christian existence apart from the Roman culture they had come to love, in spite of all of the inhumanities which accompanied the many Roman comforts and consolations. This is the conservative note which finds expression in the Christian scholar, Jerome, who could not keep himself from grieving upon hearing the news of the sacking of Rome by the Goths under Alaric. In the preface to his *Commentary on Ezekiel* Jerome included these words:

> No doubt all things born are doomed to die, and that which hath grown to maturity must grow old. Every work of man is attacked by decay, and destroyed by age. But who would have believed that Rome, victorious so oft over the universe, would at length crumble in pieces, the mother at once and the grave of her children? She who made slaves of the East has herself become a slave, and nobles once laden with riches come to little Bethlehem to beg. In vain I try to draw myself away from the sight by turning to my books. I am unable to heed them.

From time to time in Christian history this love of culture for its own sake and out of its relation to the life of man has expressed itself in the thoughts and actions of a significant number of Christian people. In thought this has involved the recognition of the existing social order either as the best of all possible worlds realizable by human effort or as the one necessary order established by divine appointment. In practice this love of culture has provoked an indifference and opposition to social reform and to social revolution, not merely as things generally undesirable and unpermissible but also as specifically heret-

ical and unchristian. And Christians in sprinkling the holy water of conservatism upon social conditions have caused even the most abominable of institutions to become endowed with an aura of propriety. In the many historic efforts to offer protest against the outrageous fortunes of common people, Christian conservatives in their pious respectability have constituted a formidable opposition.

Thus the democratic lay movement of monasticism was in time reduced to the aristocratic interests of the mediæval papacy: St. Thomas Aquinas, in his great summing up of Christian wisdom, defended as just both slavery and the inequality of possessions; Innocent III proclaimed a holy crusade and later an inquisition against the lay, communistic, antipapal sects of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries; in the environment of the industrial and commercial classes, Calvin urged that certain individuals are elect by God's " . . . gratuitous mercy, totally irrespective of human merit . . ." [3] and Calvinists accepted the world as ordained for the sake of those whose salvation is already observable in the success of their bourgeois enterprises; in the environment of the protracted feudalism of nineteenth-century America, Christian theologians and preachers justified as an expression of the divine will the enslavement of Negroes in the South.

It is perhaps true that in our time no social conservatism is more vicious or more thoroughgoing than that sanctified by religion and religious institutions. One calls to witness here the complacency of Christians with respect to racial discrimination even within the fellowship of the church; with respect to the propriety of economic enterprise carried on for the sake of profit rather than for service; with respect to the sacredness of private property in the form of the instruments of production; with respect to the maintenance of cultural differentials necessitated by inequalities in the distribution of the instruments of life. In our time reaction does not always speak in public. In many instances the stand is taken in silence where it is more effective to be silent and more expedient not to take sides. But one is reminded here of the ringing words with which R. H. Tawney concluded his eminent work, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*: ". . . rashness is a more agreeable failing than cowardice, and, when to speak is unpopular, it is less pardonable to be silent than to say much . . ." [4] Silence is a form of taking sides, and the Christian stands condemned even in his silence. And this is the condemnation of the Christian's conformity with respect to a whole system of appetites and values involving, again in the words of Tawney, ". . . the deification of the life of snatching to hoard and of hoarding to snatch . . ." [5]

[3] John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, trans. by J. Allen, 1838, Vol. II, pp. 128-129 (bk. iii, chap. xxi, par. 7).

[4] R. H. Tawney *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, New York, Harcourt, Bruce, 1926, p. 287.

[5] *Ibid.*

We might continue at some length upon this negative note. But at the best any review of the falling short on the part of Christians can have merely a rhetorical significance. We need at all times to recognize with clear sight and to express in forthright language the errors and dangers to which the human spirit has fallen victim. We cannot at any time be sentimental and sloppy about the foibles of human beings, insofar as frankness in the recognition, expression, and implementing of truth is our only torchlight, to paraphrase here certain words of George Santayana, leading across the mysterious and dread void of human frailty and uncertainty. Our treatment of the record of Christians has been for the sake of contrast and it has been therefore selective. It is in the interest in reaffirming the essence of Christianity as a gospel of light against the darkness of the earth that one must strive first to distinguish this essence from the many unnatural externals which have been engrafted upon it. But our interest is really in the essence and its natural expressions rather than in the unnatural expressions. Our interest therefore is in the profession of faith of an Ambrose, for whom Christianity was a gospel of light and progress.

There have been those, often outnumbered, outmanœuvered, and persecuted, who have stood in the history of the Christian movement in the company of Ambrose. To name but a few one might mention, in science and learning, Duns Scotus, William of Occam, and Roger Bacon, who laid within the very bosom of later mediæval Christianity the foundations of modern experimental science; Copernicus, Bruno, and Kepler, whose mystical piety found expression in the new world-view which culminated in time in the great scheme of Newton; and Lessing, Herder, and Schleiermacher, whose romantic piety brought contributions to the modern literary criticism of the Bible, opening up new possibilities for the enthusiastic perusal of the pages of our scripture.

In personal morality, the tendency of Christians to turn their ethics into a stony self-righteous legalism has been opposed historically by those who have emphasized the cultivation of the life of the spirit and of that spontaneous decency from which the only truly reliable goodness can emerge. One thinks here of Augustine, of Abelard, of Francis of Assisi, of Eckhart and Tauler of the early Pietists, and of the early evangelicals in England and America.

In social morality, the tendency of Christian social ethics to turn into the sanctification of social order and social privilege has been opposed historically by those who have urged upon their fellows the social ideal of the common good: the democratic ideal of the radical equality of all mankind, socially as well as in the sight of God; the conception of wealth-getting and wealth-using as subordinate to the life of man rather than as ends in themselves. One is reminded of the early

monastics in the West; of the radical sects of the late Middle Ages; of Francisco Suarez in his advocacy of the natural rights of man; of the Anabaptists and the Shaking Quakers; of the Methodists of the eighteenth century, and of the Christian Socialists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

As inheritors of the traditions of the Christian movement we need to be reminded constantly of our responsibility as children of the light to enrich and foster these traditions in the great struggle against the dark forces of the earth. By the mere act of living in an age, Christians hold an investment, more or less secure, in the culture by which they are surrounded and which in part they help to create. The danger at all times is that, in the required business of living at a particular time and place, we will lose sight of that which alone can save us from the limitations and weaknesses in our culture which tend to drag us down and engulf us. This is particularly true in a time such as the present when the increasing complications of our civilization tend to provoke even very calm men to great panic; when men seem to be unable or unwilling to distinguish between what is worth preserving and what is not.

It is for our heritage of true Christian aspiration that we may properly be thankful at this as well as at other times. For it is this alone which can secure to us whatever of genuine human good we may achieve and provoke us to share this good in the neighborhood which is now the community of the whole world. If we are responsible beings we are responsible for the misery of the world as well as for its goodness, and this responibility must be kept before us whenever glibly we would give thanks for the good things which we enjoy. Christians in the less distressed parishes of this world are today under tremendous obligation to place their talent and their strength against the misery of our time—the misery of intellectual sloth and antiquarianism, of moral decay, and of material and cultural dispossession. This sense of dedication gives rise to a very special exhilaration. This is an exhilaration comparable to that described in W. Somerset Maugham's *The Alien Corn*:

> She played Bach. I do not know the names of the pieces, but I recognized . . . a tender cosiness; and in my nostrils there was a warm scent of the soil and I was conscious of a sturdy strength that seemed to have its roots deep in mother earth, and of an elemental power that was timeless and had no home in space.

It is in this sense of the elemental and the unchanging that one has the ground for progress in human good. For in genuine progress we merely surrender one thing for the sake of another which is more compatible with what we understand to be the nature of things. In this way we pass on to better things. In this only is the hope of mankind.

GAMALIEL AND THE FUNDAMENTALIST

MORTON S. ENSLIN
Crozer Theological Seminary

SOME YEARS ago during one of the Monday morning sessions of the Philadelphia Conference of Baptist Ministers the discussion became lively and heated. The precise matter at issue is of no immediate consequence; in fact, those familiar with the now sparsely attended sessions of that body will probably assume that the matter under discussion was even then of no world-shaking import. Finally the motion was put, after having been repeatedly called for, and, surprisingly, was lost. The fundamentalist brother who had heatedly championed the defeated action was, however, not to be deprived of the last word. Rising indignantly to his feet, he delivered himself: "Well, you can do it your way; I'll keep on doing it God's way."

Now those who have known fundamentalists, individually and collectively, and few there be who have escaped that misfortune, will not find this anecdote especially novel. It is scarcely an overstatement that this expresses precisely the attitude of this noisy and self-confident group, an attitude which led a reasonably well-balanced individual, not a churchman, some time ago to remark of a minister of his acquaintance: "I presume Mr. So-and-So is a very good man, but he always gives me the uneasy feeling that he has an almost indecent familiarity with God. It's as if he had just come from a cocktail party with the Almighty and had picked up all the latest divine opinions." This may at first strike some as a brutally frank reaction, but as they think back over the many sermons they have heard—and preached—on the general theme, "What God thinks about——," they may feel that it was precise and apt.

It is not my purpose in this essay to attack this somewhat modern version of the confidence, "I have seen the Almighty face to face," although I am frank to say that it seems to me not only immodest but distinctly absurd. Rather I am concerned to ask a question which appears to me definitely pertinent to that point of view. And the question is this: Why, if the fundamentalist is so absolutely confident that he is right, that God has shared his innermost thoughts and opinions with him, has revealed to him precisely what is to be done and will be done—why, if this be the case, is he so bitter and venomous to his misguided brothers and sisters? Why is he not, on the contrary, pained and saddened at their blindness and obtuseness, horrified, one might even think, at their sad plight and even worse impending doom? Why does he not feel a compulsion to plead with them, to try to let a little ray of the divine

sunshine, of which he is so confident that he has a full supply, flicker into their darkened minds? Is he not certain that his views will be established by God, that he will be more than vindicated, that his opponents will be overwhelmed? Why, then, does he shriek and rant in brittle nervousness, just as if he expected the heavens to fall at any moment were he not to support them?

When the oxcart was jouncing over the rough road back from Philistia to Judah, Uzzah is said to have put forth his hand to steady the ark. Presumably he thought the ark was going to fall off. Had he been utterly confident of the stability of the object, of its ability, so to speak, to defend itself, he would scarcely have done as he did—and, following the ancient story, his days would probably have been longer in the land. This point appears to me too clear to require elaborate buttressing; one does not get nervous and panic-stricken for the safety of that which he is confident is in no jeopardy. There are people, I am told, who claim to believe that the world is flat. I can understand folk, more mission minded than myself, I might remark, trying to reason with them, to show them the error of their ways, but for the life of me I cannot conceive attacking them, writing impassioned and lurid books and tracts against them, and damning them. Were I to find myself doing such, I should fear greatly lest my own confidence in what has been clear to most intelligent people, at least since Galileo, had become sadly undermined.

But the fundamentalist claims, not infrequently with a zeal which flames but does not illumine, that the Bible is his particular and personal possession and that (though he curiously feels he has to defend it) he believes it, as he quaintly phrases it, "from cover to cover." There is one story in this book which he apparently rarely, if ever, seems to refer to, and that is the story of Gamaliel and his advice. Why the marked reticence in using this story? (It can't be, I am sure, due to any scholarly qualms as to the verbatim nature of the speech in which reference is made to Theudas and Judas. Some students of Acts, to be sure, have found here a thorny problem, but it would naturally not appear such to the fundamentalist.) Is it too much to assume that the reason for the fundamentalist's seeming avoidance of this tale is that he secretly deplores—or at least does not share—the confidence of the honored doctor of the law? For Gamaliel was not jittery; he was apparently perfectly placid as to God's control and competence. Hence his concluding word:

> And now I say unto you, Refrain from these men, and let them alone; for if this council or this work be of men, it will be overthrown; but if it is of God, you will not be able to overthrow them; lest haply ye be found even to be fighting against God.

Sage advice that, it has seemed to many. But the fundamentalist, although he ought to share this attitude and to restrain himself to weeping o'er the erring one and praying for the fallen, satisfies himself at that point by singing the gospel song and then launches into his attack. Is it that he is afraid, after all, in those hidden recesses of his mind in which Freud walked so confidently that the opposing views, and men, *are* of God? Perish the thought! Then, if any thought at all is involved, it would seem to be that these self-appointed steadiers of the ark, defenders of the Book, and protectors of God are afraid that unless they jump in to help, the Almighty's (that is, their own) cause will be lost. And so we are back where we started from. That serene confidence and absolute assurance that they have the faith—all of it, including every last jot and tittle—which was delivered supernaturally to the saints, of whose number they are conspicuously the unique descendants, by blood, or rather by spirit, are not so "serene" and "absolute" as they would pretend. Instead, had nonfundamentalists been in the place of Peter and the other apostles and the fundamentalists in the rôle of Gamaliel—but this latter is almost impossible; few of them are "doctors of the law" or "had in honor of all the people"—they would have moved heaven and earth (or rather, to be strictly fair and accurate, would have tried to—there is a difference) to have them expelled from the denomination, fired from their positions, and defamed from the roof tops—and if that had proved impossible of achievement, would have founded a new denomination and yelled to high heaven because they couldn't be supported by pensions from the older society which they had unsuccessfully sought to ruin and from which they had departed amid a fetid cloud of dust-raising—and if God did not like it, so much the worse for God.

I realize that the tone and tenor of this essay will likely be highly unpopular with many readers, both fundamentalists and those who would indignantly disclaim that epithet, which though respectable liguistically has become a badge of shame through its adoption by those whose line of descent is less clear from Gamaliel than from the Ephesian mob which is said to have cried, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians," for two hours, although "the more part knew not wherefore they were come together." It will be unpopular with many nonfundamentalists, even self-designated liberals, because it will seem to be stooping to the low level of attack which has been for so long the particular platform of the fundamentalist. The liberal, it is proudly said, is too proud to fight.

It appears to me that the time has come for liberals to wake up, to cease this prattling about "descending to the level of the fundamentalist," and to speak out. By our refusal to answer slanderous and malicious attack, not merely personal but of what we believe valuable and fine and

true, we are directly responsible for the fact that the American public is being deluged with ridiculous and absurd statements of what real religion and honest-to-God Christianity are and are not. And we sit back and allow these slenderly equipped Uzzahs to claim that they, and they alone, are faithful to the "dear old Book," followers of "my Jesus," and honest in their allegiance. So we let them spread their poisonous lies, ruin reputations, and make religion and the church unworthy of the serious attention or loyal devotion of men and women unwilling to park their intelligence with their automobiles at the curb before the meetinghouse. We permit in our ordination councils a young man of fine ideals, devotion of purpose, and devout love for what most thinking people believe to be the upward path, who for years has sought to train himself to meet the needs of men and women in the headaches and heartaches which are so often life—we permit him to be blacklisted at the start by men who are coldly and deliberately set to knife him and who, instead of doing it openly and honestly, cloak their malice as they snivel out the horrid blasphemy: "I shall vote against the young brother, for while I love him dearly, I love my Jesus more."

By this time some readers will say—if they read this far, and I fancy they will—"Physician, heal thyself; how about having Gamaliel's prescription filled for your own consumption?" And the criticism leaves me cold. For, unlike the fundamentalist with his capricious God who aids his friends, if, like Abel, they give him a roasted sheep, but blasts his enemies, if, like Cain, they offer "fruits of the ground," who shows his power by interfering with the world and upsetting its laws, and by contradicting what he has written in the stones by what he is said to have dictated in a book, I believe in an orderly universe where caprice is not and need not be God. And that puts an extra responsibility on man, instead of on God. I am not so sure, I frankly admit it, as was Gamaliel, that the good and the right will inevitably conquer, that it is permissible to sit back and wait. When the farmer "leaves his garden to God," how the weeds and bugs multiply! Thus, like the fundamentalist —I soberly and a bit regretfully admit that *one* point of similarity—I believe we must fight if we would win. But, unlike him, I do not prate that God has told this to me in a personal conference, and that this is what he is going to do. I believe that he will do it only if we buckle our armor on and go into the front ranks and fight. If we want hospitals and schools and plows, we must use our steel for them instead of for battleships and bombs. If we want atomic energy, about which every one is talking so glibly, to unleash the greatest blessing the world has yet seen instead of blotting humanity from the face of the earth, it is up to us to see that it is done, not to lie back at our ease and simply trust.

We may as well awake to the fact that the twentieth century is not

the first, that we have drunk too deeply of certain wells, that we have eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that it is up to us to choose as we pick the fruit of the other tree—of life and of death—as well. It is nonsense—worse than that, it is criminal and wicked—to continue to prate that "good will come finally if we wait long enough." Good will not come unless we seek it and force it. And what is "good" and "true" must be hunted for with painful and groping search; it is not whispered in our ears or communicated magically by ordaining hands laid on our heads. We shall fail time after time in our quest, but God help us if we cease our quest or wait for him to drop the desired pearl in our laps.

Years ago a popular preacher delivered a sermon which caused no little rumpus, "Shall the Fundamentalists Win?" Many soft-shelled liberals deplored the sermon. It was not tactful. It made the fundamentalists mad. It was stooping to their level. And because of that too-proud-to-fight attitude we are in the mess we are in. In far too many areas the fundamentalists have won. It is easy to retort, "They haven't won. Steadily they have been defeated, have lost this stronghold and that." That is only half the truth. They may have lost certain key positions, have been forced from certain places in the sun, but by their persistent and noisy campaign of vilifying all who do not share their views—including our starry-eyed and politically minded appeasers—and of insisting that they and they alone have the truth, they have won many adherents from those who don't know what it is all about, and, far worse than that, have given the impression far and wide to the unthinking and religiously adrift that that is religion, take it or leave it.

It is time for men and women who are not afraid of the badge liberal and who do not care to be cast in the rôle of either Nicodemus or Caiaphas, who want to feel at home in this world of ours as they quest on seeking to be "loyal to the royal" in themselves, who find immeasurable values in a book which has been through the years a lamp to the feet of millions toiling on to the sunlit summits, to refuse to allow it to be turned into a lamp-post on which to lynch their brothers and sisters who refuse to interpret, or misinterpret it, as they do. It is time for us to still our fears about fighting being beneath our dignity, to scorn Munichs—religious as well as political—to refuse to allow values in which we believe to be misrepresented and vilified, to fight with all our strength for the right of every man, ourselves included, to push on and, if possible, to find that which satisfies, without the constant stigma of irreligion and impiety from those who impudently try to force the Almighty into the pitifully small confines of their own likes and dislikes. Shall the fundamentalists win? God help the world if they do.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

One of the characteristics of the King James version, and one which not infrequently leads the unwary reader astray, is its habit of indenting every verse and starting it with a capital letter. A case in point is found in I Thess. 5:22. Here we have, as a seemingly independent and general admonition: "Abstain from all appearance of evil." And it is safe to say that the average reader understands it as did Calvin: "Abstain from even the appearance of evil; not only from what is definitely wrong but also from that which seems to be wrong but actually is not.

That this is good advice and cannot be repeated too often, especially to those in positions of influence, is beyond argument. Many are they—and not infrequently ministers have been of the number—who inadvertently or, on occasion, more deliberately as an impatient protest against customs or proprieties which seemed to them superficial or outworn, have uttered the commonplace: "As long as my character is unspotted, I am not concerned about my reputation." And usually, when it is too late, they have discovered, like Esau, that it is far easier to throw away priceless possessions than it is to retrieve them. Undoubtedly there are occasions when character and reputation stand in seemingly hopeless conflict and to preserve the one means to sacrifice the other. If that tragedy occurs, the man of integrity must, of course, sacrifice the appearance for the real, with the hope that in the long run the reason for his choice may be apparent. But, unless he is a fool, he will do it only after what used to be styled soul-searching and regret, and with his eyes wide open to the likely consequence. The sage advice of the old priest is still pertinent and open to almost endless amplification: "Never say anything good about yourself, for no one will believe it; never say anything bad about yourself, for every one will believe it." Yes, the traditional interpretation of I Thess. 5:22 sounds a wholesome warning and one with which Paul would have been in complete agreement.

But wholesome as that advice is, it is not apparently what Paul had in mind here. He is not concluding his letter with a series of separate aphorisms or maxims. Instead, verses 19-22 are tightly connected and have to do with a problem which was of great importance to the early church, namely, *charismata,* that is, extraordinary powers which Christians believed they had received to perform deeds which others, not so endowed, could not hope to duplicate. That this early Christian confidence could, and on occasion did, lead to very unfortunate excesses is all too clear. A strong beam of light is thrown here by Paul's words in I Cor. 12–14, words in part evoked by specific questions raised by the Corinthians themselves, in part by the sorry excesses of a group in that ancient city who had found that particular drink very heady and demoralizing. And

his reply had been characteristic. Gifts of the spirit were very valuable and were to be prized, but fruits of the spirit were still better. Much that masqueraded as "fruits of the spirit" was unfortunately far from wholesome or to be desired.

Here in his letter to Thessalonica a similar, while not identical, situation is to be seen. Apparently the Thessalonians had not raised queries at this point, nor had precisely the same sort of abuses arisen. Nonetheless a similar situation was present and needed direction. So his words: "Do not quench the spirit or its gifts, that is, do not repress those who are genuinely able to make worthy use of them; do not treat lightly cases of prophesying; yet, on the other hand, test all the gifts of the spirit, holding fast to the good and standing aloof from whatever kind is evil." So translated the passage has cogency and pegs down the warning he had earlier sounded against the troublesome and potentially dangerous group who by their unwarranted demands might well cause the newly established church to be viewed with suspicion and contempt. And this translation does justice to the Greek as the traditional "appearance" does not. It is highly improbable that the word so rendered is open to that meaning. Calvin, apparently led astray by the fact that the Vulgate rendered it *species,* failed to see its proper force—*sort,* or *kind,* or *class*—and understood it in the sense of appearance as over against reality.

Nor was Paul's a solitary voice. A similar note of warning is sounded in the Johannine letters. In I John 4:1 it is crisply and unmistakably phrased: "Beloved, believe not every spirit, but prove—that is, *test* (the word is the same as in I Thess.)—the spirits; because many false prophets have gone out into the world." And in the shorter second epistle (v. 10) the warning is the same: Those who fail to meet the test are not to be welcomed in your homes or gatherings. In that less known but very valuable writing, the *Didache* ("Teaching of the Twelve Apostles"), an even clearer warning is sounded—and one essentially the same as Paul's word to Thessalonica: "But whosoever shall say in a spirit, 'Give me money, or something else,' ye shall not listen to him; but if he tells you to give on behalf of others in want, let none judge him" (11:12). Unfortunately, as the early records make all too clear, there was always a temptation to cash personal checks on the Bank of Heaven.

Nor is the menace wholly past as every sober Christian must regretfully confess. There are Elmer Gantreys, both clerical and lay, although fortunately not quite so common as some novelists would suggest. Eventually we may even wake up to the fact—and so may the F. B. I.—that certain nationwide so-called religious broadcasts, with their seductive and high-pressure appeal for funds, are very lucrative performances for their promoters. Yes, "test all things," including "prophecies" and "spiritual healings," is still wholesome advice. And, as is always the case, the honest man, whose "gifts" are accompanied by genuine "fruits," welcomes the test.

From Off the Campus and On

WITH THIS issue completed the editor draws a very long and deep breath. For six months a normally very efficient and almost ideal relation between editor's desk and composing room has been disrupted by a most unhappy set of labor problems which brought annoyance and hardship to all concerned. For the first time in many years CROZER QUARTERLY has been late in appearing. We believe, however, that its quality has not suffered and that our readers preferred to wait a few weeks rather than to receive a substandard issue. 1948 will be one year that the editor devoutly hopes will not be repeated.

We are very happy to be able to print Mr. Ware's article. Too often we become smug and satisfied with our present attainments. It is to those who are constantly pressing against their intellectual frontiers that we are indebted for all progress. Was it not Browning who remarked in substance: "If one's reach does not exceed one's grasp, then what's a heaven for"? As Mr. Ware wrote the editor, "Thank God (I say it reverently) I haven't solved my problem and I never shall, for it is one whose 'margin fades forever and forever as we move.'" Mr. Ware is a patent lawyer, practicing in Philadelphia, who has found time to read and think far beyond the normal horizons of his profession. The son of an Episcopal minister, he was educated at the University of Virginia and George Washington University, receiving his LL.B. from the latter. During the first world war he served in the United States Army.

Professor Keighton needs no introduction to our readers. His articles and book reviews have been frequent and rewarding. A graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and of Crozer, he has been for several years, following long service in the parish ministry, professor of preaching and worship at Crozer. In the present essay he sounds a note which very definitely needs sounding.

Dr. McCreary received his A.M. and Ph.D. from the University of Toronto. Following several years on the faculties of the University of Western Ontario and McMaster he taught at Sarah Lawrence College. He has recently been called to Bates College as professor of psychology.

Dr. Bristol is assistant professor of biblical studies at McMaster University, of which he is a graduate. He also holds degrees from the University of Toronto, Union Theological Seminary, and Victoria University. After six years in the parish ministry he returned to McMaster, first as lecturer in classics, then to his present post.

Professor Banner is assistant professor of church history in the School of Religion of Howard University. He is a graduate of Pennsylvania State College (A.B.), Yale Divinity School (B.D.), and Harvard

University (A.M. and Ph.D. in philosophy). During his stay at Harvard he was a Sheldon traveling fellow.

Dr. Enslin is professor of New Testament at Crozer. A considerable part of his time is spent in deciding what should and should not appear in CROZER QUARTERLY. Very possibly his judgment in both of these regards is at times open to question. Some may incline to feel that the present issue affords an example of such editorial inadvertence.

We are happy to round out the year with an especially large crop of book reviews and notices. Our readers have been so vocal in their appreciation of this section of CROZER QUARTERLY that we are venturing to devote forty pages to our survey of new books. Thirty-nine reviews from thirty reviewers is a pretty liberal amount, but we believe that there is a place for reviews which attempt to be fair and to appraise the volumes surveyed on their merits. Dr. Aubrey is president of Crozer and Mrs. John P. Crozer professor of Christian social philosophy. Dr. Oren Baker is dean and professor of pastoral theology at Colgate-Rochester. Professor Berkeley is head of the department of Old Testament at Andover Newton. Professor Booth has the chair of historical theology at Boston University's School of Theology. Dr. Brush is professor of church history at Andover Newton. Dr. Buckler has a similar chair at Oberlin. Dr. Bundy is professor of English Bible at De Pauw University. Professor Cassady is professor of applied Christianity at Crozer. Dr. Cranston is Phillips professor of religion at Dartmouth. Dr. Davis is professor of Christian theology at Crozer. Dr. Enslin has been introduced. Mr. Theodore Enslin is a former student of Boris Goldowsky at the New England Conservatory of Music. Dr. Ferm is professor of philosophy at Oberlin. Dr. Franklin is president *emeritus* of Crozer and a recognized authority on foreign missions. Dr. Harkness is professor of church history at Crozer. Dr. Herrick is president *emeritus* of Andover Newton. Dr. Hudson is professor of the history of American Christianity at Colgate-Rochester. Mr. Ivey is minister of the Second Baptist Church of Richmond, Va. Professor Keighton has the chair of preaching and worship at Crozer. Professor Kluckhohn is a member of the department of anthropology at Harvard and director of its Russian Research Centre. Dr. Knudson is dean *emeritus* of the Boston University School of Theology. Mr. Luttrell is minister of the First Baptist Church, Emporia, Va. Dr. Mays is president of Morehouse College. Dr. Moehlman is professor *emeritus* of church history at Colgate-Rochester. Dr. Pritchard is professor of Old Testament at Crozer. Dr. Roberts is professor of theology at Union Theological Seminary. Dr. Rose is minister of the First Baptist Church, Philadelphia. Dr. Schloerb is minister of the Hyde Park Baptist Church, Chicago. Dr. Van Dusen is president of Union Theological Seminary. Mr. Westphal is minister of the Lansdowne (Pa.) Baptist Church.

BOOK REVIEWS

Church, Law and Society, by Gustaf Aulén, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. xvi, 114, $2.

This little book contains the Hewett Lectures, delivered in three American seminaries by a Swedish bishop who is already well known in this country through the English translation of his *Christus Victor*. It suggests that Sweden is offering a middle way in theology as well as in economics; for by means of his conception of the law of God Bishop Aulén seeks to mediate between the church and secularism and (within the church) between liberalism and the theology of crisis. Accordingly he urges that although the gospel supersedes the law as a means of salvation, it has not abrogated the universal validity of the latter as the basis for justice. One of his main purposes, therefore, is to show how love and justice are reconcilable.

He criticizes pietism for separating the church from the world, since such a separation leads to a passive attitude toward social problems or to a perfectionist attitude toward the rôle of Christians in social action. He criticizes liberalism for so accomodating itself to prevailing patterns of secular thought—idealistic philosophy, the doctrine of progress, belief in the goodness of man—that it has lost sight of those aspects of the gospel which cannot be reduced to an ethico-cultural ideal. His own view springs, he claims, from a fresh insight into the intention of the Reformation and a new, realistic approach to the biblical message; the principle of justification by faith safeguards against pietism's perfectionism and against liberalism's tendency to regard salvation as an accomplishment of the "divine part" of man. The same standpoint prompts him to adopt an eschatalogical interpretation of history and to see the church as coextensive with the working of divine *agapē*. Only so, he believes, can the uniqueness and saving power of the gospel be understood. But the power of God works beyond the gospel and the church, through the law; and recognition of the positive, dynamic function of the latter can teach Christians to collaborate with non-Christians in striving for world order, without compromising their own position.

A survey of the crisis of our age underscores the fact that belief in universal justice has been almost swallowed up by claims which are relative to the interests of particular nations and cultures. The fault lies partly, but not wholly, with those secular conceptions of human autonomy which refuse to acknowledge any inviolable and holy claims superior to man himself. The churches are also at fault wherever they have adopted an indefensible dichotomy, based on a *misinterpretation* of Luther, between spiritual and political questions. On the positive side, secular and humanistic forces, as well as the churches, have contributed to the struggle against tyranny, though the latter possess a uniquely fortifying resource in being able to appeal to God's law against the depredations of the totalitarian state. This has manifested itself in a sense of solidarity, a courage in the face of persecution, and an unshatterable confidence in God's moral sovereignty which secularism cannot rival.

The struggle of the church for her own integrity and for social justice has increased her willingness to admit and to learn from her undeniable shortcomings. These have been of opposite kinds: first, in many ecclesiastical quarters an indifference to great social and international problems, and a willingness to "string along" with wealthy and nationalistic influences; second, monopolistic claims to be the

only spokesman for righteousness. In the former case, the "otherworldliness" of Christianity has been abused. The saying about "the church keeping out of politics" has been completely discredited because of its cynical employment by those who sought to destroy the church. Against it, a properly conceived eschatology will make belief in the kingdom of God its guiding criterion for attacking economic and political evils. The doctrine of original sin has also been so abused as to lead to a passive fatalism. As the Reformers developed it, it means that man cannot achieve eternal salvation through his own power, but it does not at all deny that men, including the unconverted "natural" man, can carry forward political and social actions which directly affect the extent to which justice is fulfilled. Bishop Aulén is, for good reasons, especially careful at this point to show that Luther did not so conceive of the distinction between church and state as to give the latter license to pursue a policy of expediency; on the contrary, he regarded the state as the guardian of justice, under responsibility to the law of God, and held that the church must admonish the state when the latter fails to live up to its divinely grounded obligations. Hence Aulén is able to assert that the Norwegians who quoted Luther in resisting Quisling were much more faithful to the Reformer's central ideas than were the Nazi Christians who quoted him in rationalizing their capitulation to Hitler.

The second criticism of the church, mentioned above, makes us aware of the fact that it has sometimes been guilty of sponsoring utopian aims and of failing to realize the extent to which Christians remain enmeshed in power conflicts and egotism.

As he develops his views concerning the positive function of law, the author steers a middle course against legalistic theories which would reintroduce "salvation through moralism," and against antinomian theories which would regard love as abrogating the need for justice as the stable basis for human fellowship. He does not appeal, however, to the doctrine of *lex naturæ* because he rejects the assumption that reason can be so emancipated from particularism and cultural conditioning as to provide, by itself, a universally valid conception of justice. All theories of human rights or human dignity, when arrived at apart from belief in God, are vitiated by relativism. The true basis for universal justice is the dynamic activity of God himself *(agapē)*, and there is no ultimate contradiction between love and justice because when the two are separated the former becomes sentimental and the latter becomes harsh and impersonal.

So far as the church's implementation of justice goes, the bishop's views are familiar—and not too incisive. It should oppose both irresponsible individualism and enslaving collectivism. It must go far beyond private charity, taking the initiative in creating a better social order. It must recognize realistically that the maintenance of justice requires the use of political power, but it must also be watchful of the dangers to liberty which attend the centralization of power.

In undertaking this task, the church finds herself weakened by internal divisions in a world which has become increasingly pagan. But she has grounds for hope in the inner fidelity to Christ which the struggles of these days have strengthened, and in a supernational unity which has manifested itself in the ecumenical movement.

In general, this little book is well suited to perform a mediating task. Coming as it does from the leader of an established Lutheran church, it makes a significant contribution to Protestant coöperation on political and social questions. Patently the author has striven to be moderate and fair instead of polemical, and his attempt to show that the principle of justification by faith can be combined with a positive

social ethic (without resorting to Roman Catholic expedients) is directly toward filling a tragic gap in conservative Protestant thought. In this reviewer's opinion, however, the book is unsatisfactory at the point where Bishop Aulén fails to examine adequately the relationship between his own conception of the law of God (as based on revelation) and secular conceptions of justice. To dismiss the latter because they are subject to relativization is far too simple. He ignores the fact that faith in revelation is subject to the same difficulty; at least, he fails to demonstrate that it is not. Moreover, it is difficult to see how he can reconcile his thesis that all men can affect the cause of justice (which is grounded in *agapē*), with his assertion that *agapē* is purely divine and not human at all. The above survey has also made it evident that his "recommendations" to the church and to the world are, to say the least, somewhat general. Finally, it must be confessed that the book is repetitious and loosely organized, though concessions should be made to the fact that the author was not using his mother tongue.

DAVID E. ROBERTS

Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture, edited by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver, New York, Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion [distributed by Harper], 1947, pp. xx, 703, $6.50.

Man is gripped by a profound fear, a fear of possible extinction. Has he released the furies or a benevolent genie? Even if life is saved, must man live in slavery, or will he master the vast power now flowing unlimited from hitherto hidden sources of the universe? The seventh symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion confronts this problem courageously in a remarkable series of sixty-two papers by sixty-five scholars and specialists, many of national and international renown. The special form of this problem of control of power is that conceived by the leaders of the Conference as central for Western culture; namely, "How can we retain the essential advantages of our civilization and yet bring the quest for power and the tendency toward aggression under control?" The assumption made throughout is that the answer to this problem is not to be found in any one field of knowledge but in an integration of various disciplines. This quest for a unity of knowledge probes to the very heart of the spiritual problem of our day and gives this volume a special value for religious thinkers. It will be obvious to the reader that the purpose of the Conference, to achieve some unifying principles of action to guide our statesmen and men of affairs in finance and industry, was not realized. The thick barriers of academic specialization do not make for coördination, but the will and purpose were present if not the deed. And it would be hard to find a more solid, weighty treatment of power motives and tendencies toward aggression, from many angles of contemporary science, philosophy, and religion, or a more illuminating purview of the serious, deeper insights of modern intellectuals than these papers.

The papers are arranged in six sections, each section corresponding to a session of the Conference at which the papers were read and discussed. They begin with an analysis of Western culture, then its transmission, the basis of unity in culture, the rôle of religion, the sources of power, and, finally, the nature of political power. Most interesting is the fact that two general points of view develop among the authors of each group of papers; there tends to be agreement in general among those in the same field of knowledge. Yet each paper stands by itself as an independent, personal achievement, each to be judged and enjoyed on its own merits.

1. *Analysis of Western Culture:* The sociologists and others explain the

aggressive tendencies in our culture in terms of behavior patterns evolved mainly within the family, the occupational group, the economic arrangements of society, the ideological influences. This is the hopeful crowd. They are confident behavior patterns can be changed, through social legislation, informal education, better parental guidance, and improved conditions of growth, especially for children. But the political scientists, philosophers, physicist, and others trace the sources of aggression to man's inherent nature: some to his native lust for power, others to his morphological structure, his irrationality and emotionalism, or his long nomadic history in the West. The cure for the malady, they say, is either accomodate society to these elemental and inevitable forces in man, or give him moral ideals and scientific attitudes of mind to curb and control his self-assertiveness and natural aggrandizement.

2. *The Transmission of Culture:* Is there a point in the transfer of culture at which aggressive tendencies can be siphoned out? Yes, indeed, say the psychologists and educators. But we may have to begin with the embryo, with early biological development as well as with re-education of emotional patterns through family, church, and school. For man is largely molded by the cultural process. As we can change the conditions of man's growth—physical, social, psychical—man is remade. No, says the historian, the physicist, the public official, and others, you can't change man, but you can give him new ideas, ideals, value concepts. Give him thorough scientific knowledge, revamp his entire view of the nature of his universe, and he will change and remake the cultural process. The transmission of culture is mainly an exchange of ideas.

3. *The Basis of Cultural Integration:* Given the process of change, how does culture come to have stability and unity? What binds the parts of a civilization together? Some of the religious scholars conceive of God, man's faith in God, as the only true basis of unity, a spiritual order in other words. Others more concretely describe the web of custom, habit, and folkways, the "cultural matrix" (Wieman) by which individuals mutually support and sustain each other, yet seek individual fulfillment. One fascinating paper on two Hopi Indian communities is illuminating. Unfortunately, no paper presents the importance of the cultic rôle of religion in integrating the human community. The numerous *means* suggested throughout the section for overcoming divisive, disintegrating tendencies in our culture would probably be agreed to by all and already constitute familiar social objectives.

4. *Rôle of Religion and Other Social Factors in the Control of Power:* The writers are largely religious scholars. Four papers, analyzing the past, generally conclude that religion has been a restraining rather than a transforming influence. It ameliorated social evils rather than eliminated them. Five papers dealing with the present and future reflected two viewpoints on the reconstruction of religion. Some like Northrop placed emphasis on reconstituting the nature of Western religion. Others urged the mobilization of its inherent resources and a redirection of its energies. These are most thought-provoking analyses, quite individualistic, not integrated, but striking. Of special mention is a brilliant paper by Ordway Tead on the "Economic Channeling of Personal Power" that everyone having responsibility for human relations should read.

5. *Sources of Power:* Are ideas and ideals real sources of power? Yes, say the theologians and philosophers. Ideas have intrinsic worth, for they are beyond the conditions of culture, or space and time. Man, says Allers (Catholic psychologist) is not a passive product of culture; he can fashion his life in terms of great ideals. The sociologists and economists say also, Yes, ideas, have power, but only as they

are incorporated in groups or movements having the power to make the ideas effective. This is cogently argued by Wirth. We see here one of the old battles of history. But is not the real problem for us, What are the *good* ideas? And when we find them, how do we gain their acceptance among men? Such questions would have made more pointed the substance of these papers.

6. *The Rôle of Political Power:* These writers are all political scientists and experts in international law. Two things mark this group. First, they are unanimous in seeing the inevitability of some kind of world order; they favor a world federation rather than a national imperialism with world domination or the old-fashioned balance of power (now between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.). Second, they are an unhappy lot. For their analyses reveal trends mainly in the direction of the alternatives least to be desired. Behind the facade of the United Nations (the creation of idealists), the great powers are engaged in the old game of establishing new bases, rearming, making alliances, covertly sabotaging the very things they ostensibly support. Considerable attention is given to nationalism, to its constructive value in developing new nations, as well as to its malignant growth as the supreme barrier to international comity. There is agreement too that the Soviet power has become too great to be "pushed around" and that agreement with her is the only alternative to war. Significant is the absence, with the exception of one general reference, of any consideration of the churches in molding political power or effecting world order. One senses here the chasm between the churches and contemporary intellectual leadership. Is it that the latter hesitate to presume on that field? Or is it ignorance? Or have they subconsciously dismissed the churches from their calculations? Yet one paper speaks of power, operating not of itself but in the *minds* of men, men who have created it, utilized it, and chosen its direction. Has any force stirred the minds of men as has religion? Has religious scholarship failed to make explicit what contemporary anthropological scientists (Malinowski, Mead, Benedict) have demonstrated?

A final paper on "Culture and Power" seeks in a measure to summarize some of the conclusions of the conference.

Three impressions of this reviewer: We have a long, long way to go before a real synthesis of knowledge and some underlying principles are attained. But a real beginning has been made. Second, the Conference by a change of method from debate to collaboration would attain marked progress toward unity of knowledge. Third, it is impressive to note what a large community of interest exists between anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists on the one hand and religious thinkers on the other. Probably in no other area would a minimum of agreement be so amply rewarding.

MAYNARD CASSADY

Witness to the Light: F. D. Maurice's Message for Today, by Alec R. Vidler, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. 238, $3.

Christian social leadership is caught today in the crossfire between "eschatological" theologians who deplore utopian schemes for christianizing society and radical social reformers who decry theology as a distraction. This is not a new experience. In the middle of the nineteenth century Socialism in England was allied to morality but not to religion; while religious leaders concerned themselves little with the industrial worker. To overcome this gap F. D. Maurice proposed to "christianize socialism," and in order to do that he proposed to dig down to the foundations of Christian social action.

The result was a system of Christian theology anchored deep in the Bible but dynamic in its practical implications. This theology is here studied by a distinguished contemporary Anglican scholar and editor.

Maurice had his limitations, especially in regard to biblical criticism, but he was the exemplar of a deep conviction which he held about the Christian faith, and the force of his personality often overcame the lack of logic in his argument.

That argument was as follows: God has created and redeemed man in Christ, and by the fact of the Incarnation all other events are to be interpreted. Thus man is to be understood by starting not from his sinfulness but from his "constitution in Christ." Since all men thus find their true meaning in Jesus Christ, and since all creation also derives through him, all men stand united in him and apart from him they are lost. God chose to save men through Christ and thus holds the initiative in the divine-human relation.

But this universal relation of Christ to men and creation precludes all talk of the world as hopelessly evil and all glib ecclesiastical opposition to secularism. The church is witness to the true constitution of the world, but it bears a peculiar responsibility to bring the world to the order of God. The church therefore cannot be exclusive, and the idea of a church universal is of mankind claiming what is its right: unity in Christ, as a consummation of all forms of fellowship. No sect dare claim this for itself alone; and no party in the church dare assume superiority or try to suppress others.

This unity in Christ is not produced, but only recognized, in baptism; and yet must be recognized as something given by God and not achieved by human decision. For what is repentance if God does not already love man? Thus it follows that baptism is "the sacrament of constant union," but not the necessary condition of that union. Similarly creeds are symbols of our being saved by faith, and to repeat them is only to affirm allegiance to the Name they speak. Common prayer helps to preserve the sense of the continuing unity, and to keep the individuality from self-centredness and fragmentariness in praying.

In the eucharist all the acts of the church find their consummation, for here the communion of God with man and of man with man, the sense of a mysterious order in which men participate, the higher meaning of material things, all find expression. In the ministry the continuity and structure of the divine-human fellowship finds a sign; while the unity is suggested in the episcopate. But the priest is not a vicar of Christ, taking the place of someone absent. Rather he is the representative of the ever-present Christ.

These things Maurice felt to be rooted in the Bible, in its history and in its theological orientation, where God's universal kingdom is set forth not as a goal but as a fact. Beside this central truth the minor questions of doctrinal detail fade into insignificance. From this as a centre he could move out into the political order with confidence, seeing in the nation a local and temporary expression of the great, deep community which men have under God. Nations are therefore part of God's plan, a "necessary condition for the preservation of a living faith in God." Let a man then be proud of his nationality, but let him also view his nation as in conscience bound to serve God.

Such service cannot be left to the *demos,* to decision by the greatest number. It is a matter for the ruler and the aristocracy which hold their authority not from the people but from the grace of God. The national church must "uphold the national life . . . by its prayers, its confessions, its sacraments." The Church of England is both Catholic and Protestant: Catholic in its stress on the universality of the church,

Protestant in its assertion of the responsibility of every nation and person to God. In the clarification of this responsibility lay his interest as a Christian Socialist—as educator rather than politician—for which he is perhaps best known in this country.

This is much more than an Anglican study. It has general theological significance, and its more hopeful view of society cannot be dismissed as an outworn Victorian optimism. While there are many points in the above argument that strike us as archaic and provincial, there is a breadth and depth of conception which challenge us today in America as much as in England. And while this is in no sense a biography, the reader cannot escape in the copious (sometimes too copious) quotations the personality of the man of whom five men once wrote independently that they would prefer his company to that of any other man in the last hours of life.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

Prejudice and Property, by Tom C. Clark and Philip B. Perlman, Washington, Public Affairs Press, (1948), pp. 104, $2 (cloth) and $1 (paper).

The Public Affairs Press, with the coöperation of the United States Department of Justice, sets a valuable precedent by making available in popular form a brief presented to the Supreme Court by the Attorney General and the Solicitor General. The average reader finds its seventy-five pages of argument as interesting as any good book, and scarcely realizes that the flowing narrative is a legal document buttressed by nearly twenty pages of small-print notes, tactfully called references, and relegated, along with an excellent short bibliography, to the back of the volume. The notes are derived not only from court decisions, but also from standard works and articles on racism, publications of professional associations, and the report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights.

The brief attacks a relatively new departure in American life, racial and religious restrictive covenants. These arose after the Supreme Court in 1917 declared invalid certain state and municipal laws which limited residence in specified urban areas to members of privileged racial stock. These covenants became more common when Negroes migrated from the rural South to the urban North and West during and after the world wars. They are either inserted in deeds or embodied in written agreements made between neighboring land owners and officially recorded in order to give due notice to subsequent purchasers or occupants. They usually state that for a fixed period the property cannot be bought, leased, rented, or occupied by persons not of "the Caucasian race." If a non-Caucasian attempts to live in the restricted area, the courts are asked to eject him. Such covenants have become common in established residential areas and new subdivisions throughout such metropolitan areas as Detroit, St. Louis, Washington, New York, Philadelphia, Columbus, and Los Angeles. Negroes, Orientals, Puerto Ricans, Hawaiians, and sometimes even Jews, although most of them are American citizens, are by these covenants excluded from desirable regions and thereby limited to inadequate and unwholesome dwellings for which they must pay abnormally high prices. Employing social and moral as well as legal techniques, the brief analyzes inequalities and other evils incident to the present American housing system.

Although the High Court of the Canadian province of Ontario has declared such racial and religious covenants invalid, courts in nineteen of the United States and the District of Columbia have held covenants enforceable, and in no jurisdiction of the United States have they been ruled entirely inapplicable. Not until 1948, however, were covenant cases submitted to the Supreme Court of this

country. Although the federal government is not a party to the cases, the Justice Department as "friend of the court" has filed this brief petitioning that the Court declare the covenants invalid as a matter of public interest. It is suggested that the issue is as significant as that involved in the Dred Scott decision of 1857. Mr. Clark, Mr. Perlman, and their aides contend that restrictive covenants violate the civil and constitutional rights of American citizens, particularly as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. They indicate that the covenants are essentiallly a Northern problem, and that the system if continued might provide a channel through which whole groups of citizens, designated by race, color, creed, or ancestry, might be exiled forever from this nation.

The book concludes by observing that if and when the Court may determine these covenants to be abhorrent to the law of the land, the racial issue will still remain and will demand further attention. Religiously minded Americans should know about and support the positive action of their agents who have presented this significant brief. They also should work more vigorously to create and implement an intelligent public opinion calculated to strengthen such official national policies and to stimulate effective local measures to guarantee the social and civil rights of all races and religions.

EARL CRANSTON

The Protestant Era, by Paul Tillich (translated and with a concluding essay by James Luther Adams), Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948, pp. xxxi, 323, $4.

The Shaking of the Foundations, by Paul Tillich, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. vii, 186, $2.50.

Professor Adams of the Meadville Theological School has done a real service in translating for the first of these volumes many of Dr. Tillich's essays that were not previously available in English. In so doing he has given many Americans access to the broad sweep of Tillich's thought, so that the latter's theological and social ideas may have the impact they deserve.

For Tillich has a depth and a balance not shared by most of the so-called dialectical theologians, and again and again he protests against the excesses of Barth and Kierkegaard. In his inaugural address as professor of philosophical theology at Union Seminary (Chapter VI here) he made an irrefutable case for the combination of philosophy and biblical (or, as he calls it, kerygmatic) theology: "Both philosophy and theology become poor and distorted when they are separated from each other." Furthermore, he is unalterably opposed to dogmatism in any form whether naturalistic or supernaturalistic, because he believes that we can never claim to have caught the whole or ultimate truth in any of our formulations.

This skepticism is for him an important principle of Protestantism which is a a perennial protest even against its own forms; but there is also a positive side to Protestantism, and this is the experience of grace which is apprehended in "imaginative intuition." Yet this intuition does not evade the logical processes but rather penetrates through them with the acute awareness that beyond or within the object is a meaning that is ultimate and unconditional and unavoidable. Consequently, Tillich is able to proceed *through* the natural world to its deepest meanings, and to find in the secular order religious significance. Indeed, he asserts that "in every Protestant form the religious element must be related to, and questioned by a secular element," and accordingly that "Protestant theology should . . . frankly . . . relate itself to philosophy and courageously so, though under the criterion of the Protestant principle."

What then, is this Protestant principle? It is "the radical proclamation of the human border-situation . . . that is encountered in despair"; and it faces this boundary of our human life in terms of "the new being which is manifest in Jesus Christ." At this point Tillich objects to the morbid subjectivism of Kierkegaard and his followers which has been more destructive than reconstructive; but he does not in this volume make as clear as one could wish the meaning of "the new being in Christ." He seems to refer to the power that breaks through all forms in nature and in history, and is manifest as the love (*agapē*) which overcomes separation and undercuts all legalisms by its more fundamental power. It is to be hoped that in his forthcoming *magnum opus* on systematic theology Dr. Tillich will elaborate this considerably since it remains rather vague here.

The Protestant principle is however more than this. It is a perpetual relating of the eternal to the immediate situation in venturesome, decisive action, with daring and risk. That the author has himself done this is abundantly evident from his own career (he was expelled from his chair of philosophy at Frankfurt by the Nazis) and from his writing in this volume. Time and time again, in areas that less courageous Christians avoid, he brings devastating criticism, profound analysis, and daring proposals to challenge the smugness of the churches, of science, of education, of capitalist economics, of political creeds, of psychotherapy. He accepts much of the Marxist economic analysis but rejects the communist confidence in the power of social reorganization to redeem mankind as well as Marx's assurance that this human perfection would come at some future historical period. To Tillich man will always have an outreach that exceeds his grasp and leaves him always caught in the tension and contradiction of unrealized possibilities. To accept this fate as the very condition of all our thinking is the eseence of Tillich's philosophy.

When it comes to specific action, however, he is puzzling. His critical strictures on contemporary social life imply by contrary some positive action to be taken; and his existential philosophy requires "the unity of theory and practice," in, "actual living" which includes decisive action. "The truth must be done in order to be recognized." Yet he declares that it would be "very inspiritual to try" to give "a program of spiritual action." While the risk of arbitrary dogmatism attaches to all programs of action, we have no other way either of expressing our faith or of testing it; and one has the uncomfortable feeling that the practical issues of Christian ethics are dissolved in the general "direction towards the unconditional."

The meaning of this "unconditional" is carefully analyzed in Adam's essay which has been wisely put at the end as a summary rather than at the beginning as an introduction. The author's own autobiographical introduction serves as an excellent background for the essays that follow.

No reader can fail to be impressed with the tremendous range of Tillich's scholarship and the depth of his perception; and in this beautifully translated volume there is a crisp, analytical style that is clear because it is free from the verbosity of Berdyaev and the rhetorical paradoxes of Reinhold Niebuhr. It is unfortunate that more reference is not made to our American philosophers, though he did on one occasion relate his own views with those of leading thinkers in the United States in a brief article in the *Union Seminary Review* not reproduced here. This serious neglect is not due solely to the pre-exilic date of most of the material included here, and it points to a weakness still needing correction in his writing.

In the little volume of sermons also cited at the top of this review the

philosopher often turns poet, and the meditations which he presents are gripping in their depth of feeling and their intensity of thought. Glib preachers would do well to ponder the substantial and rich diet which is offered in brief compass. The Bible comes to life with tremendous force for the modern man as Tillich deals somberly with our current social situation, or brings the exultant faith of one who has deeply doubted and bravely trusted.

After this we shall eagerly await his great systematic work.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

Prayer and the Common Life, by Georgia Harkness, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 224, $2.50.

We are familiar with the expression "What the World Needs." We have heard it—and doubtless used it—many times. It is with this common phrase that *Prayer and the Common Life* begins and to which it reverts from time to time. The writer, Professor Harkness, who has done much to bring religious thought to the popular level, of course, recognizes the fact that prayer of itself is not enough. It is not all the world needs. The naïvely devotional reader might, however, miss the warning and be led to say, "Let us pray," when the word should be "Let us act." In these days of desperate need and turmoil prayer should be not an escape but, in the scriptural phrase, a preparation for girding up the loins.

While the book is divided into three parts: Foundations, Methods, and Fruits, it largely deals with two problems: prayer for the world and prayer for the individual. It is in the latter aspect, it seems to me, that it makes the more helpful contribution in spite of the fact that it may lead the unreflecting to think of prayer as passive and submissive. The enormous sale of Rabbi Liebman's *Peace of Mind* is a revelation of the longing of the individual soul in these dark days for an inner tranquillity. In the section in the third part of the book on prayer and peace of mind there is daily food for this great human hunger. Prayer, the author says, can redirect and purify desire and thereby help us fulfil desire within the will of God. This is great and comforting truth. It is what the individual truly needs, and since it is basic, it is true to say that it is what the world needs.

Like many pastoral prayers, the book is somewhat discursive. Undoubtedly we should have a better theological perspective for our prayers. So the book starts with a foundation of Christian belief regarding man and God. Yet when we turn to the gospel we are impressed with what may be called the great assumptions of Jesus. To him God was the environment of the soul. He taught his disciples not so much to define his attributes as to realize the environment. This is something we must achieve, not by means of theology but sometimes almost in spite of it.

The last chapter, "Prayer and the Peace of the World," moves from the individual to the cosmic woes of our times. "If we are to have a new world with peace, order, and security," she tells us, "there is nothing more needed than prayer." We recall how Lincoln said of the North and South during the Civil War, "Both sides pray to the same God." It is appalling to think how terribly true this was during both world wars. Beyond even the need of prayer is the need of what Professor Harkness calls "a spiritual world community." To achieve that we need not so much more praying as a different kind of praying. "God bless America" praying is not likely to be the kind of praying that moves us toward world fellowship. Effective and redemptive prayer must be within the will of God. It is hard for a devout Christian to realize that sometimes even with the best intent he may pray amiss.

The book covers a wide range. There is an analysis of prayer, private and public. It deals with the nature of worship, even worship by the radio. It enumerates the hindrances to prayer and the emotions to which prayer should minister. It does not overlook psychology and prayer. It has two fine values. It can be a help to the sincere individual to find a richer and more worthy prayer life. The book is abundant with help of this sort. It can also be a help to a group as a study book. It should be a group with a purpose to make prayer a sacred fellowship and to discover through prayer a better understanding of the task of Christian living in a world that has gone contrary to the will of God. This should teach, as the closing paragraphs show, that prayer must not be an escape from the judgment of God but an earnest effort to bring ourselves within his will. E. C. HERRICK

The Psychiatric Study of Jesus, by Albert Schweitzer, Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. 81, $2.

The translation of this little study by Albert Schweitzer was not provoked by any general interest in the issue discussed—the possibility of psychopathic traits in the mind and personality of Jesus. It was called forth by the ever-growing interest in Albert Schweitzer—the man, his message and mission. The issue of the sanity of Jesus never aroused any general Christian reaction or protest. The great majority of believers were never aware of the fact that the sanity of Jesus had been questioned. Those who did know ignored it as absurd or dismissed it as obnoxious—something of the same feeling that may have prompted Matthew and Luke to omit Mark 3:21.

The detection of possible fanatical traits in Jesus goes back as far as the *lives* of Jesus by Strauss (1835) and Renan (1863). However, the pathological portrayals proper belong to the first decade of the present century. In the successive portrayals the pathological color deepens. For O. Holtzmann, Jesus was an ecstatic. For Julius Baumann, he was a neurotic. For Emil Rasmussen, he was an epileptic. For Dr. de Loosten (Georg Lomer), William Hirsch, and Dr. Binet-Sanglé, Jesus was a paranoiac.

Schweitzer's little monograph, only forty-six pages in German, published in 1913 under the title *Die psychiatrische Beurteilung Jesu,* was one of several similar defenses of the sanity of Jesus. This little study served a double purpose. It was Schweitzer's dissertation for his doctorate in medicine, and it gave him the opportunity to defend the sanity of his exclusively eschatological Jesus. Schweitzer devotes most of his attention to de Loosten, Hirsch, and Binet-Sanglé, for whom Jesus' exalted self-consciousness indicates delusions of grandeur—paranoia. In his defense of Jesus' sanity, Schweitzer follows four lines of argument: 1. Schweitzer surrenders the Gospel of John where numerous assertions and attitudes ascribed to Jesus shatter the limits of normal healthy human consciousness and have the appearance of megalomania. Most of the materials used by the pathographers against Jesus comes from the Gospel of John. 2. Most of the materials drawn from the Synoptic gospels by the pathographers is, Schweitzer maintains, fictitious and legendary (the cursing of the fig tree, the hallucinations, and so forth). 3. Jesus' belief in the near end of this world and the appearance of a new supernatural order headed by the Son of man was not his own peculiar aberration. This religious outlook came to Jesus by social heritage. It was a thought world of two centuries standing, something which Jesus shared from and with his own people. It was a mistaken belief, but it was not the product of a mass or of an individual psychosis. 4. According to Schweitzer, the only authentic material which admits of serious psychiatric study is Jesus' exalted self-consciousness and perhaps also the hallucination at the Jordan—data wholly inadequate for proving the existence of a mental illness.

Among the refutations of the psychiatric judgment against Jesus Schweitzer's little monograph is the best. More recent criticism would eliminate the hallucination at the Jordan as a *Glaubenslegende* (Bultmann), or as an epiphany along mythological lines (Dibelius), or as the first phase in the dramatization of Mark's dogma of Jesus as the Son of God.

A number of critics, however, have felt that Schweitzer could not make a clear, clean case for the psychic health of his exclusively eschatological Jesus. The dominance of the messianic conviction in Jesus' mind and mission, as interpreted by Schweitzer, borders on *idée fixe*. A Jesus who racks himself on the wheel of history, who goes to Jerusalem to force his death and thus compel the kingdom to come, must be regarded as a fanatic. For Jesus to believe in the near collapse of the old order and the prompt appearance of a new heavenly order inaugurated by the Son of man, is one thing; but for Jesus to believe that he himself is destined to be that supernatural Son of man, is something very different, hardly different from delusions of grandeur.

In the midst of this psychiatric controversy, Emil Rasmussen wrote, "The lamp of the spirit will smoke if it is turned too high" *(Jesus,* p. 130). Many critics and students, among them some of Schweitzer's most sincere admirers, cannot avoid the impression that in his exclusively eschatological emphasis the lamp is turned too high.

Schweitzer's published works exhibit a fascinating contrast in his picture of Jesus. In his earlier technical studies (1901-1913) we meet the academic, the all-too-historical Jesus of pure eschatology. In his later writings, especially those with Teacher and Master who is the inspiration of Schweitzer's humanitarian life and the background of his work in Africa, we meet the confessional, communal Jesus, the

Those who do not read German will be grateful for this translation of one of work. These two pictures seem to exist side by side in the same mind without confusion of thought or purpose.

Books of Faith and Power, by John T. McNeill, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. viii, 183, $2.

The latest contribution of Professor McNeill consists mainly of four lectures delivered during the month of January, 1945, in the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, New York City, under the auspices of the Institute for Religious Studies. These lectures formed part of a triple series entitled "Classics of Western Religion," in which other lectures presented Roman Catholic and Jewish works of similar distinction (p. vii).

The initial summary given by the author cannot be improved upon:

> The selection of the titles has been made with a view to variety rather than with purpose to secure the cumulative effect of a series of similar writings. While all have in common a body of Christian teaching, they differ widely in content and expression. Luther gives eager utterance to his fresh discovery of a faith that yields service in freedom; Calvin builds a theology from Scripture materials around his theme of the sovereign majesty and unmerited grace of God; Hooker is the philosophical theologian, willing to submit all to tests of reason; Bunyan transports us to a world of vivid imagery where the faithful triumph after much tribulation; Law hurls a challenge to the ungodly and pleads for a resolute and ordered devotion; and Wesley, while himself no stranger in this brilliant company, is the honest reporter of a career of unique activity.

The lectures are clearly arranged and well written. The scheme suggests the desirability of the "sincerest form of flattery" for the heroes of the faith and its literature. The book is an admirable introduction to a field in which it is far from the lesser-known works of Albert Schweitzer.

WALTER E. BUNDY

easy to induce younger students to stray from the more formal textbooks, from which "all things bright and beautiful" have been excluded in favor of an arid system of public utility.

Each essay contains an introduction to the author's early life, followed by a picture of his main work and the growth in the spirit which produced it. It is impossible to summarize them without depriving them of their charm and reducing the review to the level of a textbook. In place of this course, your reviewer will confine himself to a few notes of emphasis or addition.

The story of Martin Luther is told to give the setting to the treatise *On Christian Liberty*. An interesting note is given Luther's debt to St. Bernard of Clairvaux (p. 8.), and the author opens his sketch of the work by quoting Luther's remark, "Faith is held an easy thing by those who have no experience of it," and he continues the analysis. The quotation from William Bennett's *Freedom and Liberty* on the distinction between *freedom* and *liberty* is perhaps somewhat unconvincing to one led astray by the political scientist, a point which the author recognized in the remark, "Luther is not playing with such a distinction." The chapter proceeds to recognize Luther's mysticism born of faith. He concludes (pp. 22-26) with an admirable reply to the modern political scientist—that antithesis is all that is historical—in the attack on Luther in recent years as the forerunner of Hitler, mentioning Peter F. Wiemar's *Martin Luther, Hitler's Spiritual Ancestor,* and Gordon Rupp's admirable reply, *Martin Luther, Hitler's Cause or Cure?*

In dealing with Calvin Professor McNeill is in his own ecclesiastical field, and it would be temerity on the part of your reviewer to "rush in." He might be permitted to notice, however, that in his appreciation of Calvin's work, the author tends to leave the Renaissance and the *Institutes* hanging side by side. The outstanding feature of Calvin, which he would neglect, is that Calvin is the "noblest Roman of them all," who looks from the papal empire to the Divine Republic. He had not started life as a canon lawyer for naught.

Richard Hooker and the *Ecclesiastical Polity* calls for nothing but praise; the lecture on John Bunyan is a delight. The passage from the sixteenth and seventeenth century to John Wesley and the eighteenth is made by William Law, the nonjuror. In the two there is brought out the contrast between the Cambridge and the Oxford High-churchman. Law became a fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and John Wesley, a fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford, both to become determining influences in the opposite camp. Law's *Serious Call* influenced not only Wesley but also the Clapham sect and the evangelicals as well as Newman and the Oxford movement. Wesley was destined, much against his will, to be the father of the greatest schism the Anglican Church had suffered.

One quarrel your reviewer has with this book is its forbidding title. Professor McNeill has produced a sensitive, at times almost whimsical, book which brings out the spirit of the writers of whom he writes. It might well have taken its title from Bunyan—"A Pilgrim's Progress from Luther to Wesley"—which would have prepared the reader for its charm.

F. W. BUCKLER

Magic, Science and Religion, by Bronislaw Malinowski, Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. xi, 327, $3.50.

This volume reprints five of the most admired writings of Malinowski, all of which appeared in learned journals or in volumes that are now somewhat difficult to obtain. There is a felicitous introduction by Professor Robert Redfield.

The first essay—which gives its title to the volume—appeared originally in 1925

in *Science, Religion, and Reality* edited by James Needham. It has long been considered by anthropologists as one of Malinowski's clearest and most original contributions. It is rich in striking phrases which are conceptually sound. For instance, his definition of religion as "man's confession of impotence in certain matters" deserves to stand with Tylor's famous "minimum definition." The contrast Malinowski draws between fishing in the lagoon where technical skill is sufficient to ensure safe and productive effort and fishing in the open sea where the Trobriand Islanders have learned from experience that even the most skillful fishermen come to grief gets at what is probably the main psychological basis of religion. Lagoon fishing is free of ritual; open-sea fishing is replete with fear, belief, and rite.

The second paper, "Myth in Primitive Psychology," originally published as a small book, is also one of Malinowski's more significant achievements. He shows the intricate interdependence of myth with ritual and many other forms of behavior. He examines myths not as *curiosa* taken out of their total context but as living, vitally important elements in the day-to-day lives of his Trobrianders, interwoven with every other type of activity that the scientist can abstract. "Myth is a constant by-product of living faith which is in need of miracles; of sociological status, which demands precedent; of moral rule which requires sanction." Those realms of behavior and of experience which man finds beyond rational and technological control he feels are capable of manipulation through symbols. Both myth and ritual are symbolical procedures. The myth is a system of word symbols, whereas ritual is mainly a system of object and act symbols. Both are symbolic processes for dealing with the same type of situation in the same affective mode.

The next chapter, "Baloma; the Spirits of the Dead in the Trobriand Islands," is the most technical portion of this volume. Its texts and substantive content are excellent, but to the nonanthropologist its value lies in its brilliant revelation of how the field worker deals with his problems of observation, selection, and conceptualization of his materials. The reviewer, on re-reading this first-rate paper, could not escape the melancholy reflection that this, the first long report on Malinowski's field work, attains a quality of workmanship never consistently present in any of Malinowski's later publications.

The two final selections are presumably of lesser interest to readers of this journal. "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Language," appeared as an appendix to *The Meaning of Meaning.* It has been widely acclaimed as a contribution to semantics. The reviewer must confess that his enthusiasm for this essay has diminished over the years. Dorothy Lee's article "A Primitive System of Values" (*Philosophy of Science,* 1940) makes much more adequate use of Malinowski's linguistic data than Malinowski was ever able to. The last chapter is "An Anthropological Analysis of War." It contains some interesting points and some dubious assumptions.

The Free Press and the Beacon Press deserve the thanks of students of religion and of students of man in general for making these stimulating papers generally available again.

CLYDE KLUCKHOHN

The Witness of the Prophets, by Gordon Pratt Baker, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 213, $2.25.

"In this book the messages of the prophets and of Jesus are interpreted for modern man to use in his social, religious and economic life." So reads the announcement of this new volume in the field of the spokesmen of God. The treatment is divided into two parts: Part I. The Way of the Witnesses, Amos, the Moralist;

Hosea, the Evangelist; Isaiah, the Statesman; Habakkuk: The Father of Speculation; Jeremiah, the Poet; Haggai, the Realist; Zechariah, the Idealist. Part II. Jesus, The Heir of the Prophets; Jesus, The Prince of the Prophets; Jesus, The Hope of the Prophets. This outline shows the homiletical mind at work patterning the thought of the prophets very neatly and suggestively. The men of God and their ideas are properly pigeonholed to aid the reader.

The book contains very good writing. It has vigor, decisiveness, clarity, freshness. The preacher marshals his material with clear thinking and clear aiming at a decision upon the part of the reader. The exposition reads well and shows forcefulness in preaching. There is a good deal of theologizing at the homiletical level to help the reader of today.

Someone should write a book on "the Danger of Modernizing the Prophets." This book shows this danger. It does not start with the prophets themselves in that uniqueness which constitutes their supreme importance and value. One who writes on these dynamic messengers of God should feel and express the awareness of being possessed directly by the presence and word of God: "The Lord said unto me," "The Lord took me," "The Lord showed me," "The Lord spake thus to me with a strong hand and instructed me," "I found thee, knew thee, sanctified thee." It is this unique experience of being taken hold of by God himself in a forceful way, which differentiates these men and indicates to us their peculiar importance for us. In this book we are presented with the supposed prophetic syllogisms by which these men are supposed to have arrived at certain concepts. The writer states their process of reasoning, although we have no information on the subject. But the powerful act of God is not brought home to the reader.

Again the writer has great ability in painting a picture. There are paragraphs which show homiletic skill in this important art of the preacher. But there is the danger of giving fancy for fact when employing this method. When the modern writer produces the scene, words, and reasoning of the prophet out of his own mind, there is the danger of losing the prophet. An example will be found on pp. 23-25 where we are told of Amos in his opening words at Bethel. We are informed of the thinking and feeling back of Amos' words and all the reactions and words of the audience. Here is a portrayal of Amos as a clever lawyer using the tricks of the trade. This is not exposition of the man whom God took hold of in the visions of chapter seven. God spoke to the conscience of the prophet, and the prophet spoke to the conscience of the nation. Amos in that opening message was speaking to and dealing with the moral sense of the people from his first word and was not employing a method which sought to arouse the worst feelings of his hearers in order to catch them in his net, as portrayed in this treatment of the sermon.

The tendency is to make Amos oversevere and Hosea oversentimental. The two men possessed by the same divine mind have more of similarity than of difference in their message. Amos who prayed so tenderly for his nation in the visions of 7:1-6 had the heart of the good shepherd. Hosea in his arraignment of Ephraim in 4:1-14 is as severe as anything in Amos. The mind of God at work in the two men is the great reality, not the process of thinking of the two.

The handling of Hosea by an expositor is a revealing test. The prophet's message is given us in two divisions: chapters 1–3 deal with his marriage experience; chapters 4–14 give his preaching to Israel. The proportion is interesting, but expositors tend to reverse this. They give more to the three opening chapters and less to the remainder. But the basis for the discussion of Hosea is 4:1-5. The vocabulary and revelation of that section should be clarified first of all. See pp. 30–33 for Baker's treatment of Hosea and Gomer. Here is the "tear-jerker" homilete. We are

told specifically what Hosea felt and said and did. "The thought inflamed him with a desire to hurt even as he had been hurt. If only he could see her for one vengeful moment! He would let her grovel at his feet, ashamed and afraid. And he would laugh at her pleas for mercy. Coldly and deliberately he would laugh, crushing her with his scorn as easily as one grinds a spider beneath his heel. But at last the paroxysm of frustrate love wore itself out. He threw himself across the bed and wept like a child" (p. 32). The reconciliation (p. 33) is equally gushy. This is bearing false witness against a friend and yielding to the mood of present-day eroticism. It is far removed from the Hosea in whom the word of the moral ruler was at work in the judgment upon a social order going down to destruction within a few years.

A strange omission of the book is the Second Isaiah. There are threee references to passages from these climactic chapters of the prophets but no dealing with them. Why should Haggai and Zechariah occupy the place of the Second Isaiah? Strangest of all is that in dealing with Jesus as the Heir, Prince, and Hope of the Prophets there is no reference to Isaiah 53 where prophecy comes nearest to the cross.

In the final chapter, Jesus, the Hope of the Prophets, we might expect a treatment of that subject. But there is no reference to the prophets except for a questionable interpretation of Hosea (p. 204). There is discussion of Jesus' kinship with men and the problem of the cross. This theologizing regarding the person and work of Jesus is not related to what is proposed in the heading, the Hope of the Prophets.

In short this book makes the prophets the spring board for many observations about religion but is not an exposition of the unique and ever-recreating work of God in the prophets. Such a glaring misinterpretation of Ezekiel as that found on p. 201 is without excuse. This book cannot serve the purpose it declares. Such treatment will not help modern men in true knowledge of the prophets.

JAMES P. BERKELEY

Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language, by Sister Miriam Joseph, New York, Columbia University Press, 1947, pp. xiv, 423, $3.75.

The Elizabethans took their language seriously and yet gaily. It was a serious business because of their training in grammar, rhetoric, and logic; it was a gay business because such training sharpened both their appetites and their relish for the literary food served them. They not only appreciated the artistry, they were informed of what it was that delighted them, which is a different and an added pleasure. This seems to have been particularly true of the drama, and it is almost certain that the audience in the pit of the Globe more thoroughly enjoyed *Macbeth* than most of us could honestly say of any play we have seen.

In the late sixteenth century the Elizabethan writers were in a phase of creativity, but together with rhetoricians and logicians they insisted upon the importance of the precepts and theories of the ancient Greeks and Romans. To imitate these worthy predecessors was their ideal. To this theory the contemporary works on rhetoric and logic gave agreement, counsel, and aid. As a result there were distinguished some two hundred figures of speech. It would be natural to suppose that Shakespeare wrote in the prevailing mode of his day. That he did so is the main thesis of Sister Miriam Joseph: ". . . the theory in its entire scope . . . is, with two or three negligible exceptions, illustrated in Shakespeare's plays and poems, where it contributes to the power and richness of his language and even of his thought, while it accounts for

certain peculiar differences between the characteristic mode of expression of his time and of ours" (p. 4).

Her book is in three parts. First, there is a presentation of the general theory of composition and reading in Shakespeare's England; second, Shakespeare's use of the theory; and third, the theory as it was defined and illustrated by Tudor rhetoricians and logicians. A rewarding way of studying the matter is to read a definitive section of Part Three and then read the corresponding illustrative section of Part Two. In this way one comes nearer to the Elizabethan appreciation and delight, both enjoying and understanding the principles of enjoyment,

The astonishing fact is that Shakespeare used practically every figure of speech catalogued by his day. The sobering fact is that if more of his readers and critics understood this, there would be less bewilderment on the part of the former and far less stupid criticism on the part of the latter. We should be saved apparently endless explaining, rewriting, and even respelling, some of which, although not all, is as obtuse as that gray-with-antiquity emendation of the Duke's words in *As You Like It*, which makes them read, "Finds . . . stones in the running brooks, sermons in books."

Sister Miriam Joseph has done more than collate Shakespeare's use of the arts of language: she has written well for those who would know the dramatist better in the only way we can know him at all—by knowing the age in which he lived. This is not to say that he was himself a rhetorician. It is rather to say that this was the only way he could have written acceptably to his hearers. He and they had been taught these rules, as Baldwin, Plimpton, and others have conclusively showed. "Elizabethan literature was produced by a technique which, while giving attention to patterns of sound and movement and heaping up a rich profusion of imagery, was deeply rooted in thought and emotion" (p. 40).

If one questions some of the examples cited by Sister Miriam Joseph, it is not to be antagonistic, but to be better informed. She seems occasionally to be too concerned to find an example. Thus, her explanation of the word *frevent* (p. 53) raises more questions than the one she answers. Her example of hendiadys may be but another example of enallage (p. 61) and her remark about "the multitudinous tongue" (p. 62) is certainly an interpretation. If the fallacy of division is missing (p. 194), it may be her unwillingness so to explain "God made him, and therefore let him pass for a man," or "Thou art a Roman; be not barbarous." But these comments are less indicative of a desire to quibble than they are of the stimulation the book gives to the reader. Stimulation it will surely give. Here are the figures of grammar, the vices of language, the figures of repetition, logic, the topics of invention, argumentation, pathos, and ethos. One must be careful not to merit the quip of Moth, "They have been at a great feast of languages, and stolen the scraps." The book will be most useful to readers and indispensable to students of Shakespeare.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

A History of the Jews, by Solomon Grayzel, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1947, pp. xxv, 835, $3.50.

Most of the information in this volume may be found elsewhere if one has the industry to look for it. The book is, however, unique in its scope: it deals with the history of the Jews from the Babylonian Exile all the way down to the end of World War II. This is a long period—over twenty-five hundred years, or about half the period during which human history has been written. The range of Jewish history would not have been so great had Jews remained in one land; but, as it is, their

history is interwoven with that of scores of countries where they have lived at one time or another. It is a brave scholar who will announce a history of the Jews in one volume! Dr. Grayzel has not only set the goal, but he has succeeded in writing about a long and scattered history with an amazing sense of proportion. His style is straightforward and clear; his choice of illustrations—both the verbal ones and the 121 pictorial ones—makes for a highly interesting volume.

This work was prepared for Jews. Its author bares one of his motives: "my desire to fortify the spirit and strengthen the determination of my fellow Jews to persevere in the path of our ancestors, and patiently and hopefully to labor for the welfare of mankind." But Christians, as well as Jews, will find it of use; particularly should it appeal to those Christians who wish to close up that enormous gap between knowledge of the Old Testament and contacts with those who practice Judaism today. It will be used widely in Jewish schools; it could be used to great advantage as a text—or at least as a teacher's guide—in church schools. Dr. Grayzel treats Jewish-Christian relations with frankness as well as with a deep sympathy for the best which is to be found in both religions. Unlike some—perhaps most—histories of the Jews, this one is not too long. And, most important of all, there is as much objectivity as one can reasonably demand of an interpretative history.

The average non-Jew's curiosity about Judaism and about Jews will be satisfied at many points: Why do Jews seem to have an innate ability for trade? Why have not Jews readily embraced Christianity? How did Yiddish arise as a language of Jews? Why was the ghetto established? Why have so many Jews been moneylenders? Answers to these and other questions which have often been fuel for the spread of anti-Semitism are given in this book. While the novel and the movie may serve to combat the virus of anti-Jewish feeling in America, the slower and surer method of knowledge is basic.

A reviewer would be insensitive indeed to quibble over minor details about which he happened to have some strong opinions. He should, however, point out that four centuries of Jewish history have been condensed into three short chapters. Obviously when one is forced to put four hundred years into fifty pages he cannot exhaust each subject of that history. One might take exception to "Abraham's ideal of monotheism" (p. 5), 719 B.C.E. as the date of the destruction of Samaria (p. 16), the credibility of the plot of the book of Esther (p. 34). "Twenty-six" should be changed to "twenty-seven" (p. 21) in another edition of the book. But in none of these points is there distortion which alters the general picture which Dr. Grayzel draws of this period of Jewish history.

The Jewish Publication Society should be commended for making available such a valuable volume at a cost which is far below the asking of most publishers for a book of this size. The demand for this most modern history of the Jews should be immediate and should reward the faith of the publishers who put it within easy reach of a large reading public.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

The American Churches: An Interpretation, by William Warren Sweet, New York, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 153, $1.50.

For the past two decades, Professor Sweet has been producing a steady stream of books which have pointed up for the general historian the significance of "the story of religion in America." Many of these have been specialized studies dealing with the colonial scene, revivalism, and the frontier. The present volume, as Charles Clayton Morrison has observed, is "a sort of distilled essence of the many books he has hitherto published." The occasion for the writing of this book,

which seeks "to identify the principal factors which have made organized religion in America what it is today," was an invitation to deliver the Beckly lectures before the British Methodist Conference.

A chapter is given to the discussion of each of the major influences which have been instrumental in shaping American Christianity. Dr. Sweet identifies these formative factors as the triumph in America of left-wing Protestantism, the influence of the frontier, the rise of revivalism, the multiplicity of denominations, the presence of the Negro, the growth and influence of Roman Catholicism, and the characteristic activism of American life. His discussions of the Negro churches and of the significance of Roman Catholicism in the American scene are especiallly good.

The most illuminating chapter of the book is the one devoted to "Activism in the American Tradition." Here he shows quite clearly that the social-gospel emphasis in American Protestantism has had a long history, that its "roots . . . are to be found in the very nature of American Protestantism itself," and that its parentage is to be found in the revivalist theology of Edwards, Hopkins, Taylor, and Finney. "While such nineteenth-century German Reformed theologians as Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Lotze," he concludes, did exercise "a significant influence upon American theological thought, they did so because they all represented a point of view and an emphasis which was more or less in harmony with the American trends."

There is only one point in Professor Sweet's thesis that is open to serious question: his emphasis on the importance of left-wing Protestantism in American religious development. "All the great concepts for which American Democracy stands today," he asserts, are the product of "the triumph of left-wing Protestantism in eighteenth-century colonial America." Several objections can be made to such a conclusion.

1. Left-wing Protestantism, using his own definition of the term, was not as prevalent in the colonies as he assumes. He admits that Congregationalism became "right-wing" in New England, but it is a mistake to regard Congregationalism as having been "left-wing" in old England; nor did the Scotch Presbyterians, although a dissenting body in North Ireland, give evidence of a shift in outlook from right- to left-wing attitudes. Furthermore, the prominence of pietistic leadership among the German Reformed and Lutheran groups can scarcely be regarded as a left-wing influence.

2. The major intellectual current among the colonial religious groups was distinctively "right-wing" in terms of the Reformation movements. Reformed thought almost completely dominated the colonial religious scene. The Congregationalists in New England, the Presbyterians in the Middle Colonies, and the Episcopalians in the South were all Calvinists, while the majority of the Baptists scattered in several centres were staunch defenders of the ideology of the *Institutes*. Even the Arminianism of the Baptist minority was regarded as nothing more than a Calvinist heresy by their opponents, and had been upheld as the true Calvinism by their Arminian forebears. To these principal English groups, of course, should be added the German Reformed, Dutch Reformed, and French Reformed elements in the population. The Quakers, the only other major group, borrowed heavily from the Anabaptists and Spiritual Reformers, but this fact should not be allowed to obscure their essential character as an offshoot of the Puritan movement, nor should it blind one to the essentially Calvinist character of their ethics and social attitudes. In the light of the dominance of Calvinism in colonial America, would

it not be more reasonable to look to this "right-wing" faith as the possible source from which have been derived "all the great concepts for which American democracy stands today"?

3. It is true, to be sure, that the development of certain left-wing characteristics did begin to modify the patterns of classical Protestantism during the colonial period and that by the time of the Second Great Awakening of the early nineteenth century these new patterns had won a complete victory. This "free church" tradition was destined to be an exceedingly influential formative force in American religious life, but during the colonial period it was more a product of, than an influence upon, the prevailing religious situation. In any event its roots were in the American scene and in the necessities of English political conditions, rather than in the left wing of the Protestant Reformation.

In spite of these objections to Professor Sweet's thesis with regard to the influence of left-wing Protestantism, his contention will undoubtedly result in a more balanced appraisal of our American religious heritage. As always, he is provocative and stimulating, and once again through this brief interpretation of the American churches he has placed us profoundly in his debt.

WINTHROP S. HUDSON

The Christian Outlook, by Kenneth Scott Latourette, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xii, 229, $2.50.

The Christian Outlook is a glowing affirmation of faith by the distinguished D. Willis James professor of missions and oriental history in the Yale Divinity School. Many of his optimistic affirmations will be familiar to those who have read his *History of the Expansion of Christianity, The Unquenchable Light,* and *Anno Domini.* The following quotations are typical of the affirmations scattered throughout the present volume.

> Although figures cannot contain it or measure it, we can be certain that in Christian living the Gospel is also more widely spread than ever before.
>
> There can be no doubt that within these past thirty years . . . the Gospel has made itself felt more widely among mankind than ever before.
>
> Christianity is more to be reckoned with than ever before.
>
> Unlike other religions which rise, spread, become stagnant, and decay, Christianity comes through each major crisis with enhanced strength.
>
> The other religions are born, rise, spread, become senile, and either die out or slowly lose ground. Christianity alone remains young.
>
> Far from dying out, Christianity, so history leads us confidently to predict, is in its youth and is to continue to mount as a factor in the human scene.

Such a faith is heart-warming, and it wins our respect and admiration. Nevertheless it is still a faith, not a solidly documented historical conclusion. It is possible that a more sober account of the perils and dangers confronting the Christian enterprise today—an account which frankly admits that the course of Christian history as it projects itself into the future is susceptible to a less optimistic interpretation—would serve the need of our time more adequately. Certainly the great need of our time is not complacency.

Professor Latourette is at his best, not as a prophet, but rather in summarizing the status and trends in various communions in various areas. Particularly valuable, therefore, are his middle chapters—"Recent Losses and Gains," "Trends in the Setting," "Directions in Protestantism." Nowhere is there available such an able, compact yet comprehensive, survey of the position of contemporary Christianity. Nor will his outline of the task before us evoke anything but the heartiest assent—to "aim at nothing short of the complete fulfillment of the Great Commission," "greatly [to] strengthen the Ecumenical Movement," to

"discover afresh . . . the riches in the Bible," and to seek a powerful revival of new spiritual life and vitality.

WINTHROP S. HUDSON

Main Issues Confronting Protestantism, by Harold A. Bosley, Harper, ©1948, pp. xi, 204, $2.50.

For some time, the new dean of the Duke University Divinity School has been widely recognized as one of the keenest, most sensitive, and most original thinkers among the younger generation of American ministers. In the pulpit he reveals uncommon gifts of incisive judgment, gracious presentation, and persuasive power which have established his influence as a preacher to young and old alike. But he is more than a skilled homiletician; an early notable ministry to college students which continues through much college preaching has fostered his native bent toward basic philosophical and theological issues. These two poles of his thought determined two earlier books—*On Final Ground* (a series of sermons) and *The Philosophical Heritage of the Christian Faith*.

The present volume unites the two interests. Indeed, perhaps its greatest importance lies in its disclosure of the growth of an unusually honest and tenacious mind. There is marked advance in scope and power of discernment, both into the complexities of contemporary problems and into the profundities of Christian faith. Testing personal experiences and the deepening cultural crisis have joined to mature and mellow an earlier youthful confidence. The writer remains a convinced and intelligent Christian pacifist, in the authentic and finest sense of that abused label (the introductory meditation on "four stages in the growth of the Christian peacemaker" is one of his finest chapters), but he faces squarely the limited relevance of pacifism as an instrument of political action. Like most of his generation, he is an ardent devotee of the new ecumenical developments and concludes with a fine exposition of "The Great Church" in its world-wide realities.

Most significant, however, is a perceptible deepening of spiritual apprehension, of grasp on the central verities. One seems to detect a marked and not inconsiderable movement beyond the rather jejune modernism which dominated the circles in which Dr. Bosley was at home a generation ago and of which Professor Wieman was then the major prophet. This is evident throughout the volume. It comes to focus in the central and most important chapter on "Religious Liberalism Points the Way," first given as a lecture on the Ayer Foundation at Colgate-Rochester four years ago. Here is a careful and considered exposition of and apologia for "liberal theology." Liberalism, far from being a recent American Protestant aberration, is "to be found in all the major religions of the Western world," even in Luther and Calvin, but has achieved maturity within the Protestantism of the last century. "What began as an inspired protest has finally become an established tradition." Liberalism has parented biblical research, theological fecundity, the social gospel, and the "shift of emphasis in morality from *obedience* to *responsibility*." Liberalism embraces a philosophy of history, insistence upon the singleness of truth, tolerance, Christian unity, and a new confidence in man. "Liberalism, in short, is the vital edge of creative, reverent religion."

Here is a clear and forceful manifesto for what, one must believe, is a soon-coming resurgence of a confident and militant Liberalism. One can hardly conceive a more promising stance from which to press such a crusade than the headship of the strongest and most influential interdenominational seminary in the South. If liberalism is to win rebirth, the most favorable seedplot may well be

within progressive elements of the South, where a certain leisureliness to respond to regnant enthusiasms unites with residual and vivid memories of the absurdities of the "old orthodoxy" and spiritual vitality to resist extreme reactions toward the "new orthodoxy." Dr. Bosley appears to conceive his rôle as a modest apostle to such a movement. All must wish him well as he strives to build Duke into an even more powerful theological centre and to press further the evolution of his own creative thought. We shall watch both developments with interested and hopeful expectation.

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

Revision or New Translation? by Oswald T. Allis, Philadelphia, Presbyterian and Reformed, 1948, pp. xi, 164, $2.

This volume is the fullest and most detailed critique which the *Revised Standard Version* (1946) of the New Testament has yet received. And it is probably the unfairest, or, perhaps more accurately phrased, the most malicious. The author is out to get the translation and its several translators. Whatever they have done is wrong: the infelicities and inconsistencies—and there is no use denying that there are many—are mercilessly exposed; on the other hand, when the renderings follow *AV* as against the revisions or the so-called modern translations, Allis regularly manages to introduce an invidious comment or nickering criticism. The work evidences on every page the prodigious amount of time and labor expended in the minute comparisons and cases of word counting involved in the comparisons of *RSV* not only with the Greek textual apparatus, *AV, ERV,* and *ARV,* but with Weymouth, Moffatt, Goodspeed, and Berkeley (Verkuyl), and, occasionally, Ballantine (*Riverside*). His principal objection—and it is constantly repeated—is that the title of this new version is misleading: it is not, as it claims to be, a "revision" of the *AV* (King James), which is concerned to preserve and conserve all that is best in that noble work; rather it is far more a modern speech version, introducing many needless changes. He appears particularly pleased when he finds *RSV* following Moffatt or Goodspeed (when these latter two differ between themselves) and can point out that here Moffatt or Goodspeed, as the case might be, had apparently been able to carry the day in the Committee, and incidentally that that proves that all the work is more or less subjective, and that striving for "more idiomatic" renderings is usually fatuous. And with this charge goes a second: the translation is the work solely (the inclusion of Dr. Wentz gave him a bit of difficulty at this point) of modernists and liberals who by their disavowal of verbal and plenary inspiration naturally reach the conclusions they do. A brief appendix is devoted to a sort of who's who of the translators. Here in a series of brief and (unintentionally) humorous paragraphs some horrid shortcoming of each of the scholars is exposed: Goodspeed, for example, "attaches great importance to the Apocrypha." And through the book again and again they are castigated either for what they wrote in their sections of the *Introduction* or in this volume or that.

There can be no question but what Allis has proved his contention again and again that there are many "unnecessary" (in his sense of the word) alterations of *AV,* that there is real "inconsistency," and that the version is not the final and altogether ideal translation. But no one, so far as I know, thought that it was—least of all the several translators. And despite the utterly unfair and picayunish sort of criticism which can scarcely fail to convince the impartial reader that the author is deliberately blind to the many excellencies of the translation and to some of the reasons why at times their aim exceeded their grasp, undoubtedly the several translators themselves will profit from this brisk, if unfriendly, currying.

At times, as I was reading the book, I found myself in essential agreement with his (uninterpreted) findings. In fact, I had reached some of these conclusions myself when two years ago I had studied the volume. Could they have been presented objectively and free from the partisan and unwarranted eagerness to account for the reason for each deviation, the volume would have been of far greater value. That a translation should be clearer than the original which it purports to translate is to me, as to Dr. Allis, far from certain. To what extent a translator is or should aim to be an exegete or commentator is a point at which disagreement is not surprising. I am even ready to agree that such seemingly innocent changes as modernized punctuation, the inclusion of quotation marks, and the attempted standardization of capital letters are at times "interpretive." But the obvious attempt to amass all the criticism possible led him, to my mind very unwisely, to include a deal of bird shot (not to mention rotten eggs) along with his heavier ammunition. I do not wish to put myself in his class at this point; hence I frankly admit that despite a petty and tiresome eagerness to point out flaws, as much where none are to be found as when real strictures are warranted, the book has distinct value for those competent to judge its merits and to discount its one-sided partisanship. My fear is that it will be most widely read by those least likely to weigh it critically and with balance. MORTON S. ENSLIN

The Church, the Gospel, and War, edited by Rufus M. Jones, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xii, 169, $2.

It is perhaps fitting that the last book left us by Rufus Jones should be one dealing with peace and war. For this subject had through spiritual inheritance and long reflection sunk deep into his heart and conscience. He always, so far as I know, expressed himself freely on the subject, though judging from the titles of his more than fifty books none of them were devoted as a whole to its discussion. The present book was edited, not written, by him. His only contribution to it is a brief *Introduction.* There are in the book eleven chapters of quite unequal length. Three of them take up only three, four, and six pages respectively, and the other eight range from eleven to thirty-four pages. Among the contributors are such well-known writers as C. E. Raven, H. H. Farmer, R. H. Bainton, K. S. Latourette, Kirby Page, and Evelyn Underhill. The articles, however, with the possible exception of two, were not written for this particular collection. They appeared in various magazines and books between the years 1935 and 1946.

The standpoint represented by most of these articles is emphatically expressed by Dr. Jones in his Introduction. "From my point of view," he says, "war is absolutely and eternally morally wrong, and utterly and flatly incompatible with the way of life Christ has revealed and Christianity has established." To those who accept this absolute pacifistic standpoint there is much in the book that will commend itself. It will stir their emotions and perhaps strengthen their pacifistic faith. There is also not a little historical material in some of the chapters that will prove interesting and informing to the general reader. But if the reader is seeking a rational and practical solution of the problem of war and peace, he is destined to disappointment. Underlying absolute pacifism there is a species of irrationalism. And in this book there is nothing that alters its character in that respect. No argument is presented or could be presented that would make absolute pacifism a reasonable practical method of ending war. It is no doubt true, as Latourette says (p. 110), "that if the large majority of professed Christians, led by the churches, were to bend their full energies and resources to the achievement, were utterly and wholly to renounce war and decline to participate in it and were positively to do those things which

make for peace, reconciliation among nations could be effected, peace become the normal state of mankind and international relations be placed on the basis of justice." But it is also true that it would probably be easier to end war by other means than to bring about such a radical transformation of character in the large majority of professed Christians as would be involved in the condition of universal peace here laid down.

This, however, does not mean that absolute pacifism has not made a worthwhile contribution to the peace movement. It has given to the Christian world a remarkable example of moral heroism, it has helped to keep alive the ideal of a warless world, it has bodly championed the rights of the individual conscience against the mounting authority of the modern state, and has in other ways been an inspiration to all who are struggling for world peace. In view of these facts the present book is to be welcomed as a vigorous expression of the pacifistic faith, despite the mystical and irrational tendencies in the philosophy of the latter and the illicit abstractionism in its ethics.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON

The One Great Church, by Joseph Fort Newton, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. x, 122, $2.

Dr. Joseph Fort Newton has risen above petty sectarian prejudices and spoken as a Christian on the question of spiritual unity in this volume. The reader has the feeling that if Jesus were living in this period of a burdened and divided world he would have spoken and written in a similar vein.

The author is the rector of the Church of St. Luke and the Epiphany in Philadelphia. Born in Texas, a Baptist, he has served as minister of the City Temple, London, and is one of the most gifted writers of the American pulpit.

His most recent book has been published on the eve of the Amsterdam Conference with the direct purpose of adding impetus toward achieving the goal of spiritual unity among Protestants. Its contents offer truths upon which the clergy needs to meditate and a spirit which should master them. It doubtless will contribute to the spiritual preparation of those attending the conference and will increase the receptiveness of clergy and laity alike to the actions of the conference.

Skillfully Dr. Newton points out that in every age "There have been clairvoyant souls who saw the unity underlying all diversity and have lived in the community of the saints." He continues, "If people today could only discover that the churches of Christ are one great church, it would be a discovery more thrilling by far than finding a new star on the edge of the sky." The author expresses in his cryptic style the basic unity among Protestants: "We are trying to speak the same truth, each with his own accent and emphasis." However, he emphatically states that such unity does not demand uniformity. "No one wants a regimented church." What he does urge is "faith without fear, and coöperation without compromise."

His hope for Amsterdam and the World Council is a quest which will issue in a basis of coöperative effort providing "the liberty of faith, the fellowship of the love and suffering of Christ, the fraternity of righteousness, the redemption of men from solitariness and selfishness in a Beloved Community" whose efforts shall be directed "to heal a broken and divided world, to reveal love where now there is hate, to melt bitter racial rancors . . . to heal the malady of war itself, to lead the way to a juster and more humane social order, and to send the gospel to the far dark corners of the earth." This is but a suggestion of what is to be found in his first chapter. All of those which follow are equally stimulating in both style and content.

His second essay on "Fate, Faith and God" grips the reader as the author

begins with man's awareness of destiny which he can "neither elude nor long defy." Masterfully the reader is brought to face God and the meaning of the universe through the mortal leap of faith. "God," says the author "is the fourth dimension of existence without whom our little sums do not work." He thinks of God as finite and infinite involved in our agony and our aspiration. Suffering is viewed in the light of and explained on the basis of God's limitations by nature, by his purpose in human enterprise, and by the character and development of man. Love is the key, the motive, and the method of Higher Fatalism. This love in God is described as "Vision and power, impassioned reason, spiritual intelligence, self-giving and self-sacrifice, the energy of a steadfast holy will bent on creating fellowship, character and perfection. Such love works by freedom not by force—yet evermore God triumphs by 'a strange power which men call weakness.'"

Dr. Newton's treatment of the subject, "What is Salvation?" is both refreshing and practical. He brings out the basic ideas in the word used by the early Jewish and Christian writers as William Tyndale, the father of the English Bible, translated it: health, soundness, and wholeness. Centuries of theological treatment have added the more abstract ideas.

His cardinal point is that salvation is something done in us rather than something done for us. It is character, moral thoughtfulness, and health of being. Conversion comprises a person's transition from illusion to reality.

Equally stimulating are his chapters on "Religion and Health," "The Marriage Muddle," and "What to Do with Life Today." His review-of-reviews chapter on *River of Years* is unique. Particularly interesting are the principles which he mentions as those he has used in reviewing another's book namely: What did the writer intend to do? How well did he do what he planned? Was what he tried to do worth doing?

In the preface to his present book the author states his purpose clearly: "To interpret spiritual life as it is related to the problems of thought and the issues and aspirations of our time." He has done this so effectively and the goal toward which he has pointed is so crucial that the reviewer can say it is a book which should be read by ministers and church members alike. It will doubtless have a salutary effect in helping many place Christianity above denomination—where it rightfully belongs. Perhaps many will come to see with the author that "Fellowship in Christ is the supreme sacrament."

JAMES HOUSTON IVEY

Revive Thy Church Beginning with Me, by Samuel M. Shoemaker, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xi, 127, $1.50.

Bishop Henry K. Sherill, presiding bishop of the Episcopal Church, chose this book for Lenten reading and discussion study in the churches under his jurisdiction. It is evangelical in its purpose, as the title indicates, and, according to its author, is a "how" book rather than a "why" or "what" book. Whether it achieved its purpose during Lent of 1948 or not has not been made known to this reviewer. but it is altogether probable that it has proved to be the means of revitalizing the faith of many churchmen.

Dr. Shoemaker writes with a strong sense of crisis in human affairs, and calls the roll of those whose fear of world destruction has made the headlines of the public press. With Hutchins he worries about the atomic bomb; with Felix Morley he quakes lest our government, with little change, become government by outright decree; with unnamed statisticians he is concerned with the ratio of the mentally sick to the total population, or with the evident increase of chronic alcoholics. Then

with dramatic finality he says, "We need help, and we need it quickly. We need hope and faith, for without them we can only wring our hands. Help can hardly come from something that might be brought on the scene to ease the crisis. There simply is not time for that."

Then Dr. Shoemaker builds a strong case against what he terms the "unconverted Church" by calling Karl Barth, Kierkegaard, and others as witnesses, and finally joins them in pleading for "the reintroduction of Christianity into Christendom." The summation of his case is tersely stated in three points: 1. The church is not bringing to the desperate and open world of this time the answer of Jesus Christ. 2. We ourselves are typical of the church, and as such, are responsible for its being what it is. 3. The change has got to begin in us, before we can expect it to affect others, our parish, or our world.

Turning now to the "how" of revival, Dr. Shoemaker makes excellent use of rather commonplace illustrations to point out that if a person is to be led to God and experience spiritual renewal he must 1. be conscious of an existent need; 2. be absolutely honest with himself and God; 3. be ready to make a decision with moral content; 4. be willing to trust God to work a miracle within him.

Another chapter deals with the "how" of making faith real to people. Again Dr. Shoemaker demonstrates his persuasive power in the use of illustration to drive home the importance of those procedures which effective personal workers have always been careful to pursue, namely: "Make friends"; "speak about your own fault"; "find a point of need"; "be a good listener"; "suggest the answer"; "encourage decision."

The remaining chapters of the little book deal effectively with the importance of personal witnessing, and set forth practical procedures in the task of revitalizing the spiritual life of church organizations. The final pages serve as an eloquent peroration, and make significantly personal all the pleading that has gone before.

This is not a profound book, nor can it lay claim to being in any way original, but it is a book to stir men's souls, and that is probably what its author intended.

MILTON C. WESTPHAL

The Christian Way in Race Relations, edited by William Stuart Nelson, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. ix, 256, $2.50.

Already listed as one of the outstanding religious books of the year, the work deserves a place also among the several excellent studies of the American race problem which have appeared since Gunnar Myrdal made this country more fully conscious of its major dilemma. Written by thirteen men and women who through their own experience have become authorities in the field of Negro achievement, this volume comprises an integrated development which might have come from a single hand. This unity is due to the planning and editing of William S. Nelson, dean of the School of Religion of Howard University, and also to the fact that the contributors, all members of the Institute of Religion sponsored by Howard, met together at intervals over two years to discuss and criticize one another's chapters which therefore became in a sense the final product of the entire group.

The authors indicate that American democracy is seriously retarded economically and socially by its unwarranted prejudice against the Negro. The United States pays a heavy price for the luxury of racial discrimination; even the white majority retards itself. The inconsistency between high moral professions and irrational and unjust actions weakens American influence in constructive efforts

like the United Nations and affords a field day to foreign critics of American institutions and American sincerity.

Turning quickly to positive recommendations, the experts find that the Christian attitude toward life stresses the dignity of every individual and the need for human and religious universalism. Although all men suffer for the shortcomings of humanity, the Negro has borne more than his share of the burden of general social sin. Christian love can and should afford a solution, not through patronization, but through normal and honest living in which variations in the color of the skin become no more significant than those of eyes or hair. Christianity must cut the bonds of strangeness, segregation, and caste which exclude from the American heritage a whole group of persons irrespective of their achievement, growth, and economic and intellectual status.

Existing institutions are examined in the light of what they have done and might do. In most cases welfare agencies have been stronger in pronouncement than in action, but on the whole the churches, Christian associations, colleges, and social and civic organizations have done well; at least they are on the right side, are improving conditions within their own spheres, and are applying stricter standards of judgment and reformation to the racial policies of business, labor, and government. Practical advances in Southern centres like Atlanta, Durham, and Nashville are examined, but not viewed as final solutions. In the book's longest and most radical chapter, Professor J. Neal Hughley holds that the economic plight of the Negro is a vivid symbol of the failure of modern social Christianity as it is pervertedly practiced under a "decadent capitalist culture."

The writers reenforce their arguments with a wealth of case studies and examples. The practical reforms of Mahatma Gandhi are cited as evidence of what the truly religious spirit, individual and social, may accomplish. The reader concludes that on the American scene the Negro has done his part in proving himself and in seeking to remove an artificial distinction which should never have existed. It becomes increasingly the task of the majority race to manifest equal imagination and effectiveness in advancing a spiritual world community.

EARL CRANSTON

The Protestant Church and the Negro, by Frank Loescher, New York, Association Press, 1948, pp. 159, $3.

Frank Loescher, in his book *The Protestant Church and the Negro*, gives conclusive proof that the Protestant church is perhaps the most segregated institution in America. There are approximately 8,000,000 Protestant Negroes in the United States. It is carefully estimated that 7,500,000 are in separate Negro denominations. Considering the local church and moving upward through national assemblies, more than ninety-three per cent of the Negroes have no association in work and worship with Christians of other racial groups; except in a few instances in interdenominational organizations. Even when we consider the 500,000 Negroes who are in denominations that are predominantly "white," ninety-nine per cent of them are in segregated congregations. Loescher estimates that only about one-tenth of one per cent of all the Negro Protestant Christians in the United States—8,000 souls—are members of local "white" churches. As a rule, the local churches have no stated policy regarding Negro membership; nor the national church except pronouncements.

Furthermore, he demonstrates again the historical fact that the church as an organized institution is highly conservative and that it seldom leads in making

constructive social changes. The modern Protestant church, on the whole, accepts segregation in secular and religious life, without protest.

Before World War I the churches had practically nothing to say about improving race relations. The Protestant churches began to speak out against certain injustices only after World War I. In the period following 1919, Protestantism condemned lynching and brutality. It called for justice but within the segregated patterns. When the depression came, the church emphasized equal opportunity within the segregated patterns. With the coming of World War II, Protestantism began to recognize racial discrimination in industry, economics, politics, and civil affairs. It was not until the end of World War II that the Protestant churches began to see that "the heart of the problem of Negro-White relations is segregation —in employment, in education, in housing, and in the Church".

For the most part the pronouncements against segregation are official statements and have not influenced the rank and file. There seems to have been no statement against segregation by the church before 1935 and no very strong statements against it before the forties. The greatest statement against segregation was adopted by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ at its called meeting in March 1946. At this meeting the Federal Council went on record as renouncing segregation and promised to work for a "non-segregated Church and a non-segregated society." Loescher points out that the pattern of racial segregation that prevails among Protestant churches is found among Protestant educational institutions as well.

Now that the churches are not only condemning segregation itself, it is to be hoped that the Protestant churches will move rapidly beyond pronouncement against segregation and demonstrate in work and worship the true Christian fellowship that knows no racial lines. But unfortunately the church seldom leads in such matters. It follows. This book should be read by every churchman who claims to be a Christian. It should make our guilty consciences uneasy.

BENJAMIN E. MAYS

American Overture, by Abram Vossen Goodman, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1947, pp. xiv, 265, $3.

The reading of this book brings vividly to mind the little rhyming adage:

> There is so much good in the worst of us,
> And so much bad in the best of us,
> That it ill becomes any of us
> To talk about the rest of us.

Mr. Goodman pays high tribute to the final achievement of religious liberty in the United States which is the finest representation of its national unity. And he rightly emphasizes the fact that this separation of church and state was not a sudden attainment of constitutional enactment. It had a steady though varied growth throughout the colonial period in America. His review of the position occupied by the Jew in the various colonies, and the treatment accorded him, is in general true to the facts of history. But there are occasions when either the facts are unknown or they are not clearly stated, to say the least. The author is careful to stress the point "that Jews were rare in the thirteen colonies," that, indeed, "it is safe to say there were never more than one thousand Jews living among the three million and more inhabitants of the colonies." It is, first of all, when the author unfavorably contrasts their status in the mother country with that held in the colonies that the question of scientific research and interpretation arises.

The first chapter, which portrays the life of the Jew in the England of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, leaves the impression of prejudice even though confession is made that "The Jews of England must have considered their lot fortunate when compared with conditions on the Continent." "Marlowe's *Jew of Malta*, and the detestable Jew that Shakespeare drew, were intended to satisfy the appetite of the populace for spiced novelties," we are told. Are we to understand, then, from *The Taming of the Shrew*, that this is the bard's conception of all women? In 1685 "almost half of the members of the London community were arrested for failure to attend church." But this is the period when five hundred Quakers were at one time in London jails while thousands of others were imprisoned in the provinces, and Baptists, chief among them the immortal John Bunyan, suffered similar punishment.

It is when, in contrast, the "Jewish Rights in the Puritan Canaan" (chap. 11) are presented that the impartial spirit of the author is even more in question. As an indication of the generous attitude of the Puritans toward the Jew even our credulity is shocked by the sober information that the "ancient Hebrew passion was there. It gave rise to a Harvard College only a few short years after the first settlements had been made along the shores of Massachusetts Bay." I should like to have the old Puritan divine, Reverend John Cotton of Boston, read those sentences!

Related to this is the statement that "the most distinctive feature of the Harvard curriculum was the emphasis on Hebrew and kindred languages. It is significant that such studies were unknown in the British universities of the day." A strange statement this in view of the one fact alone that the Hebrew Scriptures had been translated into English. John Gorham Palfrey in his authoritative *History of New England* states that "The course of study [at Harvard] had been adopted from the contemporaneous usage of the English universities." G. C. Brodrick in *A History of the University of Oxford* informs us that Henry VIII endowed five professorships in that university: "Divinity, Hebrew, Greek, Medicine, Civil Law"; that for the M.A. degree the student had to study "geometry, astronomy, metaphysics, natural philosophy, Greek, and Hebrew." C. E. Mallet in *A History of the University of Oxford in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* states that in the reign of Edward VI it was ordered that "Hebrew, Civil Law, Philosophy, and Greek were to follow [to be taught] from eight to nine." Both Greek and Hebrew professors were appointed and "Hebrew was valued chiefly for theology." Archbishop Laud laid down rules as to teaching both Greek and Hebrew. Frederick Arnold in his history of *Oxford and Cambridge* calls attention to the great achievements of Edward Pocock and Miles Smith, both of them Hebrew scholars in the seventeenth century. Smith was, perhaps, the chief translator of the Old Testament for the King James Version.

As another proof of Puritan favor toward the Jew, Mr. Goodman cites the case of Solomon Franco, who in 1649 was denied by the court his claim for a certain salary but, being penniless, was "granted . . . an allowance of sixty shillings, to last him ten weeks until he could secure his passage to Holland. As a result, this Jew enjoyed Puritan benevolence." But the author fails to quote the final phrase of the court's sentence: "so he doe it within that time." In spite of Mr. Goodman's effort to intimate otherwise there was no place for the Jew in the Puritan Canaan or Massachusetts Bay.

The status of the Jew in the other colonies is in general true to documentary evidence though in a number of instances the attempt is again unfairly made to contrast colonial conditions with those of the mother country to the discredit of the

latter. In almost all cases the religious authorities resented the presence of the Jew while the civil powers tolerated him for business and financial reasons.

Thus there is so much that is trustworthy in this book, mixed with that which is otherwise from a factual standpoint, that it is difficult to write a review. Let it be said, however, that the "good" overbalances the "bad." R. E. E. HARKNESS

On the Resolution of Science and Faith, by Wendell Thomas, New York, Island Press, ©1946, pp. xii, 300, $3.50.

This is an important, interesting, and very well handled thesis: "science" and "faith" may only be joined by the recovery of a long lost monistic religious philosophy. For this we may, says the author, have to go back beyond Aristotle and Plato to one lonely ancient Greek thinker (Anaximander) and to the old Vedanta philosophy of the East.

The *physis* of Anaximander (sixth century B.C.) was interpreted by him as "the boundless" which issues in opposites and which is fundamentally *theos,* the unlimited reality, the source and ground and the goal of all activity. Unhappily this ancient piece of wisdom was forgotten by both the Greeks and by the oncoming Western world. Succeeding Greek philosophers failed to see this simplest solution of all philosophical, religious, and scientific problems. The big boys—Pythagoras, Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle—were all "blind guides," each setting up false and misleading dualisms. Jesus, like Anaximander, was fundamentally monistic in his outlook. God, he thought, was everywhere present, not far removed, in whom we live, etc., the soul of the world. Man is fundamentally God.

But this simple truth received its Greek interpretation not from a type of monism like that of Anaximander but from the dualisms of mystery cults. On top of all this, came the dualist Paul who helped mightily in the distortion. John's *logos* was an attempt to get back but was unsuccessful in overcoming perverted dualism. Western religious thought never has recovered from all this. More nearly approximate to a fundamentally sound view, *i.e.,* to a monistic theism, is the nondualistic school of the Vedanta which shows how God and creation are one within God—an idea developed in mediæval times by Sankara, "the foremost philosopher of Hindu history."

Naturally, the author finds in Eriugena the spokesman for the cause of monism and theism. Indeed, he says that Eriugena "reached the high-water mark of Christian thinking in the history of Western philosophy." Aquinas fell for the dualism of Aristotle and misled the church further. Spinoza, with not a full measure of success, attempted to break the pattern of dualism and belongs in the tradition of Anaximander, Jesus, and Sankara. George Fox also taught the gospel of divine immanence. Newton helped in this philosophic direction in integrating a broken physical world. Partial contributors to this wholistic foundation for a religious philosophy by which "science" and "faith" are to be made harmonious are such recent writers as Dewey and Morgan and certain scientific theories, such as the unified field theories of the physical sciences (the rapprochement of physics and mathematics, for instance). The remainder of the book is given over to a constructive discussion of categories which may be useful toward harmonizing a religious and philosophic-scientific view of the world, capping it all with a unified social theory.

VERGILIUS FERM

BOOK NOTICES

Rising through the Dust, by Archie R. Crouch, New York, Friendship Press, ©1948, pp. ix, 179, $1.50.

Here is a successful attempt to show that the Christian movement in China has risen in influence and vitality despite all the hindrances created there by violent economic, social, and political storms of the last half century. Those storms were the Boxer uprising of 1900, the overthrow of the Manchus, and the establishment of a republic a few years later, the fierce communistic and antiforeign upheavals in 1926-1927, and the Japanese invasion, 1937-1945, with all the chaos and suffering still prevailing. The author, an American Presbyterian, was barely getting well started in his work in a mission school for boys at Ningpo when the occupation of that city in 1937 by the Japanese caused him to join the famous trek of many thousands of students and numerous teachers to far-western China, where, at points nearly two thousand miles in the interior, their schools could be conducted in safety. From that time he has traveled widely. Twice he flew "over the hump," the ranges of the Himalayas lying between Burma and China. He was welcomed to villages in far-western China and among the wild tribes of the borders of Tibet. Fortunately, the author saw situations and developments with eyes so new to China that he noted the significance of events that might have escaped special emphasis by "old China hands." But the historical background is not overlooked. The adventure of Nestorian pioneers in the seventh century is recognized, and the early efforts of the Roman Catholics, first in the thirteenth century, and successfully since 1580. Not until 1807 did Protestant missionaries begin to reach China. As a result of the longer period of devoted efforts the Roman Catholics claim about four million adherents, while Protestants claim a half million. The book is properly appreciative of the work of so-called faith missions, such as the China Inland Mission, the Missionary Alliance and the Border Mission, whose representatives have done so much evangelistic pioneering in remote regions, but less in large strategic cities and in colleges and universities than the older denominational boards. A great part of the book is given to very brief sketches of the life and service of devout Christians, Chinese and missionary, who are such "good seed" that they may well be called "the sons of the kingdom," and who give evidence that something eternal has been planted in Chinese hearts here and there that bombs and bayonets, famine and fires, cannot destroy. The book confirms this reviewer's personal observations in China as to the witness for Christ which is being given there by humble men and women who have experienced the gospel. In one community, near famous Buddhist shrines on Mt. Omei in China's far west, "such changes in the lives of converts that the non-Christian Chinese on the streets said to one another, 'The Christians' God has come down.'" Several Chinese Christians are portrayed from whose lives light has been shed across the seas. Of special interest is the eagerness of Chinese youth for new light. Of course the place of the schools is recognized, and over against them the fact that about 120,000,000 Chinese young people, one to twenty-five years of age, are illiterate. And there is a desperate need for well-educated clergymen. Young Christians are being trained in conferences, and the movements toward a federation of the churches and interdenominational coöperation go forward. It is an excellent book, with a good picture of the

developing church in China. It would be hard to find another volume of similar proportions containing so much information and encouragement regarding the Christian forces in China.

JAMES H. FRANKLIN

Christian Beliefs, by Ralph E. Knudsen, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1947, pp. 177, $1.75.

This volume concerns what the Christian believes should be evaluated first of all in the light of its purpose. The author expresses that in these words: "This book is not a book of theology but rather an attempt to state our common convictions in simple terms for the layman" (p. 11). And such it turns out to be. It is a systematizing of Christian beliefs about the Bible, the concepts of God therein, Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit, sin, forgiveness, salvation, the church, the kingdom of God, and immortality. The style of writing is simple and direct. The average layman will know what the author means. The book, however, lacks that depth and penetration which are essential if one is to be led on into the areas of full understanding about the primary propositions of Christian faith. Yet, in view of the author's stated purpose, we should have to agree that it is suitable as a first book for Christian believers, young people, and Sunday-school teachers. The critical reader will have difficulty with certain statements and views expressed in the book. He will wonder about the statement that John 20:31 expresses the purpose of the Bible. That it expresses the purpose of the Fourth Gospel none can doubt, but it is extremely doubtful whether Genesis or Hosea or Zechariah were written "that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God." Yet that is the impression the author leaves on p. 13. Again, those who know the various New Testament views of the beginning of Jesus will not feel easy about the exclusive presentation on p. 47 of the miraculous conception to cover this matter. No hint is given that Paul thought Jesus' earthly beginning to be that of one "born of the seed of David according to the flesh" (Rom. 1:3), or one "born of a woman, born under the law" (Gal. 4:4). These and other New Testament views concerning the beginning of Jesus of Nazareth are not even recognized in a footnote. They seem to be serious omissions if one wants to play fair by all New Testament points of view. The reviewer finds almost unpardonable the inability or unwillingness to trace down the authorship of an important quotation. Not even the secondary source from which the author takes it is noted. In connection with a discussion of the miracles of Jesus he cites an American clergyman as saying, "A miracle is God's use of his own law-abiding powers to work out, in ways surprising to us, his will for our lives and for the world." He footnotes this as "Author unknown." The quotation, minus the commas, is from Harry Emerson Fosdick, *The Modern Use of the Bible,* p. 162. Apart from these and other criticisms of a minor nature which might be made, let the book serve its avowed purpose with beginners in the Christian faith. Even with certain deficiencies, it will perform a useful function, giving systematic theological information to those starting the venture of Christian life.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Psychology for Pastor and People, by John Sutherland Bonnell, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xii, 225, $2.50.

The ten chapters of this book are an expansion of the James Sprunt Lectures delivered by the author at the Union Theological Seminary (Virginia) in 1943. So much is being written in these days about the art of counseling that the appearance of a new book on the subject at once raises a question concerning the distinctive character of its contribution to the field. It is no disparagement of the present work

to say that it is primarily a report on the personal experiences of the writer in his relations with people who have come to him for help. Much anecdotal material, drawn from interviews, is set forth with the obvious purpose of establishing a case for the "spiritual counseling" of the minister in contradistinction to the kind of service offered by other types of consultants. The pattern of interpretation adopted is rounded out by numerous citations from a broad field of literature with special attention to relevant selections from the Scriptures. Such treatment of the subject reveals frequent traces of the homiletical habit to which ministers are addicted, and there is some loss in what might have been a more straightforward discussion of counseling method and goals. There is, in short, a transfer of contexts in the sense that the experiences are reported in terms of meanings derived from the reflections of the author rather than the meanings of the people who consulted him. This is a common tendency among religious writers and, in this instance, there is gain in the disclosure of the fact that the relation of the minister to people in distress does possess distinctive characteristics. The book does not add a great deal to the "science" of counseling, but it is testimony to the fact that the minister with a listening ear and responsive heart may have his time and skill put to the test of increasing calls from his people. Perhaps the most important contribution of the work is its studied attempt to advance a movement well under way among religious counselors to emancipate themselves from a too close association with psychiatry.

OREN H. BAKER

A Hundred Years of China Methodism, by Walter N. Lacy, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 336, $3.50.

This reviewer has nothing but praise for this book. It is a first-class historical review of the planting and evolution of Methodism in China. There is a map, a fine table of contents, extensive appendices containing important documents, and a good index. The author, Mr. Lacy, is well prepared for his task, and has used the assistance of able authorities for those areas of the work where he felt inadequate to the assignment. This is the case in the sections on Bishop Bashford and on the Epworth League. But more than remarkable is the list of names of the persons who have read his manuscript and given him guidance in the fields of special knowledge and experience. The names of the guides who have helped him reads like a list of the ablest and best of all the China workers. For this he is to be highly commended. Here is a history that is deserving of the name, for it combines sound knowledge, perspective, and a warm appreciation. This review does not need to outline the work; it is enough to say that it is faithful to its title. And this is not too often the case, many books seeking titles that attract rather than describe. I happen to be writing in Boston; so I note with pride the part which New England Methodists had in getting the work started, but I promise all readers of the book that they will find a fair history and a thrilling presentation. EDWIN P. BOOTH

The Christ of the Poets, by Edwin Mims, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 256, $2.50.

Here is a book that should help to backbone many limp Christians. The retired professor of English at Vanderbilt in Tennessee is a vertebrate believer in Christ the Eternal Son of God and Saviour of men. In a series of brief essays on English and American poets from Spenser to our contemporaries, the latter bunched together, he weighs them for the attention they give to Christ and the things which Christ stands for. Of individual poets Blake and Browning get the longest treatment. The

essays on John Donne and Gerald Manly Hopkins were to me the freshest. The one on Milton satisfied me least. I was thrilled to meet again the admirable Thomas Traherne, who died in 1674, but who did not rise again to live in the literary mind until the "miracle" of his sudden rediscovery in 1896. Needless to say, the Christ of the poets is not of a single recognizable type. The adoring vision of the Catholic Crashaw sees a different Christ from the one Carl Sandburg reveals in his angry blast "To a Contemporary Bunkshooter." Dr. Mims' opening and closing chapters, "Doubt and Faith," and "The Future of Faith," give the book an excellent reflective and prophetic setting. He deplores the fact that no significant living bards have risen to the challenge to faith presented by such sages as Whitehead and Toynbee, men who realize the unique glory of Jesus Christ in the light of modern thought and modern breakdown. Nearly twenty-five years ago this reviewer rose from a certain book with a shout of joy, and he has been commending it to seekers ever since. What a pleasure then to find Dr. Mims winding up his book with a tribute to Paul Elmer More's "Christ the Word"! More's book tells us why Plato would have fallen at the feet of Jesus Christ. Dr. Mims writes simply and solidly, and that is a virtue. At times I wished for more of the poets' own sparkle in his prose. But I cannot but wish such a book well. May it inspire many a man who has gone prosaic through unbelief!

JOHN WOOLMAN BRUSH

Goethe: Two Addresses, by Albert Schweitzer, Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. 75, $2.

Here we have a beautifully printed translation of two addresses by Schweitzer upon Goethe, accompanied by an introduction by Charles R. Joy. The memorial address by Schweitzer at the celebration of the one hundredth anniversary of the death of Goethe in 1932, translated by Joy, leads off, while the response delivered by Schweitzer on receiving the Goethe prize from the city of Frankfort, 1928, translated by C. T. Campion, follows. The latter requires eight pages, the former thirty. Schweitzer's interpretation of Goethe helps round out the data on the great apostle to the Negroes now being gathered so industriously. It adds a revealing evaluation of that grand German writer whose four principal qualities are described as honesty, sincerity, serenity, and kindness. The translator's renderings of Schweitzer's apt quotations from Goethe fail at times to reproduce Goethe's thought. Joy's interpretation of the two Olympians may be summarized: "so much alike in many ways, so profoundly different beneath their likenesses: Goethe brilliant, self-confident, proud, autocratic; Schweitzer simple, humble, lovable, democratic. Goethe . . . the oft-erring but deeply discerning student of life; Schweitzer . . . the sublime exemplar of ethical life."

CONRAD H. MOELMAN

Naw Su, by Harry L. Marshall, Portland (Me.), Falmouth Publishing House, ©1947, pp. 351, $2.75.

Students of Christian missions seem agreed that in Burma, where Adoniram Judson labored and suffered for the greater part of his life, there may be found one of the most inspiring achievements in the development of self-supporting and self-directing churches among primitive peoples. And in all Burma no efforts in that direction seem to have been more successful than those with the Karens, who in their villages of bamboo huts, far removed from the centres of civilization and the highways of travel, came to be known as the "wild cattle of the hills." Their lives were spent in fear not only of the raiding bands of Burmese, their traditional enemies, but of *nats,* or devils infesting the air, and, according to their frightful superstitions, haunting their paths day and night. Moreover, their own taboos

further oppressed them. As a result of work, begun by American missionaries but now taken over largely by the Karens themselves in churches and schools, Karen Christians before World War II totaled some 75,000 or more, the largest Christian racial group in all Burma. The development of the Christian movement among these primitive people, with its many forms of activity carried on now chiefly by the Karens, seems almost incredible. The novel *Naw Su* is particularly valuable for giving us insights into the customs, ignorance, taboos, and devastating fears of a tribal group in which one of the "miracles of modern missions" may now be found. *Naw Su* is a novel, written by a missionary, Dr. Harry I. Marshall, who spent forty years among the Karens. He affirms that the thread of the story is pure fiction, but the incidents are "based on historical facts." A monsoon was raging in the hills of Burma on the night when, in a bamboo hut in Tee Wa village, a girl was born. They named her Naw Su: *su* meaning storm; *naw,* a woman. The name proved prophetic, for the little girl was to encounter storm after storm in life. She was full of mischief, skeptical of *nats* and tribal customs, and bent on knowing more about the outside world. The older women in Tee Wa would shake their heads and say: "That little pullet will not live to lay eggs. The devils will catch her." One day two strangers entered the village with stories of the arrival of white foreigners down country with mammoth guns. They had captured the king and mowed down regiments of Burmese. Another day another stranger came who reported the arrival down country of a "white brother" who proclaimed "one God" and possessed a book that "talked" to those who were educated to read it. It all fitted in with the Karen tradition "that some day He would come back to us and that He would send us the book." All this excited Naw Su. She would learn how to let the book "talk." In time she ran away to a far-off mission school, despite the opposition of her parents. Storm after storm beset her. Struggle after struggle. One struggle resulted in a determination to devote her life to giving new life to her native village. Obstacle after obstacle. Kind missionaries. Rigid, dogmatic missionary. Sympathetic missionary. Love affairs with a schoolboy, who joins the army, and his tragic misstep. Romance continues. Naw Su back at Tee Wa with her vision of service and haunting memories of romance with the soldier. Dr. Marshall's treatment of the romance doubtless conforms to Karen sanctions. As literature and as a novel the book might be stronger. In Christian missions there is often more romance in facts than fiction. The thread of the story is interesting, and the book is very valuable for insights. It will promote interest in Christian missions.

JAMES H. FRANKLIN

Reflections of the Spirit, by Winnifred Wygal, New York, Woman's Press, ©1948, pp. 200, $2.

Periods of worship and meditation are desirable for everyone, but there is always the danger that they will become merely vague wanderings of the attention, without coherence or creativity. Miss Wygal's book seeks to give direction and content to such experiences. Planning her materials for both private and corporate worship, she has prepared twenty-three vignettes: a scripture quotation, a brief comment, quotations from literature, and a prayer. Each treatment is followed by hymns one may use and the sources of all quotations. Blank pages for personal notes and comments are added to each subject. She has explicitly cautioned against their use as routine substitutes for personal worship and has widely avoided making them mere moralizations. The whole tone is above that. A mere glance at the sources of the quotations will convince one of the breadth of her contribution and of the

height and depth of her insight. Of extreme significance is the quality of her own comments; they are pertinent, sensible, incisive, and exploratory without the slightest sacrifice of dignity, worth, and power. Here is a book for jaded palates as well as for discouraged searchers for worship materials that are effective on a high level.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Doing Likewise, by Walter R. Alexander, Nashville, S. S. Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, ©1947, pp. 146, 75 cents.

Here is a book written by the executive secretary of the Relief and Annuity Board of the Southern Baptist Convention to acquaint the denomination with the service ministry of that Board and the benevolent work of the Southern Baptist hospitals and orphanages. It is designed for use in the Baptist adult union study courses on denominational life and, like other volumes in this series, suffers from that great limitation. More than half of the total number of pages is devoted to many and sundry scriptural proofs for these existing organizations in a somewhat stilted systematic fashion, providing little incentive to examine, correct, and better these ministries. But then, that is true of most training school books. The usual theme is present: Sell the coöperative program, but don't *tinker* with it . . . don't seek to improve or correct it! It is a concise statement of what we *are* doing but totally lacks the challenging emphasis on the things we are *not* doing as a denomination. The lists of names and addresses of the state hospitals and orphanages and the brief statistics presenting the rapidly increasing rate of old-age people and orphaned children in the United States will prove valuable to those who use the book. The author hints at many good reasons for the advance of care for the aged and sick but waves these aside as peripheral and, on p. 82, raises *the* question that dominates the book: "But *is* social security justified by the Word of God?" . . . leaving us with the feeling that unless there is a proof text we must let 'em go and take care of themselves. In the reviewer's opinion, certainly more time could have been spent on the present-day challenges confronting these definitely Christian ministries and much less on scriptural sanction. The use of this book, and others like it, may only serve to further our blind encouragement of the *misuse* of the scriptures. The book will call our attention to the fact that these three organizations do exist and are based upon scriptual and human needs but will challenge few of us to evaluate what we now have in the light of what we could have in the service of Christ.

O. EDWYN LUTTRELL

Religion through the Ages, edited by Herman F. Bell and Charles S. Macfarland, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1948, pp. xlvi, 445, $5.

This is an anthology with a difference. Collections are usually made with reference to the author or authors represented, brought into being by the judgment or feeling of the compiler to indicate an era, a type, or a movement. While something of this is necessarily true in the volume under consideration, the unification is based upon the fact that the selections are those that contributed positive elements and examples to the developing theology of Herman F. Bell. Bell graduated from college in 1905, but his chosen profession of the ministry seemed closed to him because, out of the prevailing conflicts of theology, his convictions about the inspiration of the Bible and the Incarnation of Jesus prevented his acceptance by the church and, in truth, his acceptance of the church. He read widely and from authors as varied as the Stoic Epictetus and the Christian St. Augustine; the theologian Calvin and the Quaker Whittier; the romanticist Wordsworth and

the realist Browning. (No twentieth-century author is quoted, which seems somewhat strange for a searcher who lives in that century.) The selections are well chosen for the purpose indicated, and both illustrate the spiritual biography of the compiler and stimulate the thoughts and feelings of the reader.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

High Wind at Noon, by Allan Knight Chalmers, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. 208, $2.50.

When Christian liberalism becomes articulate as positive realism, it is evangelistic in the very best sense of that overworked word. This new book from the facile pen of Dr. Allan Knight Chalmers qualifies on that score. Penetratingly conscious of the unregenerate state of human society, our author nevertheless has faith in the power of the gospel to redeem a lost generation. Without recourse to an orthodoxy of despair he contrives to be wide-eyed and hopeful at the same time. To quote his own words, "It is not by the reason of man, but by the power of his undiscouraged experience, by the profundity of his grasp of the fact that there is no other chance for life to have ultimate meaning than to believe in it to the end, that we understand Jesus' interpretation of life. Christianity means that we venture our all on the Gospel of Perfection which reaches out after us" (p. 47). Replete with incisive illustrations and forceful in the challenge that modern liberalism take Christ seriously in his call to perfection, Dr. Chalmers succeeds in high-lighting the gospel for the twentieth-century Christian. And he does all this in language that is at once salty and compelling. This book is required reading for the tired liberal.

MILTON C. WESTPHAL

More Than We Are, by Margueritte Harmon Bro, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. 144, $1.50.

Prayer is a method of helping us to become more than we are. "Certainly it is plain through experience," writes Mrs. Bro, "that the power of God which is within us and within the one for whom we pray is augmented, freed, activated in prayer." Many practical suggestions are made by which prayer can be a vital and effective experience of contact with God. The author must have young people in mind, for many of her illustrations are drawn from the life of students and young people. Few of the suggestions she makes are new, but there is value in being reminded of the ways in which prayer can be made a more significant experience. One note which is struck at several points in the book is the hint that the individual may have had previous incarnations. "Who knows . . . how much seed sowing and harvesting our soul has known before it took on its present physical dress?" Mrs. Bro brings to her writing a sensitiveness to beauty that gives much of her thinking a poetic touch.

ROLLAND W. SCHLOERB

French Grand Opera: an Art and a Business, by William L. Crosten, New York, King's Crown, 1948, pp. ix, 162, $2.75.

The interested reader will find here an excellent study of a limited period in the history of French opera, and, until he has weighed the book well, it is probable that he will find no more than that—a consideration of the activities of such men as Véron, Meyerbeer, and Scribe during the heyday of so-called "grand" opera. In the light of present-day conditions, however, the book takes on a new importance. In the history of the operatic doldrums preceding 1830 there is a striking resemblance to the sterility of the field in our own day. Although we may deplore the tactics of such a man as Véron (everything that he did was gauged by box office response,

and the resemblance to the "spectacle" technique employed by present-day Hollywood was often startling), his desire to make opera a paying business succeeded and paved the way for a finer school, by rousing the interest of the public enough so that it was willing to support the later artistic achievements of Bizet and Verdi. There are only two serious defects which I find in this book. In his limited consideration of the period of true "grand opera" the author almost entirely excludes the influence of Berlioz, whose operas *Benvenuto Cellini* and *Les Troyannes* are certainly written in the grand style, and which have had a far more lasting influence on musicians than anything Meyerbeer ever wrote. Secondly, the author's consideration of opera as a business far outweighs his discussion of the art, notwithstanding an excellent chapter on the development of the *mise en scène,* and another concerning the libretto. I feel that a series of such books might be written, perhaps by Mr. Crosten himself, each treating of a short period in the history of opera, the whole series to cover the field from mediæval beginnings until the present day. Perhaps this, coupled with a judicious use of showmanship in the opera houses themselves, might resurrect an art which is fast becoming a joke for no very good reason when one considers that there are such contemporary works as *Socrate* of Erik Satie, and *Mavra* of Strawinsky, although, unfortunately, they are rarely, if ever, performed.

THEODORE V. ENSLIN II

The Church Today and Tomorrow, edited by Dave J. Weiand, Elgin (Ill.), Brethren Publishing House, ©1947, pp. 117, $1.

This readable and challenging little volume is intended to interpret the intellectual and spiritual responsibility of the Christian church in these demanding modern times. More specifically, it is the serious effort of members of the Bethany faculty (Church of the Brethren) to declare their concern and faith in such a manner as to make a worthy contribution to the general keenness of the Christian mind and heart. And while the several chapters cover pretty much the whole field of impression and expression in the field of vital religion, there is a heartening pride in the validity of their own way of faith and life. The treatment by Professor Bowman alone on their tradition and present responsibility in the matter of the conflicting authority of state and church is both extraordinary and compelling. The work is, however, far from being a propaganda effort on behalf of an historic "peace church." Its writers give you the feeling that you are sharing in basic philosophy as well as experience in things of superior moment. Such group interpretations of the Christian witness put us under obligation indeed.

IVAN MURRAY ROSE

Poems for the Great Days, compiled by Thomas Curtis Clark and Robert Earle Clark, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 245, $2.50.

For fourteen church and national days of the year the compilers have selected 352 short poems by 192 poets. Emerson, Herbert, Herrick, and Lanier are each represented by one poem; Lowell, Markham, Oxenham, Tennyson, and Whittier by several; the vast majority are relatively little-known poets of our own day who have appeared in magazines, notably the *Christian Century,* and are here represented by only one poem apiece. The material is relatively fresh and unhackneyed, but its use will be largely dependent upon the responsiveness of the user to his immediate needs and his level of appreciation.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

BOOKS RECEIVED

**Reinhold Niebuhr*: Prophet from America, by D. R. Davies, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. xv, 102, $2.

**War, Politics, and Insanity,* by C. S. Bluemel, Denver, World Press, 1948, pp. 121, $2.

**A Pastoral Triumph,* by Charles F. Kemp, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. 120, $2.25.

**How We Got Our Denominations,* by Stanley I. Stuber, New York, Association Press, 1948, pp. 224, $2.50.

**A Greater Generation,* by Ernest M. Ligon, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. xii, 157, $2.50.

**Christianity: How it came to us; What it is; What it might be,* by Charles Edwards Park, Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. 121, $1.75.

**Corpus of Ancient Near Eastern Seals in North American Collections: The Pierpont Morgan Library,* edited by Edith Porada, 2 vols., New York, Pantheon, © 1948, pp. xxvii, 187, pl. 1157, $15.

**America's Spiritual Culture,* by Bernard E. Meland, New York, Harper, © 1948, pp. 216, $2.50.

**Education for Life,* by John O. Gross, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 219, $2.25.

We Hold These Truths, compiled by Stuart Gerry Brown, New York, Harper, 2nd ed., © 1948, pp. xi, 429, $2.75.

A second edition, with some new material, of a convenient book of documents of our American democratic heritage. The first edition appeared in 1941.

**Ancient Christian Writers: St. Augustine's The Lord's Sermon on the Mount,* translated by John J. Jepson, Westminster (Md), Newman Press, 1948, pp. 227, $2.75.

**The Plight of Freedom,* by Paul Scherer, New York, Harper, © 1948, pp. xiv, 227, $2.50.

Paul as Experient, by Henry Burton Sharman, New York, Harper, 2nd impr., © 1948, unpaged, n.p.

A second impression of a little book in which Dr. Sharman sought to aid the searcher to see Paul as he was, through his own words. Words, he feels, are often misleading. To see Paul we must resolutely eschew the word *faith.* Paul's contribution was great; he "learned from experience, not by intellection." The book is unpaged and in the form of a little volume of readings.

**General Evangeline Booth of the Salvation Army,* by P. W. Wilson, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. 264, $3.50.

**The Chinese Student Movement,* by Wen-Han Kiang, New York, King's Crown, 1948, pp. xi, 176, $3.

**Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought,* by H. Dooyeweerd, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1948, pp. ix, 80, $1.50.

**The Bible: the Book of God and of Man,* by James A. Montgomery, Ventnor (N. J.), Ventnor Publishers, ©1948, pp. 108, $2.75.

**God Was in Christ,* by D. M. Baillie, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. 213, $2.75.

**John Hales of Eton,* by James Hinsdale Elson, New York, King's Crown, 1948, pp. 199, $2.50.

**The Critical Theology of Theodore Parker,* by John Edward Dirks, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. ix, 173, $2.25.

**Man and Metaphysics*, by George P. Adams, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. vii, 162, $2.50.

**In Search of a Way of Life*, by Edgar A. Singer, Jr., New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. 97, $1.75.

**The Naturalism of Samuel Alexander*, by John W. McCarthy, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. 111, $2.50.

**The Communication of Ideas*, edited by Lyman Bryson, Institute for Religious and Social Studies (New York), Harper, ©1948, pp. ix, 296, $3.50.

**Rhetoric as a Dramatic Language in Ben Jonson*, by Alexander H. Sackton, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. ix, 182, $2.50.

**The Home of the Rural Pastor*, by Ralph A. Felton, Madison (N. J.), Drew Theological Seminary, ©1948, pp. 111, 40 cents (paper).

**Prospecting for a United Church*, by Angus Dun, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xi, 115, $1.50.

**Greek Piety*, by Martin Persson Nilsson (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press), New York, Oxford University Press, 1948, pp. viii, 200, $4.25.

**Judaism in Theory and Practice*, by Beryl D. Cohon, New York, Bloch, 1948, pp. ix, 243, $3.50.

**Lands of the Cross and Crescent*, by Cyrus H. Gordon, Ventnor (N. J.), Ventnor Publishers, ©1948, pp. 267, $3.75.

**The Christian Faith and Secularism*, edited by J. Richard Spann, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 296, $2.50.

**What Can We Believe?* by Vergilius Ferm, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1948, pp. xi, 211, $3.

**The Inquisition at Albi, 1299-1300*, by Georgene W. Davis, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. 322, $4.

**Trends in Protestant Social Idealism*, by J. Neal Hughley, New York, King's Crown, 1948, pp. xiii, 184, $3.

**The Bhagavadgita*, edited by S. Radhakrishnan, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. 388, $3.50.

**The Symbol of the Faith*, by George Hedley, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. xi, 173, $2.50.

**A Call to What Is Vital*, by Rufus M. Jones, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. ix, 143, $2.

**Science, Faith and Society*, by Michael Polanyi, London (and New York), Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 80, $1.

**Separate Church and State Now*, by Joseph Martin Dawson, New York, Smith, 1948, pp. 220, $2.50.

**Mahatma Gandhi: an Introduction*, by E. Stanley Jones, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 160, $2.

**Social Psychology*, by Wayland F. Vaughan, New York, Odyssey Press, ©1948, pp. xviii, 956.

**Government and the Arts of Obedience*, by William W. Hollister, New York, King's Crown, 1948, pp. 139.

**Sex Laws and Customs in Judaism*, by Louis M. Epstein, New York, Bloch, 1948, pp. x, 251, $3.50.

**Morals and the New Theology*, by H. D. Lewis, New York, Harper, n.d., pp. 160, $2.

**The Pilgrimage of Peter Strong*, by Paul Geren, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. 229 (illustrated), $2.75.

* To be reviewed.

ANNUAL INDEX

I

ARTICLES

By Title

A. A. Bowman on the Validity of Religious Knowledge (*John K. McCreary*), 308
Baptist Looks at Ecumenicity, A (*Howard W. Smith*), 27
Chasid Maggidim, The (*Paul E. Pfuetze*), 144
Christian Approach to the Problem of Human Suffering, A (*J. Calvin Keene*), 207
Church and Schools in America (*F. Raymond Baker*), 193
Delusion of Advaitist Vedantism, The (*Alban G. Widgery*), 51
Elder John Leland (*E. C. Herrick*), 131
Gamaliel and the Fundamentalist (*Morton S. Enslin*), 332
God in the Epistle to the Hebrews (*L. O. Bristol*), 319
How Far Can the Pastor Go in Counseling? (*Seward Hiltner*), 97
I Am a Minister (*Robert E. Keighton*), 303
Indian Thought and Its Metaphysical Goal (*Clarence H. Hamilton*), 117
Liberty of Prophesying," "The (*John W. Brush*), 216
Minister as Artist, The (*Henry W. Foote*), 39
New Relevance of Religion, The (*Edmund A. Opitz*), 202
Our Heritage and Our Future (*Kennard N. Ware*), 289
Physical Universe, The (*Eugene Ayres*), 109
Present Status of Liberalism, The (*Edwin E. Aubrey*), 1
Religion for One World, A (*Nels F. S. Ferré*), 230
Revelation and Mythology (*Elliott Van N. Diller*), 12
Three Letters (*Theodore V. Enslin II*), 224
Too Many Cooks (*James B. Pritchard*), 141
What Is Our Christian Heritage? (*William A. Banner*), 324
Word and the Flesh, The (*Alfred M. Perry*), 241

. . . . . .

Book Notices: 88, 187, 280, 371. *See Index II*
Book Reviews: 59, 156, 253, 341. *See Index II*
Books Received: 95, 191, 287, 379
From Off the Campus and On: 57, 154, 251, 339
Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly: 55, 248, 337

By Authors

Aubrey, Edwin E. (*The Present Status of Liberalism*), 1
Ayres, Eugene (*The Physical Universe*), 109
Baker, F. Raymond (*Church and Schools in America*), 193
Banner, William A. (*What Is Our Christian Heritage?*), 324
Bristol, L. O. (*God in the Epistle to the Hebrews*), 319
Brush, John W. (*"The Liberty of Prophesying"*), 216
Diller, Elliott Van N. (*Revelation and Mythology*), 12
Enslin, Morton S. (*Gamaliel and the Fundamentalist*), 332
Enslin II, Theodore V. (*Three Letters*), 224
Ferré, Nels F. S. (*A Religion for One World*), 230
Foote, Henry W. (*The Minister as Artist*), 39
Hamilton, Clarence H. (*Indian Thought and Its Metaphysical Goal*), 117
Herrick, E. C. (*Elder John Leland*), 131
Hiltner, Seward (*How Far Can the Pastor Go in Counseling?*), 97
Keene, J. Calvin (*A Christian Approach to the Problem of Human Suffering*), 207

Keighton, Robert E. (*I Am a Minister*), 303
McCreary, John K. (*A. A. Bowman on the Validity of Religious Knowledge*), 308
Opitz, Edmund A. (*The New Relevance of Religion*), 202
Perry, Alfred M. (*The Word and the Flesh*), 241
Pfuetze, Paul E. (*The Chasid Maggidim*), 144
Pritchard, James B. (*Too Many Cooks*), 141
Smith, Howard W. (*A Baptist Looks at Ecumenicity*), 27
Ware, Kennard N. (*Our Heritage and Our Future*), 289
Widgery, Alban G. (*The Delusion of Advaitist Vedantism*), 51

II

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

The reviews are arranged alphabetically by authors. The names of the reviewers (in parentheses) follow the titles.

Abelarde, P. E., *American Tariff Policy towards the Philippines—1898-1946* (EARL CRANSTON), 189
Alexander, W. R., *Doing Likewise* (O. E. LUTTRELL), 376
Allis, O. T., *Revision or New Translation?* (M. S. ENSLIN), 362
Arand, L. A. (ed.), *Ancient Christian Writers: St. Augustine's Faith, Hope, and Charity* (M. S. ENSLIN), 276
Aulén, Gustaf, *Church, Law and Society* (D. E. ROBERTS), 341
Baker, G. P., *The Witness of the Prophets* (J. P. BERKELEY), 354
Baker, R. T., *Darkness of the Sun* (J. H. FRANKLIN), 160
Baron, S. W., *Modern Nationalism and Religion* (I. G. MATTHEWS), 156
Baxter, B. B., *The Heart of the Yale Lectures* (J. H. IVEY), 79
Bell, B. I., *A Man Can Live* (MAYNARD CASSADY), 80
Bell, H. F., and Macfarland, C. S. (edd.), *Religion through the Ages* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 376
Bernard, Theos, *Hindu Philosophy* (FRANKLIN EDGERTON), 188
Blackwood, A. W. (ed.), *The Protestant Pulpit* (E. C. HERRICK), 171
Bonnell, J. S., *Psychology for Pastor and People* (O. H. BAKER), 372
Bosley, H. A., *Main Issues Confronting Protestantism* (H. P. VAN DUSEN), 361
Bro, M. H., *More Than We Are* (R. W. SCHLOERB), 377
Brown, N. O., *Hermes the Thief* (E. R. GOODENOUGH), 181
Bryson, Lyman, *et al.* (edd.), *Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture* (MAYNARD CASSADY), 343
Bushnell, Horace, *Christian Nurture* (A. C. KNUDSON), 279
Butler, G. P. (ed.), *Best Sermons, 1947-1948* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 190
Cadbury, H. J., *Jesus: What Manner of Man* (M. S. ENSLIN), 76
Calvin, John, *Commentary on the Epistle of Paul to the Romans* (M. S. ENSLIN), 190
Chalmers, A. K., *High Wind at Noon* (M. C. WESTPHAL), 377
Clark, M. L., and Teall, Briseis, *The Executive Director on the Job* (E. D. EGGLESTON), 94
Clark, T. C. and R. E. (edd.), *Poems for the Great Days* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 378
Clark, T. C., and Perlman, P. B., *Prejudice and Property* (EARL CRANSTON), 347
Coffin, H. S., *God Confronts Man in History* (E. E. AUBREY), 93
Colwell, E. C., *An Approach to the Teaching of Jesus* (H. J. CADBURY), 88
Commager, H. S., *Theodore Parker* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 182
Crosten, W. L., *French Grand Opera* (T. V. ENSLIN II), 377
Crouch, A. R., *Rising through the Dust* (J. H. FRANKLIN), 371
Cuninggim, Merrimon, *The College Seeks Religion* (C. M. BOND), 178
Curtis, M. S., *Their Faith and Ours* (J. B. PRITCHARD), 284

Davidson, R. F., *Rudolf Otto's Interpretation of Religion* (E. S. BRIGHTMAN), 74
Dillistone, F. W., *The Holy Spirit in the Life of Today* (G. W. DAVIS), 89
Dodd, C. H., *The Bible Today* (J. R. BRANTON), 165
The Johannine Epistles (A. C. PURDY), 68
Dodge, G. H., *The Political Theory of the Huguenots of the Dispersion* (W. S. HUDSON), 82
Dunham, J. H., *The Religion of Philosophers* (E. S. BRIGHTMAN), 168
Eakin, M. M. and Frank, *The Pastor and the Children* (H. B. WHITE), 82
Easton, B. S., *The Pastoral Epistles* (M. S. ENSLIN), 275
Farmer, H. H., *God and Men* (E. S. BRIGHTMAN), 158
Ferguson, W. D., *Journey through the Bible* (I. G. MATTHEWS), 187
Ferré, N. F. S., *Evil and the Christian Faith* (W. G. MUELDER), 64
Pillars of Faith (G. W. DAVIS), 259
Frankfort, H., *Ancient Egyptian Religion* (J. B. PRITCHARD), 278
Goldman, Solomon, *The Book of Books* (J. B. PRITCHARD), 255
Goodman, A. V., *American Overture* (R. E. E. HARKNESS), 368
Gordon, E. D. (ed.), *And Let Us Reason Together* (G. G. ATKINS), 170
Gore, Charles, *Prayer and the Lord's Prayer* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 94
Grant, R. M., *The Bible in the Church* (RITTENHOUSE NEISSER), 260
Grayzel, Solomon, *A History of the Jews* (J. B. PRITCHARD), 357
Hagedorn, Hermann, *Prophet in the Wilderness* (C. H. MOEHLMAN), 187
Hammerschmidt, W. W., *Whitehead's Philosophy of Time* (E. M. AUSTIN), 282
Hardman, Oscar, *The Christian Doctrine of Grace* (G. W. DAVIS), 90
Harkness, Georgia, *Prayer and the Common Life* (E. C. HERRICK), 350
Hodgin, E. S., *Confessions of an Agnostic Clergyman* (M. S. ENSLIN), 283
Howells, William, *The Heathens* (F. G. SPECK), 258
Hutchins, W. N., *Discovering Wayside Treasures* (R. N. BACK), 286
Johnson, F. E. (ed.), *Foundations of Democracy* (EARL CRANSTON), 75
Jones, R. M. (ed.), *The Church, the Gospel, and War* (A. C. KNUDSON), 363
Joy, C. R. (ed.), *Albert Schweitzer: an Anthology* (F. W. YOUNG), 264
Katz, Blanche, *La Prise d'Orenge* (W. J. GAINES), 272
Kemp, C. F., *Physicians of the Soul* (A. T. BOISEN), 91
Kessler, H. H., *Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped* (H. B. WHITE), 175
Knight, A. R., and Schroeder, G. H., *The New Life* (C. E. BATTEN), 94
Knox, John, *On the Meaning of Christ* (F. M. DERWACTER), 176
Knudsen, R. E., *Christian Beliefs* (G. W. DAVIS), 372
Kuist, H. T., *These Words upon Thy Heart* (J. B. PRITCHARD), 92
Lacy, W. N., *A Hundred Years of China Methodism* (E. P. BOOTH), 373
Latourette, K. S., *The Christian Outlook* (W. S. HUDSON), 360
Leach, W. H., *Protestant Church Building* (VON OGDEN VOGT), 285
Lee, Umphrey, *Render unto the People* (E. E. AUBREY), 84
Lewis, C. S., *Miracles* (M. C. OTTO), 61
Loescher, Frank, *The Protestant Church and the Negro* (B. E. MAYS), 367
Ludwig, Emil, *Doctor Freud* (SEWARD HILTNER), 262
Malinowski, Bronislaw, *Magic, Science and Religion* (CLYDE KLUCKHOHN), 353
Maritain, Jacques, *The Person and the Common Good* (E. E. AUBREY), 167
Marshall, H. L., *Naw Su* (J. H. FRANKLIN), 374
Martin, A. D., *A Plain Man's Life of Christ* (S. J. CASE), 88
Matthews, I. G., *The Religious Pilgrimage of Israel* (R. H. PFEIFFER), 59
Maus, C. P., *The World's Great Madonnas* (H. R. WILLOUGHBY), 92
McCall, O. W. S., *In Such a Night as This* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 93
McCormick, M. J., *Thomistic Philosophy in Social Casework* (A. P. GUILES), 286
McKenzie, J. G., *Nervous Disorders and Character* (A. T. BOISEN), 86

McNeill, J. T., *Books of Faith and Power* (F. W. BUCKLER), 352
Miller, J. H., and Allen, J. S., *Veterans Challenge the Colleges* (J. M. FOGG, JR.), 90
Mims, Edwin, *The Christ of the Poets* (J. W. BRUSH), 373
Miriam Joseph, Sister, *Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 356
Morgan, B. S., *Skeptic's Search for God* (C. M. BOND), 78
Nelson, W. S. (ed.), *The Christian Way in Race Relations* (EARL CRANSTON), 366
Newton, J. F., *The One Great Church* (J. H. IVEY), 364
Obermann, Julian, *Ugaritic Mythology* (C. H. GORDON), 269
Parker, E. C., *et al., Religious Radio* (C. H. SCHMITZ), 184
Paterson, John, *The Goodly Fellowship of the Prophets* (J. W. FLIGHT), 271
Pierce, E. L., *Therefore Choose Life* (C. E. BATTEN), 190
Pierik, Marie, *The Song of the Church* (H. W. FOOTE), 84
Pope, Liston (ed.), *Labor's Relation to Church and Community* (EARL CRANSTON), 180
Porada, Edith, *Seal Impressions of Nuzi* (S. N. KRAMER), 268
Pouget, William, and Guitton, Jean, *The Canticle of Conticles* (LEROY WATERMAN), 267
Quimby, C. W., *John, the Universal Gospel* (E. W. PARSONS), 177
Rice, A. V., *A History of the World's Young Women's Christian Association* (G. T. AUBREY), 284
Schargo, N. N., *History in the* ENCYCLOPEDIE (J. L. JONES), 273
Schweitzer, Albert, *Goethe: Two Addresses* (C. H. MOEHLMAN), 374
The Psychiatric Study of Jesus (W. E. BUNDY), 351
Scott, E. F., *Paul's Epistle to the Romans* (D. M. BECK), 173
Seaver, George, *Albert Schweitzer: The Man and His Mind* (F. W. YOUNG), 264
Shoemaker, S. M., *Revive Thy Church Beginning with Me* (M. C. WESTPHAL), 365
Sikorsky, I. I., *The Invisible Encounter* (G. W. DAVIS), 280
Simpson, C. A., *Revelation and Response in the Old Testament* (J. B. PRITCHARD), 72
Smart, W. A., *Still the Bible Speaks* (E. W. K. MOULD), 281
Sorokin, P. A., *The Reconstruction of Humanity* (J. S. BIXLER), 280
Starr, E. C. (ed.), *A Baptist Bibliography, Section A* (R. E. E. HARKNESS), 87
Stewart, R. W., *An Introduction to Jesus for the Twentieth Century* (R. C. TUCK), 177
Strong, Mary (ed.), *Letters of the Scattered Brotherhood* (H. M. GEHR), 285
Stuntz, H. C., *The United Nations Challenge to the Church* (W. K. WRIGHT), 283
Suelzer, M. J. (ed.), *Ancient Christian Writers: Julianus Pomerius' The Contemplative Life* (M. S. ENSLIN), 276
Sweet, W. W., *The American Churches* (W. S. HUDSON), 358
Taylor, A. E., *The Christian Hope of Immortality* (J. K. SHRYOCK), 91
Thomas, Wendell, *On the Resolution of Science and Faith* (VERGILIUS FERM), 370
't Hooft, W. A. V., *The Kingship of Christ* (N. F. S. FERRÉ), 257
Thurman, Howard, *The Negro Spiritual Speaks of Life and Death* (J. S. BIXLER), 188
Tillich, Paul, *The Protestant Era* (E. E. AUBREY), 348
The Shaking of the Foundations (E. E. AUBREY), 348
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (I. G. MATTHEWS), 163
Vernier, Philippe, *Not as the World Giveth* (M. C. WESTPHAL), 188
Vidler, A. R., *Witness to the Light* (E. E. AUBREY), 345
Wall, Ernest, *The Sovereign Emblem* (H. M. GEHR), 190
Waterman, Leroy, *The Song of Songs* (W. F. STINESPRING), 266
Waxman, Meyer, *A Handbook of Judaism* (S. V. MC CASLAND), 186
Weiand, D. J., *The Church Today and Tomorrow* (I. M. ROSE), 378
Wieman, H. N., *et al., Religious Liberals Reply* (W. K. WRIGHT), 71
Willoughby, H. R. (ed.), *The Study of the Bible Today and Tomorrow* (G. B. KING), 253
Wygal, Winnifred, *Reflections of the Spirit* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 375
Yoder, Audrey, *Animal Analogy in Shakespeare's Character Portrayal* (R. E. KEIGHTON), 183